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OVERVIEW 
 
This thesis is concerned with the neuropsychology and rehabilitation of 
memory disorders, specifically with the remediation of memory disorders using 
compensatory external aids, and the exploration of the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying memory disorders using a single case approach.  
 
Part 1 of the thesis systematically reviews the existing literature concerning the 
use of external memory aids in the cognitive rehabilitation of memory. In recent 
years there has been increased interest in compensatory approaches using 
external aids (for example diaries or electronic devices) to support memory 
functioning. Part 1 aimed to systematically assess the evidence for the 
effectiveness of this type of approach, and evaluate the state of current 
knowledge about which external aids, which training procedures, and which 
patient characteristics might be associated with the best outcomes.  
 
Part 2 presents a single case with déjà vécu resulting from a head injury, and 
experimentally explores the cognitive mechanisms underlying the condition 
using a neuropsychological single case design.  Déjà vécu is a rare memory 
disorder in which patients have the repeated experience that they have lived 
through the present moment before. However the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying it are poorly understood. Part 2 aims to investigate the cognitive 
basis of déjà vécu with a view to informing both our understanding of normal 
memory processing, and how to rehabilitate memory disorders of this type.  
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Finally Part 3 appraises the work presented, by expanding on methodological 
limitations, and reflecting on the extent to which the study was able to achieve 
the objectives of informing our understanding of normal memory function, or of 
how to rehabilitate déjà vécu and related paramnestic disorders.  
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PART ONE: LITERATURE REVEW 
 
The Use of External Memory Aids in the Cognitive 
Rehabilitation of Memory: A Systematic Review 
  
11 
ABSTRACT 
 
Aims: 
To evaluate the use of external aids in cognitive rehabilitation for memory 
impairment in patients with acquired brain injury resulting from TBI and 
stroke.  
Methods: 
Studies evaluating external aids published up to 2008 were extracted from the 
systematic reviews of cognitive rehabilitation by Cicerone and colleagues 
(Cicerone et al., 2000, 2005, 2011). In addition Medline, PschINFO and CINAHL-
Plus were searched from 2008 up to March 2012. The reference lists of relevant 
articles were scanned to identify any additional studies.   
Results: 
39 studies were reviewed. 12 studies evaluated paper-based aids and 27 studies 
evaluated electronic aids. All studies reported improvements in memory 
functioning associated with use of an external aid, although only one study 
directly compared an external memory aid to alternative memory interventions.  
Conclusions: 
External aids are an effective tool in the rehabilitation of memory impairment 
following TBI and stroke. Further research is required to explore whether 
particular aids are differentially suited to particular types of patient or memory 
problem, and to explore the factors that are predictive of sustained use after 
discharge.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive impairments are common after brain injury, with memory deficits 
being amongst the most frequent complication (Wilson, 2009). Memory 
impairments may involve difficulty recalling information and events from the 
past (retrospective memory) as well as difficulty remembering to carry out 
tasks in the future (prospective memory). As such they have a considerable 
impact upon personal independence and social and vocational functioning. 
Unfortunately memory impairments are also amongst the most complex to 
remediate, as remembering to use a memory strategy is a memory task in itself. 
 
In recent years there has been increased interest in evaluating cognitive 
rehabilitation after brain injury, with a flurry of publications concerned with 
evaluating the efficacy of various cognitive rehabilitation approaches. Cicerone 
and colleagues (Cicerone et al., 2000; 2005; 2011) in a series of systematic 
reviews, have found support for the effectiveness of cognitive rehabilitation 
following traumatic brain injury (TBI) and stroke for a range of cognitive 
impairments, including memory impairment. Practice recommendations and 
standards for the rehabilitation of memory impairment are now starting to 
emerge, although questions remain about which specific interventions and 
which specific patient characteristics might be associated with the best 
outcomes. 
  
Cognitive rehabilitation approaches for memory impairment may be divided 
into restorative and compensatory approaches. Restorative approaches aim to 
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improve memory functioning through repeated memory exercises and drills, 
whereas compensatory approaches involve the use of strategies to circumvent 
memory problems, without aiming to improve memory functioning per se. 
Compensatory approaches may be further subdivided into internal aids (for 
example training in organizational strategies, rehearsal, visual imagery or 
mnemonics) and external aids (for example the use of diaries or electronic 
devices to support memory functioning).  External memory aids may range from 
relatively simple paper-based aids such as lists or schedules up to complex 
technological memory aids (Kapur, Glisky & Wilson, 2004; Wilson & Kapur, 
2009), and are particularly well suited to support prospective memory. As they 
have functional goals, they are key to the aims of the rehabilitation process.   
 
Unfortunately there is little evidence that cognitive remediation is able to 
restore memory functioning once the initial period of spontaneous recovery is 
over (Cicerone et al., 2000; Kapur & Graham, 2002; Ptak, der Linden & Schnider 
2010; Wilson 2005). However there is evidence that functional improvements 
in memory may be achieved through the use of compensatory strategies. 
Cicerone et al. (2011), in their most recent review, recommend the use of 
compensatory strategies (including notebooks and diaries) for mild memory 
impairment as a practice standard, and the use of externally directed assistive 
devices (such as pagers and voice organisers) for moderate to severe memory 
problems as a practice guideline. Similar conclusions about the effectiveness of 
external aids to compensate for functional memory problems have been 
reached in systematic reviews by Cappa et al. (2005), Rees et al. (2007) and 
Piras, Borela, Incoccia & Carlesimo (2011). However due to their wide scope 
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(most deal with cognitive rehabilitation as a whole), these reviews only provide 
very limited detail about studies concerned with the evaluation of external 
memory aids. 
 
Sohlberg et al. (2007) are the only group to have systematically reviewed the 
literature specifically relating to the use of external memory aids, analysing 21 
studies published up to 2003. They found that every study in their analysis 
described improved functioning on memory related activities in association 
with the implementation of external aids. Although the quality of the studies 
was insufficient to support a practice standard, they reiterated previous 
recommendations that the use of external memory aids should be considered a 
practice guideline for individuals with brain injury. However they noted that the 
lack of specificity of issues related to candidacy, selection of aids, training and a 
lack of evaluation of generalised and continued use of aids prevented the 
formulation of more detailed recommendations.  
 
External memory aids are clearly important in the rehabilitation of memory 
impairment. However recent systematic reviews of cognitive rehabilitation as a 
whole have not described the literature on external aids in detail.  Furthermore, 
the most recent review specifically addressing external aids (Sohlberg et al., 
2007), only reviewed papers up to 2003. (Recent reviews of assistive 
technology by de Joode, van Heugten, Ferhey & van Boxtel, 2010, and Gillespie, 
Best & O’Neill, 2012, were not restricted to memory aids and did not include 
non-electronic aids). The aim of the present review was therefore to update and 
evaluate in detail the evidence for the use of external aids in the cognitive 
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rehabilitation of memory impairment. Following Cicerone et al. (2000, 2005, 
2011) the review was concerned with memory impairments resulting from TBI 
and stroke, because these are the most prevalent forms of acquired brain injury 
requiring rehabilitation (Royal College of Physicians and British Society of 
Rehabilitation Medicine, 2003). In particular, the review aimed to evaluate in 
detail the evidence concerning which external aids, which training procedures, 
and which patient characteristics might be associated with the best outcomes.  
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2. METHOD 
 
The inclusion criteria for the present review were as follows:  
1) Articles concerned with rehabilitation of memory impairment  
2) Articles reporting an intervention involving an external memory aid (or if a 
combination of interventions were used, where results relating to the external 
memory aid could be extracted)  
3) Articles where the main participant diagnoses were TBI or stroke (other 
diagnoses were included when these were the minority of participants)  
4) Articles involving adult participants. 
 
Identification of the relevant literature was carried out in three stages. First, 
reference lists from the systematic reviews of Cicerone and colleagues (Cicerone 
et al. 2000; 2005; 2011) were searched to identify articles describing external 
aids for memory rehabilitation published up to 2008. This yielded 23 articles. 
 
Second, in order to identify articles published from 2008 to present, MEDLINE, 
PsycINFO and CINAHL-Plus were searched from 2008 to March 2012 using the 
following strategy:  
 
1)  Subject Headings: Memory OR Memory Disorders OR Amnesia 
  OR 
 Keyword: memory 
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AND 
 
2)  Subject Headings: Rehabilitation OR Cognitive Rehabilitation OR  
 Neuropsychological Rehabilitation or Neurorehabilitation  
  OR 
 Keywords: rehabilitat* or remediat* or compensat* 
 
AND 
 
3)  Subject Headings: Brain Injuries OR Head Injuries OR Traumatic Brain 
Injury OR Cerebrovascular Disorders 
  OR 
 Keywords: brain inj* OR head inj* OR stroke OR vascular 
 
Searches were conducted individually for each database, as available subject 
headings varied between databases. Searches were limited to English language 
journal articles with human subjects. Results were then combined and de-
duplicated. This resulted in 410 different articles. The abstracts or complete 
reports were then reviewed to identify those that met the inclusion criteria. 
This yielded 9 articles published between 2008 and March 2012. 
 
Finally, the reference lists of relevant articles were scanned for additional 
studies not identified in the Cicerone et al. reviews or in the database search. 
This yielded 7 additional articles. 
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In total 39 articles were included in the review.  
 
2.1. Quality Assessment: 
The level of evidence was assessed using the criteria of Cicerone et al. (2000, 
2005, 2011). These are based on previously established criteria for the 
development of evidence-based clinical practice parameters (American 
Association of Neurologic Surgeons, 1995; Woolf, 1992) and similar systems 
have been widely used in systematic reviews evaluating the effectiveness of 
cognitive rehabilitation (Cicerone et al., 2000, 2005, 2011; Cappa et al., 2005; de 
Joode et al., 2010; Sohlberg et al., 2008). Three levels of evidence were 
established:  
Class 1 studies: Well designed, prospective, randomised controlled trials. 
Prospective designs with “quasi-randomised” assignment to conditions, such as 
prospective assignment of participants to alternating conditions, were 
designated class 1a studies.  
Class 2 studies: Prospective nonrandomised cohort studies; retrospective 
nonrandomised case control studies, or clinical series with well designed 
controls that permitted between-subjects comparisons of treatment conditions, 
such as multiple baseline across subjects. 
Class 3 studies: Clinical series without concurrent controls, or studies with 
results from one or more single cases. 
 
Of the 39 studies evaluated, 9 were class 1 (including 5 class 1a studies), 2 were 
class 2 and 28 were class 3.  
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2.2. Abstraction of information: 
Articles were reviewed and the following information was abstracted:  
Participant characteristics: Number of participants, aetiology, time post-injury, 
severity of memory impairment, presence of any other cognitive impairment. 
Intervention characteristics: Type of memory aid, nature and length of training 
and intervention, aim or target function of the intervention. 
Measurement characteristics: Main outcome measures, any assessment of 
quality of life or well-being, whether the results were subject to statistical 
analysis.  
Results: Main results, results relating to quality of life or well-being, results at 
follow-up, additional comments or methodological concerns. 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Paper-based external aids: 
12 studies evaluated paper-based external aids, for example diaries or memory 
notebooks. Three studies reported class 1 evidence, and the remaining nine 
studies were class 3. The key features of these studies are presented in Tables 1 
(participant and intervention characteristics) and 2 (measurement 
characteristics and results).   
Table 1: 
Articles evaluating paper-based aids: Participant and intervention characteristics. NR = Not reported. 
 
Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of memory 
impairment (and 
how categorised) 
Other cognitive 
impairment?  
Type of memory aid 
(and control / 
comparison group) 
Length of training / 
intervention 
Target Function 
          
Ownsworth & 
McFarland 
(1999) 
1 20 15 TBI,  2 
tumour, 2 
infection, 1 
stroke 
4-37 yrs Normal – Severe 
(RBMT)  
NR Diary  
cf.   
Diary + Self-
Instructional Training 
Training delivered by 
letter and 1 telephone 
call. Outcomes monitored 
over 4 weeks of use.  
 
Use of diary; Reduction 
of everyday memory 
problems and 
associated distress 
Schmitter-
Edgecombe et 
al (1995) 
1 8 TBI > 24 mths Majority had normal 
memory functioning  
(only 1 participant in 
each group was 
impaired on WMS / 
RBMT), although all 
scored < 89 on at least 
one subtest of WMS  
 
NR Memory Notebook (+ 
alarm) cf. Supportive 
Therapy 
16 sessions group-based 
training (8 weeks)  
Improvement on lab 
based memory 
measures and reduction 
of everyday memory 
failures and associated 
distress 
Bergquist et al 
(2009) 
1a  14 TBI > 1 yr Normal – Extremely 
Low (RBANS memory 
indices). All had z 
score of -1.0 or lower 
on one memory 
subtest of the RBANS.  
NR Memory notebook  
(Sohlberg & Mateer 
training program cf. 
no specific diary 
training) 
30 online sessions in each 
condition  
Improvement in 
memory functioning 
and related low mood, 
increased use of 
compensatory 
strategies and 
community integration. 
 
Burke et al 
(1994) 
3  1 TBI NR NR (difficulty 
remembering prior 
events and future 
plans, “intermittent” 
capacity for recall) 
Impulse control, aggression, 
social judgement, 
attention/concentration, 
insight 
Memory Book (Case 
study, no control) 
Self awareness training 
followed by diary 
training. Length of 
training NR but 
“extensive” 
 
Use of journal and 
improved memory 
functioning 
Donaghy & 
Williams 
(1998) 
3  2 1 stroke, 1 
tumour 
5 mths Severe (< 0.1 %ile on 
memory measures) 
 Memory Journal 
System cf. Baseline 
5-stage training program. 
S1 took 9 weeks (27 x 30 
min sessions). Training 
failed with S2.  
 
General memory 
compensation (but only 
prospective memory 
assessed).  
Fowler et al 
(1972) 
3  1 TBI  11 mths “Severe memory 
deficit” (no tests 
reported) 
NR Printed schedule of 
daily activities (+ 
alarm)  cf. Baseline 
 
Training / Intervention 
program: 15 weeks.  
Prospective memory 
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Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of memory 
impairment (and 
how categorised) 
Other cognitive 
impairment?  
Type of memory aid 
(and control / 
comparison group) 
Length of training / 
intervention 
Target Function 
          
Kime et al 
(1996) 
3  1 TBI 20 mths Severe (immediate and 
delayed recall and 
recognition measures) 
 
NR Datebook (+ alarm) 
(Case study, no 
control) 
Training; Took > 2 
months to achieve 
independence. 
Use of datebook 
McKerracher 
et al (2005) 
3  1 TBI 1 yr Moderate (RBMT) Language, attention, 
concentration, planning,  
Memory notebook 
(Sohlberg & Mateer 
version cf. Donaghy & 
Williams version) 
Training: 5 x 10 min 
sessions across 1 day. 
Notebooks assessed 
across 4x2 week 
intervention periods 
(ABAB design).  
 
Prospective memory 
Sohlberg & 
Mateer (1989) 
3  1 TBI NR Severe (WMS and 
RAVLT) 
Executive, attention, visuo- 
spatial processing deficits 
Memory notebook. 
(Case study, no 
control). 
 
4 stage training program 
that took 6 months 
Use of notebook 
Squires et al 
(1996) 
3  1 Stroke  8 mths Severe (WMS, ROCFT, 
RAVLT, RMT,  
Executive Memory notebook cf. 
Baseline 
2 stage training program: 
10 sessions “acquisition”, 
8 sessions “application”  
 
Reduction of repetitive 
questioning  
Zencius et al 
(1990) 
3 6  TBI 6 yrs, 8 yrs, 
NR for 4 
patients 
No information on 
memory impairment 
reported 
Executive Memory notebook cf. 
3 internal memory 
strategies (written 
rehearsal, verbal 
rehearsal, acronym 
formation) and no 
intervention 
 
Training: prompted to 
enter information into 
notebook (no training to 
use independently). 
Outcome evaluated over 2 
trials per condition 
New learning 
Zencius et al 
(1991) 
3  4 TBI  NR No information on 
memory impairment 
reported 
Probable frontal / executive 
impairments in 1 patient with 
reported behavioural 
difficulties  
Memory notebook cf. 
Baseline 
Training: prompted to 
enter information into 
notebook (no training to 
use independently). 
Outcome evaluated over 
5-9 days 
 
Prospective memory 
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Table 2:  
Articles evaluating paper-based aids: Measurement characteristics and results 
 
Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality 
of Life / 
Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
 
Ownsworth 
& McFarland 
(1999) 
 
1) No. diary entries 
2) Daily memory 
checklist of commonly 
experienced memory 
problems (self-rating) 
3) Ratings of helpfulness 
of strategy use (self-
rating) 
 
1) Distress 
ratings 
associated 
with daily 
memory 
failures 
2) Weekly 
mood scale 
 
F tests and 
t tests 
 
1) No difference in overall no. diary entries 
between diary only (DO) and Diary + Self 
Instructional Training (DSIT) groups, but 
DSIT group showed better maintenance of 
no. entries over 4 week treatment period. 
2) Sig. reduction in memory problems 
during treatment cf. baseline. No difference 
in memory problem score between DO and 
DSIT groups, but DSIT group showed 
greater reduction in memory problem score 
during treatment.  
3) Both groups rated strategies as more 
helpful in treatment than baseline. DSIT 
group showed greater increase in 
helpfulness ratings.  
 
 
1) Distress was 
reduced in both 
groups, no differential 
effect of training.  
2) Reductions in 
Depression-Dejection, 
Fatigue-Inertia and 
Confusion-
Bewilderment in both 
groups, with a greater 
decrease in confusion - 
bewilderment in DSIT 
group.   
 
None 
 
Both groups showed a sharp 
decrease in diary entries after 
week 1 and continuing 
reduction in entries to week 4.  
Schmitter-
Edgecombe 
et al (1995) 
1) Laboratory-based 
recall tests (Logical 
Memory & Visual 
Reproduction, WMS-R) 
2) Laboratory-based 
everyday memory tests 
(RBMT, modified to allow 
note-taking during 
administration) 
3) Retrospective report of 
everyday memory 
failures (EMF) using 
Everyday Memory 
Questionnaire 
(Sunderland et al 1983) - 
average of participant 
and carer rating 
4) Observed reports of 
EMFs - daily record of 
EMQ items for 7 days -  
average of participant 
and carer rating.  
Symptom 
distress rated 
using Global 
Severity 
Index from 
Symptom 
Checklist 90 - 
Revised 
(Derogatis, 
1980) 
F tests  Conservative analyses: Those in notebook 
group had significantly fewer observed 
EMFs post-treatment than those in 
supportive therapy group.   
 
Less conservative analyses: Observed EMFs 
significantly decreased pre-treatment to 
post-treatment in notebook group. 
Retrospective report of EMFs significantly 
decreased in supportive therapy group.  
 
No differences on any lab-based measures 
No significant 
reduction in symptom 
distress in either 
group  
6 month follow-
up. 
 
Conservative 
analyses: No 
group differences. 
 
Less conservative 
analyses: 
Retrospective and 
observed EMFs 
significantly 
reduced in 
notebook group at 
6 month follow up 
 
3 Ss reported 
continued use of 
notebook at 
follow up. 
 
  
23 
Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality 
of Life / 
Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Bergquist et 
al (2009) 
1) Memory scale of 
Neurobehavioural 
Functioning Inventory 
(NFI, completed by 
patient and family 
member) 
2) Compensation 
Techniques 
Questionnaire items 
related to calendar use 
(completed by patient).  
 
1) Mood scale 
of NFI 
(completed 
by patient 
and family 
member) 
2) 
Community 
Integration 
Questionnaire  
Non 
parametric 
analysis of 
difference 
scores 
from 
beginning 
to end of 
each 
condition 
No significant differences between training 
and no training condition. But across entire 
60 session intervention there was a 
significant improvement in family ratings of 
memory problems, and in patient ratings of 
use of compensatory techniques. 
Significant 
improvement in family 
ratings of mood across 
entire 60 session 
intervention (no 
differences between 
training and no 
training condition). No 
sig. results on 
Community 
Integration 
Questionnaire 
between conditions or 
over whole 60 session 
intervention 
None Differences between the 
training conditions may have 
been masked by crossover 
design.  
 
64% of participants who 
completed the program were 
already using a compensatory 
aid prior to study, compared 
to only 17% of those who 
dropped out – may indicate 
that online delivery of 
rehabilitation programs is 
more suited to a higher 
functioning group, or those 
already oriented to using aids.  
 
Burke et al 
(1994) 
Anecdotal None None After extensive training, participant 
reported to review his journal 
independently each evening, and to be more 
organised, less overloaded with 
information, less confused and more 
receptive to feedback from others.  
 
N/A None Anecdotal case report: no 
data.  
Donaghy & 
Williams 
(1998) 
Pre- and post- 
intervention performance 
on 10 prospective 
memory tasks to be 
carried out across a 5 day 
period, and anecdotal 
report.  
Functional 
Assessment 
Measure 
(FAM) 
None Patient 1: 6/10 prospective memory tasks 
completed at baseline, 10/10 after memory 
journal training. Anecdotally reported to be 
90-100% successful in recording 
medications, and making greater number of 
independent entries in diary (from 18 per 
week at baseline to 42 post training)  
No change on psychometric measures of 
memory. 
 
Patient 2: 2/10 prospective memory tasks 
completed at baseline. Journal training 
failed. 2/10 prospective memory tasks 
completed at discharge 
 
Patient 1: FAM 
improved from 4 to 5  
 
Patient 2: no change in 
FAM rating (3) 
None Attributed failure of memory 
journal training in patient 2 to 
reduced awareness of memory 
deficit.  
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality 
of Life / 
Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Fowler et al 
(1972) 
Attendance at therapy 
appointments  
None None Baseline: anecdotal report that patient 
never attended appointments unless he was 
reminded. 
Weeks 1 and 2 (schedule + timer): patient 
attended 42/47 apps; Weeks 3+4 timer was 
phased out and schedule was used alone: 
patient attended 40/42 apps 
Weeks 5 onwards: patient spontaneously 
obtained his own appointment book and 
started to use this independently.  
 
N/A None  
Kime et al 
(1996) 
1) Percentage compliance 
checking datebook when 
cued by chime 
2) No. entries under 
action record in datebook 
3) No. cross references in 
datebook 
4) No. separate entries in 
monthly calendar. 
Measured first 21 days of 
treatment, last 21 days of 
treatment (after 64 days 
in program) and 3 follow 
ups 
5) Standardised measures 
of memory: WMS, ROCFT, 
CVLT, CBPMT 
None None 1) Over the 2 month training program 
compliance checking the datebook in 
response to the chime increased from 
47.6% with therapist prompting, to 100% 
with no prompting.  
2) Action records increased from 4.86 
entries per day to 8.05 entries per day, but 
still required prompting from therapist or 
family. 
3) Cross references reduced from 0.57 per 
day to 0.33 per day, but still required 
prompting from therapist or family. 
4) Use of monthly calendar declined 
throughout training (but see follow up 
data).  
5) Standardised measures: No change on 
WMS, ROCFT or CVLT. CBPMT increased 
from 40% on admission to 90% on 
discharge due to note-taking strategy. 
N/A Follow up of diary 
use 4, 7 and 13 
months post-
discharge. 
 
Checking, action 
records and cross 
referencing were 
all maintained 
throughout follow 
up.  
Patient also 
spontaneously 
started to use the 
calendar section 
of notebook again 
after discharge 
and at 13 month 
follow up was 
making 40 entries 
per month. 
 
Authors comment on 
importance of being part of a 
comprehensive rehabilitation 
program including MDT 
working and psychotherapy. 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of 
Quality of 
Life / Well-
being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being results Follow-up Comments 
        
McKerracher 
et al (2005) 
Performance on 5 
prospective memory tasks 
per week 
Beck 
Depression 
Inventory 
None Significantly better performance 
with the Donaghy & Williams 
diary (15/20 tasks completed) 
than with the Sohlberg & Mateer 
diary (1/20 tasks completed) 
 
RBMT profile score reduced from 
11 to 10 (both moderate memory 
impairment) 
Increase on BDI over the 
course of the study (39-45) 
due to adverse life events, 
but no significant change 
during diary use (scores of 
38/39/40). 
None Superior results for Donaghy & 
Williams diary were attributed 
to not having to move between 
sections. 
 
Training period was much 
shorter than original Sohlberg 
& Mateer or Donaghy & 
Williams studies.  
 
One of the only papers to 
comment on anxiety and low 
mood and the effect this may 
have on rehabilitation.  
 
Sohlberg & 
Mateer 
(1989) 
Anecdotal None None Successful use of book after 6 
months and maintained at 6 
month follow up with 
significantly greater 
independence.  
 
Standardised testing showed 
mild-moderate gains in attention 
and delayed recall after 
distraction (not using book), still 
profound limitations in memory 
and new learning 
 
At study entry patient 
required 24 hour support in 
a group home. At follow up 
patient was living alone 
with 1 hr assistance, 
managing sheltered 
employment, and referred 
for paid employment 
training. 
Consistent use of 
memory notebook 6 
mths after 
discharge.  
 
Significant “real-world” 
outcome. 
 
But no data on which aspects of 
memory functioning were most 
improved, or any ongoing 
problems. 
 
Not reported if use of memory 
notebook at follow up was 
independent or reliant on cues.  
Squires et al 
(1996) 
Daily incidences of 
repetitive questioning 
(recorded by wife) 
None t-tests pre-
post 
Significant reduction in repetitive 
questioning after diary training 
 
Some improvement in visual 
memory on WMS. Verbal and 
delayed indices remained the 
same. No improvement on other 
standardised tests.  
Carer strain reported to be 
reduced. 
 
Reported to still be 
using notebook on 
"subsequent 
unannounced visits" 
but time lapse not 
reported. 
 
Patient remained reliant on 
wife to make entries in 
notebook 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of 
Quality of 
Life / Well-
being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being results Follow-up Comments 
        
Zencius et al 
(1990) 
Recall of 6 items of 
information  from 3 job 
adverts (employer, job title 
and level of experience / 
education needed) 
None None 1 patient performed well at 
baseline and across all 
interventions.  
Others benefited most from 
notebook. 
 
Group mean recall: 
Baseline: 2.2/6 components 
recalled.  
Written rehearsal 2.0 / 6 
components 
Verbal rehearsal 3.0/ 6 
components. 
Acronym formation 3.3 / 6 
components 
Notebook 5.9 / 6 components 
 
N/A None Only paper to directly compare 
to external to internal 
compensatory strategies. 
 
But potential confounds due to 
order effects (conditions not 
adequately counterbalanced) 
and repeated recall of the same 
information. (Details of 
procedure insufficient to allow 
evaluation) 
 
Zencius et al 
(1991) 
No. components of 
homework assignments 
completed correctly (each 
homework assignment 
consisted of meeting a 
named person at a certain 
place and time and turning 
in a written assignment) 
None None Improvement in prospective 
memory performance in all 
participants with use of memory 
notebook. At baseline average no. 
components completed for each 
participant was 1, 1.2, 0 and 0. 
With memory notebook this 
improved to 3, 3, 2.8 and 1.5. 
N/A None Smallest improvement was in 
patient with executive / 
behavioural difficulties. 
 
Some concerns about reporting 
of data (query number of trials 
per participant and 
inconsistent reporting of 
performance for participant 3) 
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3.1.1. Participant characteristics:  
In all, 60 participants were studied, the majority of whom were TBI patients (n = 
52; other diagnoses were stroke n=3, tumour n=3 and infection n = 2).  
Participants varied in time post-injury, from 5 months to 37 years, and this 
information was not reported in three studies. There was a wide range in 
severity of memory impairment, with some participants having severe 
impairments, but others falling into the normal range on standardised memory 
testing. In most cases severity of impairment was categorised according to 
standardised measures such as the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test 
(RBMT) or the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS). In one case standardised 
measures were not reported but a clinical description of memory impairment 
was provided (Burke, Danick & Dugin, 1994). However in two cases there was 
no mention at all of memory impairment in the description of the participants 
(Zencius, Wesolowski, & Burke, 1990; Zencius, Wesolowski, Krankowski & 
Burke, 1991). Only half of the studies specified whether their participants also 
suffered from other cognitive impairments in addition to memory impairment. 
Of those that provided this information, all had additional executive 
impairment.  
 
3.1.2. Intervention characteristics:  
Eleven studies evaluated the use of a diary or “memory notebook”. One study 
evaluated the use of a simple printed schedule of daily activities (Fowler, Hart & 
Sheehan, 1972). Three studies used an alarm to alert participants to consult 
their diary or schedule (Schmitter-Edgecombe, Fahy, Whelan & Long, 1995; 
Fowler et al., 1972; Kime, Lamb & Wilson, 1996). Most studies compared use of 
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the paper aid to baseline or to a “no intervention” condition. One study 
compared two methods of diary training (Ownsworth & McFarland, 1999), one 
compared diary training to supportive therapy (Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 
1995), and one compared two types of memory notebook (McKerracher et al. 
2005).  Only one study directly compared the use of an external aid to 
alternative memory rehabilitation approaches (Zencius et al., 1990). This study 
compared use of a memory notebook to three internal memory strategies: 
written rehearsal, verbal rehearsal and acronym formation.  
 
Length of training varied widely between studies, from one day (McKerracher, 
Powell & Oyebode, 2005) to six months (Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989). The 
components of the training programmes also varied, with some authors offering 
detailed protocols for diary training (Burke et al., 1994; Donaghy & Williams, 
1998; Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989).  Others offered key additions to traditional 
training, for example “self-instructional training” (Ownsworth & McFarland, 
1999) or “self-awareness training” (Burke et al., 1994). Most studies used 
traditional one-on-one therapist-led training, but one study used group-based 
training (Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995) and two studies used “distance” 
training: Bergquist et al. (2009) evaluated the provision of online training using 
Instant Messenger, and Ownsworth & McFarland (1999) delivered their 
instructions by letter and a follow up telephone call. The aims of training also 
varied. Most studies aimed to teach participants to use their external aid 
independently. However in the two studies by Zencius and colleagues (Zencius 
et al., 1990, 1991) participants were prompted to enter the information into 
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their notebooks in the presence of the experimenter, and no attempt was made 
to teach participants to use their aids independently.  
 
The aims of each study varied, two simply aimed to establish use of the external 
aid (Kime et al., 1996; Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989), three targeted prospective 
memory (Fowler et al., 1972; McKerracher et al., 2005; Zencius et al., 1991), one 
targeted reduction of repetitive questioning (Squires, Hunkin & Parkin, 1996), 
one targeted new learning (Zencius et al., 1990), and five aimed to more 
generally improve memory functioning and related distress (Ownsworth & 
McFarland, 1999; Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995; Bergquist et al., 2009; 
Burke et al., 1994; Donaghy & Williams, 1998). 
 
3.1.3. Measurement Characteristics:  
The most frequent outcome measures were performance on prospective 
memory tasks (four studies), measures relating to use of the external aid (three 
studies) and checklists of everyday memory failures (three studies). Of the 
studies that used this type of checklist, two employed self-ratings (Ownsworth 
& McFarland, 1999; Bergquist et al., 2009), and two employed ratings derived 
from both self- and significant other-ratings (Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995; 
Bergquist et al., 2009). One study reported behavioural ratings (of repetitive 
questioning, Squires et al., 1996) and one study reported recall of newly learned 
information (Zencius et al., 1990). Six studies included standardised tests of 
memory amongst the outcome measures (Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995, 
Donaghy & Williams, 1998, Kime et al., 1996; McKerracher et al., 2005, Sohlberg 
& Mateer, 1989; Squires et al., 1996). Only one study included participant 
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ratings of the helpfulness of the aid (Ownsworth & McFarland, 1999). Two 
single case studies did not employ formal outcome measures, instead presenting 
anecdotal reports of the participants’ response to diary training (Burke et al. 
1994, Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989).  
 
Only five studies included measures assessing quality of life or well being. Two 
studies evaluated the impact of their interventions on symptom distress 
(Ownsworth & McFarland, 1999, Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995), three 
studies evaluated impact on mood ratings (Ownsworth & McFarland, 1999, 
Bergquist et al., 2009, McKerracher et al., 2005), one study evaluated impact on 
community integration (Bergquist et al., 2009) and one study evaluated impact 
on cognitive and psychosocial disability (FAM, Donaghy & Williams, 1998).  
 
Only four of the twelve studies conducted statistical analysis of their results: 
these were the three class 1 studies (Bergquist et al., 2009; Ownsworth & 
McFarland, 1999; Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995) and one class 3 study 
(Squires et al., 1996) which employed pre- and post- comparisons. 
 
3.1.4. Results:  
All twelve studies reported positive outcomes associated with use of an external 
aid, strongly supporting the use of paper-based external aids in the 
rehabilitation of memory impairment. However in some cases there were 
additional factors or methodological concerns which affected interpretation of 
the results.  
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Class 1 studies: 
A class 1 randomised controlled trial by Ownsworth & McFarland (1999) 
reported a significant reduction in memory problems whilst using a diary 
compared to baseline. Moreover they reported that particular benefit was 
associated with the addition of “Self instructional training” (an executive 
strategy encouraging identification of a goal, selection of a strategy, 
implementation of the strategy, and checking of the outcome) to ordinary diary 
training. They reported that self instructional training was associated with 
better maintenance of diary use and greater reduction of memory problems 
than diary training alone. However both groups showed a sharp decrease in 
diary use from weeks 1-4 of the intervention, casting some doubt on the success 
of the intervention as a whole. It was unclear whether the diary was truly 
adopted or maintained in either group, and this may have been related to a 
much shorter training period than that reported in other studies.  
 
Another class 1 study by Schmitter-Edgecombe et al. (1995) reported that 
participants who had undergone 16 sessions of group memory notebook 
training had significantly fewer observed everyday memory failures post-
treatment than those who had undergone 16 sessions of group supportive 
therapy. Unfortunately this group difference was not maintained at 6 month 
follow-up (although less conservative analyses did indicate that everyday 
memory failures in the notebook group remained significantly lower than 
baseline observations).  
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Bergquist et al. (2009) set out to evaluate the outcome of 30 sessions of memory 
notebook training compared to 30 sessions involving no specific diary training, 
in a randomised crossover trial (class 1a study).  They found no significant 
differences between the training and no training conditions. However 
differences between the conditions may have been masked by the crossover 
design. Importantly, they did report that over the entire diary intervention 
(consisting of both types of training), there was a significant improvement in 
family ratings of memory problems, and in patient ratings of use of 
compensatory techniques, demonstrating positive results for the external aid in 
general. 
 
Class 3 studies: 
Amongst the class 3 studies, successful outcomes associated with the use of 
paper-based external aids included improvement in prospective memory 
functioning (Donaghy & Williams, 1998; Fowler et al., 1972, Zencius et al., 
1991), successful independent use of a diary (Burke et al. 1994; Donaghy & 
William, 1998; Fowler et al., 1972; Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989), and reduction in 
repetitive questioning (Squires et al., 1996). The results of McKerracher et al. 
(2005) indicated that a simplified diary (modelled on that of Donaghy & 
Williams, 1998) may be more successful than a more complex version (Sohlberg 
& Mateer, 1989). 
 
However there were also some negative results. Donaghy & Williams (1998) 
reported that diary training failed in one of their participants, and this was 
attributed to reduced awareness of deficit. It was also notable in the study by 
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Zencius et al. (1991), that the patient who showed least benefit from their 
memory notebook intervention was the patient whose description indicated 
executive difficulties.  
 
In general there was no significant improvement on standardised tests of 
memory (Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 1995, Donaghy & Williams, 1998, 
McKerracher et al., 2005, Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989; Squires et al., 1996), 
confirming that external aids are a compensatory rather than a restorative 
approach. Kime et al. (1996) reported an increase in scores on the Cambridge 
Behavioural Prospective Memory Test (CBPMT), but this was due to the 
participant adopting a note-taking strategy. 
 
In the only paper to directly compare external memory aids to alternative 
memory rehabilitation strategies, Zencius et al. (1990) reported superior recall 
of information using a memory notebook compared to three internal strategies 
(written rehearsal, verbal rehearsal or acronym formation). However due to 
potential confounds in their procedure (which appeared to involve repeated 
recall of the same information, and in which recall using the notebook always 
occurred after at least 6 previous recall trials), the level of evidence is less 
strong than would be desirable.  
 
Quality of Life / Well-being: 
Results relating to the impact of paper-based external aids on quality of life or 
well-being were mixed. Ownsworth & McFarland (1999) reported a significant 
reduction in distress ratings associated with everyday memory failures, in both 
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their “Diary Only” (DO) and “Diary + Self Instructional Training” (DSIT) groups. 
They also reported reductions in Depression-Dejection, Fatigue-Inertia and 
Confusion-Bewilderment in both groups, with a greater decrease in Confusion-
Bewilderment in the DSIT group. Bergquist et al. (2009) reported a significant 
improvement in family ratings of mood, and Donaghy & Williams (1989) 
reported a small improvement in FAM rating for one of their participants. 
Anecdotal reports also described increased independence (Sohlberg & Mateer, 
1989) and reduced carer strain (Squires et al., 1996) associated with the use of 
paper-based external aids.  
 
However Schmitter-Edgecombe et al. (1995), despite reductions in everyday 
memory failures, found no reduction in symptom distress in either their 
Memory Notebook or Supportive Therapy conditions.  Similarly, McKerracher et 
al. (2005) reported no improvement in BDI scores during diary use, and 
Bergquist et al. (2009) found no significant improvement on their Community 
Integration measure. 
 
Follow-up: 
Only four of the twelve studies reported follow-up data, but these were largely 
positive. Schmitter-Edgecombe et al. (1995) found that although group 
differences between the memory notebook and supportive therapy conditions 
were not maintained at 6 month follow up, everyday memory failures in the 
notebook group remained significantly lower than at baseline. Three of their 
eight participants reported that they were still using the notebook at this time. 
Kime et al. (1996) reported that diary use in their single case was maintained at 
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4, 7 and 13 months post-discharge, Sohlberg & Mateer (1989) reported that 
their patient had maintained consistent use of her memory notebook 6 months 
after discharge, and Squires et al. (1996) reported that their patient was still 
using his notebook on “subsequent unannounced visits”, although he was reliant 
on his wife to make the entries for him. It is notable that the training in all these 
cases was fairly lengthy, lasting between 8 weeks and 6 months.  
 
Summary: Paper-based aids 
Three class 1 studies and nine class 3 studies reported positive results, with 
negative findings in a small number of participants attributed to executive 
difficulties. Findings related to quality of life were mixed. Follow-up was reported 
in four studies that had employed longer training periods, with generally positive 
results. 
 
3.2 Electronic external aids: 
27 studies evaluated the use of electronic external aids. Six studies reported 
class 1 evidence, two studies were class 2, and the remaining nineteen were 
class 3. The key features of these studies are presented in Tables 3 (participant 
and intervention characteristics) and 4 (measurement characteristics and 
results).  
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Table 3:  
Articles evaluating electronic aids: Participant and intervention characteristics. NR = Not reported 
 
Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of memory 
impairment (and how 
categorised) 
Other cognitive 
impairment?  
Type of memory aid 
(and control / 
comparison group) 
Length of training / intervention Target 
Function 
          
Fish et al 
(2008) 
1a 36 Stroke Mean 3.3 yrs 
(min 6 mths) 
NR (but in original study 
RBMT group mean was 
moderately impaired, with 
range normal – severely 
impaired) 
 
NR (but inclusion 
criterion was memory 
and / or planning 
problems) 
Paging system cf. 
Baseline (ABA) 
Training: Short trial to see if 
participants could read message 
and press response button. 
Outcome assessed over 7 weeks 
with pager. 
Prospective 
Memory 
Wilson et al 
(2005) 
1a 63 TBI  Mean 5.3 yrs 
(min 6 mths) 
NR (but in original study 
RBMT group mean was 
moderately impaired, with 
range normal – severely 
impaired) 
 
NR (but inclusion 
criterion was memory 
and / or planning 
problems) 
Paging system cf. 
Baseline (ABA) 
Training: Short trial to see if 
participants could read message 
and press response button. 
Outcome assessed over 7 weeks 
with pager. 
Prospective 
Memory 
Wilson et al 
(1997) 
2 15 10 TBI, 3 
stroke, 1 
tumour, 1 
colloidal cyst 
 
6mths - 13 
yrs 
Mild - severe (RBMT) NR Neuropage cf. 
Baseline (ABA) 
No training. Outcome assessed over 
12 weeks with pager. 
 
Prospective 
Memory 
Hersh & 
Treadgold 
(1994) 
3 16 TBI 3-12 yrs Mild to severe (measure NR) NR Study 1: Neuropage cf. 
Baseline  
Study 2: Neuropage cf. 
Log sheet Baseline 
(ABA). TBI cf. Healthy 
Control. 
 
Training: 2 hrs to learn and 2-3 
days to proficiency for 
programmer. A few minutes to 
learn to use receiver. Outcome 
assessed over 1 week with pager. 
 
Prospective 
Memory 
Kirsch et al 
(2004) 
3 1 TBI  NR Borderline - Extremely Low 
(WMS) 
NR - query some 
executive impairment 
Pager cf. Baseline 
(ABA) 
No Training. Outcome assessed 
over 9 weeks with pager.  
 
Prospective 
Memory 
Wilson et al 
(1999) 
3 1 TBI 7 yrs Severe (RBMT) No Neuropage cf. 
Baseline (ABA) 
1 training session. Outcome 
assessed over 7 weeks with pager.  
Prospective 
Memory 
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Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of 
memory 
impairment 
(and how 
categorised) 
Other cognitive impairment?  Type of memory aid (and 
control / comparison 
group) 
Length of training / 
intervention 
Target Function 
          
Dowds et al 
(2011) 
1a 36 TBI NR Normal – 
severely 
impaired (WMS).  
NR 2 types of Personal Digital 
Assistant cf. Paper Planner 
and Baseline  
Brief training 
(instructed to input 
assignments). Outcome 
assessed over 2 1-week 
periods with device 
(ABCDABCD design).  
 
Prospective 
memory 
Thone-Otto 
& Walther 
(2003) 
2 12 6 TBI, 3 stroke, 1 
systemic lupus 
erythematosus, 2 
“other neurological 
disease”  
> 28 mths Normal - 
moderately 
severe (WMS) 
NR Personal Digital Assistant 
and Mobile Phone with 
agenda function cf.  
Baseline 
Training: Up to 5 x 1 hr 
sessions. Outcomes 
assessed over 2 week 
intervention periods 
with each device. 
 
Prospective 
Memory 
Gentry et al 
(2008) 
3 23 TBI 1-34 yrs Poor – Impaired 
(RBMT-E) 
NR Personal Digital Assistant 
cf. Baseline 
3-6 90 min training 
sessions. Outcome 
assessed over 8 weeks 
with PDA. 
Everyday memory 
performance / 
Participation in 
everyday life 
tasks 
 
Giles & 
Shore 
(1989) 
3 1 Stroke 18 mths Moderate (WMS) No Personal Digital Assistant 
cf. Pocket Diary and No 
Aid.  
Training: 4 hrs 
individual training, 6 
hrs practice with 
relatives, 1 further 
month of use until 
proficient. Data 
collected over 2 day 
period. 
 
Prospective 
memory 
Kim et al 
(1999) 
3 1 TBI  2 mths NR Executive dysfunction, 
cognitive-linguistic deficits, 
attention and organisation 
impairments 
 
Personal Digital Assistant 
(Case report no control) 
No training. Device 
programmed by staff.  
Prospective 
Memory 
Wright et al 
(2001) 
3  12 Predominantly TBI 
(other aetiologies not 
reported ) 
2-12 yrs 4 Severe, 6 Slight 
impairment, 2 
Average (RBMT) 
5 had executive impairments 2 types of Personal Digital 
Assistant (no control)  
Training: 1 session and 
manual. Outcome 
assessed over 8/10 
weeks with each device. 
Use of aid / 
Prospective 
Memory 
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Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of 
memory 
impairment 
(and how 
categorised) 
Other cognitive impairment?  Type of memory aid (and 
control / comparison 
group) 
Length of training / 
intervention 
Target Function 
          
Hart et al 
(2002) 
3 10 TBI  3 mth - 18 
yrs 
Severe memory 
deficits affecting 
functioning 
(clinical opinion) 
 
Numerous (including 
executive impairments) 
Voice Organiser (cf. No 
Organiser) 
Up to 3 training 
sessions. Outcome 
assessed after 1 week. 
Memory for 
therapy goals 
van den 
Broek et al 
(2000) 
3 5  2 stroke, 1 TBI, 2 
encephalitis 
19-54 mths Poor – Severely 
Impaired 
(RBMT)  
NR  Voice Organiser cf. 
Baseline (ABA) 
Training NR. Outcome 
assessed over 3 weeks 
with voice organiser. 
 
Prospective 
memory 
van Hulle & 
Hux (2003) 
3 3 TBI  14 mths, 7 
yrs 14 yrs 
NR 2 had executive impairments Digital Voice Recorder and 
Watch Alarm cf. Written 
Reminders  
Training NR. Outcome 
assessed over max. 2 
weeks with each aid. 
 
Prospective 
memory 
Yasuda et al 
(2002) 
3 8 4 TBI, 3 stroke, 1 
tumour 
2-25 mths Moderate-Severe 
(WMS) 
Some had executive 
impairments 
IC Voice Recorder cf. 
Baseline (ABA) 
No training. Device 
programmed by 
experimenter. Outcome 
assessed over variable 
periods with device (1 
week to 3 months). 
 
Prospective 
memory 
Culley & 
Evans 
(2010) 
3 11 9 TBI, 2 anoxic brain 
injury 
3 mths - 16 
yrs 
NR NR Mobile Phone (text 
message) cf. No Mobile 
Phone  
No training. Outcome 
assessed after 1 week 
and 2 weeks with 
mobile phone.  
 
Memory for 
therapy goals  
Stapletone et 
al (2005) 
3 5 TBI 5-26 yrs 1 Poor, 1 
Moderate, 3 
Severe (RBMT) 
4 had severely impaired 
attention and comprehension 
speed, 3 had executive 
impairment 
Mobile phone (reminder 
function) cf. Baseline 
(ABAB) 
No training. Outcome 
assessed over 2 
intervention periods 
with phone (7 weeks 
and 2 weeks in ABAB 
design) 
 
Prospective 
memory 
Wade & 
Troy (2001) 
3 5 3 TBI, 2 stroke  1-15 yrs 4 Moderate, 1 
Severe (RBMT) 
All had executive impairment, 
2 had language impairment 
and 1 had 
attention/concentration 
impairment.  
Mobile phone (voice 
messages)cf. Baseline  
No training. Outcome 
assessed after 12 weeks 
with mobile phone 
Prospective 
memory 
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Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of 
memory 
impairment 
(and how 
categorised) 
Other cognitive impairment?  Type of memory aid (and 
control / comparison 
group) 
Length of training / 
intervention 
Target Function 
          
McDonald et 
al (2011) 
1a 12 4 TBI, 4 stroke, 1 
anoxic BI, 1 
encephalitis, 1 toxic-
metabolic 
encephalopathy, 1 
AVM 
 
15 - 231 
mths 
Normal - 
significant 
impairment  
(RBMT) 
5 had executive impairment Google online electronic 
calendar and linked text 
alerts sent to mobile phone 
cf. Standard Diary and 
Baseline 
1 x 90 min training 
session for each aid. 
Outcomes evaluated 
over 5 week period with 
each aid. 
Prospective 
Memory 
Lemoncello 
et al (2011) 
1a 23 16 TBI, 5 stroke, 1 
anoxia, 1 tumour 
> 1 yr NR Some executive difficulties Television Assisted 
Prompting (audiovisual 
messages delivered to TV) 
cf. Usual Practice 
 
No training. Outcome 
assessed over 2 x 2-
week periods (ABAB) 
Prospective 
memory 
Kirsch et al 
(1992) 
3 4 TBI  1-10 yrs Immediate 
verbal and visual 
recall > 2D below 
mean (WMS) 
Executive dysfunction  in all  "Interactive Task 
Guidance" (cues delivered 
on a computer screen) cf. 
Written Instructions 
 
Orientation provided in 
first trial of each 
condition. Outcome 
assessed over variable 
no. trials per subject.  
 
Vocational task 
(cleaning 
bathroom and 
waiting room) 
Brindley et 
al (2011) 
3 1 TBI  7 yrs NR NR SenseCam cf. CBT 
Automatic Thought 
Records and No Strategy  
Training NR. Each 
method used at a single 
event. 
Recall of anxiety 
related trigger 
events in CBT for 
anxiety 
 
Shum et al 
(2011) 
1 45 TBI  Mean 9 
mths 
(minimum 
NR) 
NR (but severe 
amnesia was an 
exclusion 
criteria) 
NR Diary or Organisational 
device.  
Compared 4 training 
conditions: 
1) Self Awareness Training 
(SAT) + Compensatory 
Prospective Memory 
Training (CPMT), 2) SAT 
plus active control 3) 
active control plus CPMT, 
4) active control only. 
 
 
 
8 weekly sessions 
training  
Prospective 
Memory 
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Author Class  N Aetiology Time 
postinjury 
Severity of 
memory 
impairment 
(and how 
categorised) 
Other cognitive impairment?  Type of memory aid (and 
control / comparison 
group) 
Length of training / 
intervention 
Target Function 
          
Fleming et al 
(2005) 
3 3 TBI  2 mths, 4 
mths, 12 
mths 
NR NR Diary or electronic 
organiser (patient choice) 
cf. Baseline 
 
8 week training 
program.  
Prospective 
Memory 
Boman et al 
(2007) 
3 8 6 TBI, 2 stroke 2-16 yrs Poor - Moderate 
(RBMT) 
Attention, working memory, 
problem solving. 
Training apartment cf. 
Baseline 
Training over initial 3 
weeks in apartment (1-
2 hrs, 4-5 times 
weekly). Stay of 4-6 
months.  
 
Everyday memory 
performance, 
Change in 
independent 
function and QOL 
 
Boman et al 
(2010) 
3 14 Stroke / TBI 2-41 mths Normal - 
Moderate 
(RBMT) 
NR Training apartment (Day 1 
cf. Day 4) 
Training over initial 4 
days in apartment. Stay 
of 5 days. 
 
Ability to use aids. 
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Table 4: 
Articles evaluating electronic aids: Measurement characteristics and results 
 
Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Fish et al 
(2008) 
Performance on 4-7 
tasks per day selected 
with patient and carer 
(e.g. taking medication, 
meal preparation).  
Recorded by patient and 
carer daily in memory 
diary 
None Odds ratio for 
individual 
performance, non-
parametric 
analysis for group 
comparisons  
Group results: Significant 
improvement in completion of 
everyday tasks with pager, 
with performance returning to 
baseline when pager 
withdrawn.  
 
Individual results: 33/36 
patients showed a significant 
improvement with pager (2 
improved but not significantly, 
one got worse). After removal 
70% showed significant 
decrease in performance.  
 
N/A None Return to baseline after 
withdrawal associated with 
executive impairment.  
Wilson et al 
(2005) 
Performance on 4-7 
tasks per day selected 
with patient and carer 
(e.g. taking medication, 
meal preparation).  
Recorded by patient and 
carer daily in memory 
diary 
None Odds ratios for 
individual 
performance,  chi 
square for group 
analyses 
Group results: Significant 
improvements in completion of 
everyday tasks with pager. Also 
some maintenance of effect 
after withdrawal with 
significant decline in 
performance but not to 
baseline levels.  
 
Individual results: 81% 
improved with pager (6% 
significantly worse with pager). 
After removal 46.67% showed 
significant decrease in 
performance. Better 
maintenance of effect was 
associated with better 
executive function (reported in 
Fish et al, 2008) 
 
 
Reported increase in 
level of independence 
e.g. one participant 
used pager to manage 
business meetings.  
None 7 week intervention 
appeared sufficient to 
establish a routine that could 
be maintained after 
withdrawal of pager.  
 
Authors report unsuccessful 
interventions in cases where 
a) patient felt there was 
nothing wrong b) patient so 
dependent on others that 
they are unable to carry out 
any activities independently, 
and c) carers / relatives felt 
they should do the 
reminding rather than a 
pager.  
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Wilson et al 
(1997) 
Performance on 1-7 
tasks per day selected 
with patient and carer.  
None Odds ratios Significant increase in tasks 
achieved (from 37.08% in 
baseline to 85.56% during 
treatment). Change was 
significant at group level and 
also for each individual.  
 
After removal of pager, 74.74% 
tasks achieved. Some 
individuals returned to 
baseline, others had almost no 
decline from treatment level.   
 
Anecdotal reports of 
increased 
independence, e.g. one 
patient able to return to 
college, another no 
longer needed full time 
carer.  
None Results indicated different 
responses to pager, with 
some participants  
maintaining benefits after 
removal of pager but others 
needing it in the longer term 
to maintain benefits.  
Hersh & 
Treadgold 
(1994) 
Study 1: attendance at 
rehabilitation groups 
and personalised targets 
e.g. domestic chores, 
medication.  
 
Study 2: telephone calls 
to voice mail 3 times per 
day. 
None Study 1: None 
Study 2: F tests  
Study 1: attendance at group in 
the 4 participants increased 
from 10% to 70%, 30% to 
100%, 50% to 100% and 70% 
to 100%.  On personalised 
targets, improvements ranged 
from 50% to 100%.  
 
Study 2: Significantly higher 
compliance with phonecalls 
and significantly better 
temporal accuracy with 
Neuropage than written log. 
Return to baseline when 
withdrawn.  
Performance of TBI patients 
with Neuropage did not differ 
from Healthy Controls.  
 
N/A None  
Kirsch et al 
(2004) 
Percentage of therapy 
appointments recorded 
in daily planner. 
None None Performance increased from 
22.38% of therapy 
appointments recorded at 
baseline, to 93.57% with pager. 
Performance returned to 
baseline after withdrawal.  
 
 
N/A None  
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Wilson et al 
(1999) 
Performance on 7 target 
behaviours (e.g. 
preparing dinner, 
remembering keys) 
recorded by patient 
(with help from carer).  
Caregiver Strain 
Index 
None Performance of targets 
increased from 48% at baseline 
to 87% with pager.  
After withdrawal, performance 
dropped to 70% (performance 
declined on 4 tasks but was 
maintained or further 
improved on 3).   
 
Carer strain was 
significantly reduced 
with pager.  
Anecdotal report of 
increased 
independence and 
reduced care needs.  
Pager returned to 
patient for 
extended trial: 80% 
of original targets 
that were still 
meaningful were 
achieved at 1 mth, 
100% at 2 mths.  
Number of pager messages 
required reduced as routines 
established. 
 
Dowds et al 
(2011) 
Call to voice mail 5 x per 
week plus 3 time related 
tasks, personalised to 
each participant, with 
completion reported by 
telephone call to 
research office  
None Negative binomial 
regression 
Baseline 27% completion;  
Paper planner 26% 
completion; 
Microsoft PDA 38% 
completion;  
Palm PDA 56% completion 
 
Both PDAS were significantly 
better than baseline, but Palm 
was significantly better than 
Microsoft.  
 
Gender, age and performance 
on cognitive measures did not 
predict success rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A None Even the best rates of 
performance were still quite 
low at 56%.  
 
Messages were input for 
participants, so performance 
did not depend on ability to 
master the device. Study did 
not evaluate how much 
training would be necessary 
to do this. 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Thone-Otto 
& Walther 
(2003) 
1) 20 experimental 
tasks, 2) patient-
recorded everyday 
forgotten intentions, 3) 
no. functions learnt on 
device, 5) no. intentions 
entered into device by 
patient, 6) satisfaction 
rating 
None Yes (test not 
reported) 
No comparison of results from 
from PDA and mobile phone – 
data collapsed together. 
 
Number of experimental tasks 
and everyday intentions 
forgotten reduced with 
memory aids cf. baseline, but 
difference did not reach 
significance.  
 
Some participants more able to 
learn functions than others, 
and this group favoured the 
PDA over the mobile phone.  
 
Ability to learn functions 
correlated with WMS scores.  
N/A None Some concerns about data: 
Performance appears to be 
at ceiling even at baseline 
(mean forgotten 
experimental tasks 0.12%, 
and mean 0.36 forgotten 
intentions per day).  
 
Only a subset of results are 
reported. 
 
Everyday forgotten 
intentions was a self-report 
measure, and therefore 
potentially unreliable.  
 
Both PDA and mobile phone 
were reported by 
participants to require too 
many steps to enter 
information, and to have 
keys that were too small.  
 
Gentry et al 
(2008) 
Rating of 5 deficits in 
everyday life related to 
memory impairment 
(e.g. forgetting 
appointments) as 
assessed by Canada 
Occupational 
Performance Measure 
(COPM, completed 
jointly by patient and 
carer) 
Participation in 
everyday life tasks 
as assessed by Craig 
Handicap 
Assessment and 
Rating Technique - 
Revised (CHART-R, 
completed jointly by 
patient and carer) 
Paired t tests, 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Significant improvement on 
COPM ratings of everyday 
performance related to 
memory impairment, and on 
satisfaction with this 
performance, 8 weeks after 
training.  
Significant 
improvement on rating 
of cognitive 
independence, mobility 
and occupation scales 
(CHART-R) 8 weeks 
after training, but not 
on physical 
independence, social 
integration or economic 
self sufficiency scales  
Outcomes assessed 
after 8 weeks of 
independent use, 
post training 
All participants reported 
prior knowledge of 
computers for email and 
web, and also reported using 
some kind of aid prior to 
study (e.g. sticky notes or 
appointment calendars). 
 
Although PDA showed 
positive effects over and 
above these, a positive 
outcome may also be reliant 
on pre-existing willingness / 
general orientation to using 
aids 
 
  
45 
Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Giles & 
Shore 
(1989) 
10 household chores to 
be completed over 
weekend at home – 
completion and time 
completed logged by 
patient 
None None Baseline 0 tasks completed. 
With pocket diary 8/10 tasks 
performed, 6 on time. With 
PDA 9/10 tasks performed, all 
on time 
N/A Patient still using 
PDA effectively in 
everyday life 3 
months after study 
 
Task completion and time of 
completion logged by patient 
which could be unreliable  
 
Superior performance with 
PDA over pocket diary 
attributed to alarm, but 
participant actually 
performed relatively well 
with diary given severity of 
baseline performance.  
 
Participant relatively high 
functioning other then 
memory deficit - IQ in 
normal range, insight into 
deficits and only mild 
difficulties in initiating 
behaviour. 
 
Kim et al 
(1999) 
Anecdotal - attendance 
at therapy sessions and 
independently asking for 
medication 
None None From first day with PDA, 
participant arrived on time to 
all therapy sessions and was 
able to ask for all medications 
on his schedule - 100% 
performance 
 
N/A None  
Wright et al 
(2001) 
1) Use of aid 
2) Self report of memory 
failures in “no-aid” phase 
that participants 
reported they would 
have used the PDA for 
None Yes - various 1) Participants made approx. 3 
entries per day and rated 
usefulness of PDA as 6.5/10.  
 
2) Only 3 people recorded 
forgetting things in “no aid” 
phase that they would have put 
into computer.  
 
No correlations between 
psychometric measures and no. 
of diary entries.  
 
N/A None No objective assessment of 
impact on memory. Data 
could indicate that only 25% 
benefited from PDA, but may 
also a reflect a problem with 
self report measure.  
 
5 participants dropped out 
(may have found it more 
difficult to use / less helpful 
than those reported)  
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Hart et al 
(2002) 
Free and cued recall of 6 
therapy goals - 3 
recorded and played 3x a 
day on voice organiser, 3 
unrecorded.  
None Friedman / 
Wilcoxon signed 
ranks tests 
Significantly greater recall of 
recorded than non-recorded 
goals after 7 days.  
Clinician report that 69% of 
recorded goals were associated 
with progress in rehabilitation, 
cf 22% non-recorded goals. 
NA None Even where voice organiser 
did not improve free recall it 
did have an impact on cued 
recall, so still has application 
for severe memory 
impairment.  
 
One of few studies to 
evaluate an outcome other 
than prospective memory.  
 
All participants reported 
liking the device and said 
they would use it again.   
 
van den 
Broek et al 
(2000) 
1) Passing message to 
relative after 9 hour 
delay. 
2) 4 domestic chores to 
be carried out 
throughout week.  
Positive and 
Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) 
None 1) All 5 participants showed 
improved performance on 
message passing with the voice 
organiser (mean increase from 
2.4/24 to 18.2/24). 
2) 4/5 participants showed 
improved performance on the 
domestic chore measure (mean 
increase from 3.8/12 to 
10/12). 
 
Most participants’ performance 
returned to baseline after 
removal of aid, but 
performance was at least 
partially maintained in 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No change on PANAS. None  
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
van Hulle & 
Hux (2003) 
Independence in 
requesting medication 
from staff 
None None A different pattern was 
observed for each participant: 
 
P1: achieved 56% in first 
written reminder, 74% with 
watch, then achieved 4 days 
100% performance in second 
phase with written reminders 
(voice recorder not employed).  
 
P2: achieved 3 days 100% 
performance in first written 
reminder phase (intervention 
discontinued, neither watch or 
voice organiser employed).  
 
P3: No systematic 
improvement with any aid. 
 
 
N/A None Treatment was terminated 
when a participant showed 
100% independent 
performance over 3-4 days, 
so not all conditions 
completed, and no 
assessment of maintenance 
beyond 3-4 days. 
 
Authors comment that 
responses to aids are unique 
and that interventions are 
best targeted to the 
individual.  
 
Failure to benefit from aids 
in P3 was attributed to lack 
of motivation to be 
independent 
Yasuda et al 
(2002) 
Completion of daily task 
(diary writing, letter 
writing or physical 
exercise)   
None None Voice recorder was effective for 
only 5/8 participants. Of these, 
1 showed maintenance of effect 
after withdrawal, 1 showed 
reduced effect, 3 returned to 
baseline 
N/A None Variable length of treatment, 
some only had 1 week,  
 
Voice recorder had no effect 
in 3/8 patients – attributed 
to executive dysfunction and 
initiation problems in 2 
cases, but reason for failure 
unclear in 3rd.  
 
Culley & 
Evans 
(2010) 
Free and cued recall of 6 
therapy goals – 3 sent by 
text message 3x a day, 3 
unsent.  
None Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test and 
correlation effect 
sizes 
Participants recalled 
significantly more therapy 
goals in text than no text 
condition, at 7 days and 14 
days, and majority of 
improvement had occurred in 7 
days.  
N/A None Some participants reported 
that regular alerts also had a 
general orienting function, 
prompting orientation to 
time, taking stock of  what 
they were doing, and goal 
oriented behaviour 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Stapletone 
et al (2005) 
Performance on daily 
target behaviours 
selected with participant 
and carer. Performance 
recorded by carer (and 
also by participant in 2 
cases) 
None None 3 participants showed no 
improvement, 2 participants 
showed improvement from 
around 55% at baseline to 
around 90% with mobile 
phone. Gains were maintained 
in 1 patient even when mobile 
phone was removed.  
 
N/A None Those who did not improve 
had more severe memory 
and executive impairments. 
Wade & 
Troy (2001) 
Performance on 1-6 
target behaviours 
selected with participant 
and carer. Performance 
recorded by carer  
None None Improvement in all 
participants: 
P1: 5% - 100% and remained 
at ceiling after phone removed 
P2: 63% to 100%  
P3: 48% to 92% 
P 4: 43% to 100%  
P 5: 3% - 81% 
 
Carers reported 
decreased burden. 
Authors comment on 
potential of mobile 
phones to increase 
independence, as they 
are also a means of 
contact in emergency.  
Maintenance of 
effect after 
withdrawal 
reported in 1 
patient (although 
period of follow-up 
not reported) 
 
McDonald 
et al (2011) 
Performance on target 
activities selected with 
participant and carer. 
Performance rated by 
family member. Range 3-
59 tasks, e.g. taking 
medication, completing 
domestic chores 
None Multilevel poisson 
regression models  
Significant improvement in 
prospective memory 
performance in combined 
intervention phases vs baseline 
(improvement of 58% - 69%). 
Google calendar superior to 
normal diary (82% vs 55%). 
 
Individual data showed 8/10 
showed superior performance 
with Google calendar compared 
to standard diary, 2/10 showed 
no difference.  
Authors comment that 
aid increases 
independence as 
patients are less reliant 
on prompting from 
carers. 
None Group data shows worse 
performance with standard 
diary compared to baseline, 
although this result is not 
commented upon.   
 
11/12 participants were 
already using external 
memory aids on recruitment 
to study. Although they were 
asked to stop using these for 
the baseline period, positive 
results may reflect a pre-
existing orientation to using 
external aids. 
 
Those who benefited least 
were those with more severe 
memory and executive 
impairments. 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Lemoncello 
et al (2011) 
Performance of 6 tasks:  
2 preferred, 2 
nonpreferred (chosen 
with client and carer) 
and 2 experimental (call 
to voicemail system and 
diary entry). Completion 
of non-experimental 
tasks logged by client or 
carer.   
None Mixed Model 
ANOVA 
Significant advantage of 
Television Assisted Prompting 
(TAP, 72% completion) over 
usual practice (43% 
completion), and return to 
baseline when TAP removed. 
 
No difference between 
preferred and non-preferred 
tasks 
 
N/A None  
Kirsch et al 
(1992) 
Subunits of vocational 
task scored (cleaning 
bathroom and waiting 
room) 
None None 2 participants benefited from 
computerised instruction (S1: 
55.28% to 78.26% correct; S2: 
64.47% to 86.11%) with return 
to baseline on removal. 
1 participant did not benefit 
(performance was already 
good with written 
instructions). 1 participant had 
equivocal results.  
N/A None Performance was accurate 
enough for real world job 
performance but remained 
very slow.  
 
Choice of task perhaps 
unmotivating - 4 participants 
dropped out.  
 
Potential confound related to 
written instructions being 
presented all together whilst 
computerised instructions 
were presented one step at a 
time. Positive effects may 
have been achieved with flip 
cards without requiring 
computer.  
 
Authors highlight potential 
for computers to provide an 
errorless learning 
experience.   
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Brindley et 
al (2011) 
1) Proportion 
“information units” from 
each event recalled 
correctly across 7 trials 
1-4 weeks later  
2) Affective response 
(heart rate) 
3) Nature of recalled 
information,  
None Of heart rate  data 
only 
Significantly higher proportion 
of autobiographical events 
recalled in SenseCam condition 
than Automatic Thought 
Record or No Strategy 
conditions, and associated with 
more specific emotional 
elements. No differences 
between conditions in heart 
rate.  
 N/A None Designed to evaluate impact 
on therapy rather than 
everyday memory.  
 
Only 1 event per condition, 
events may have varied in 
salience.  
 
Automatic Thought Record 
condition was associated 
with less recall of 
autobiographical events than 
no strategy condition. 
 
Shum et al 
(2011) 
1) Cambridge 
Prospective Memory 
Test (CAMPROMPT), 
(performance of 3 time 
based and 3 event based 
prospective memory 
tasks) 
2) No. diary entries 
related to everyday 
prospective memory 
tasks 
3) Frequency of 
everyday memory lapses 
as measured by Part A of 
the Comprehensive 
Assessment of 
Prospective Memory 
(CAPM, carer ratings),  
Sydney Psychosocial 
Reintegration Scale 
(SPRS) 
Nonparametric 
analysis of 
difference scores 
(post-pre scores) 
1 &2) Significant 
improvements in CAMPROMPT 
performance and diary entries 
with compensatory prospective 
memory training (CPMT) plus 
active control. On CAMPROMPT 
change was both statistically 
and clinically significant, with a 
move from “poor” to “average” 
functioning. 
 
Contrary to hypothesis, the 
addition of self awareness 
training did not significantly 
improve functioning. 
 
3) No change on carer-rated 
frequency of everyday memory 
lapses in any group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No change on SPRS None Severe amnesia was an 
exclusion criteria.  
 
Lack of change on CAPM 
measure may indicate that 
results of program were not 
having an impact in real life. 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Fleming et 
al (2005) 
 
 
1) Psychometric testing 
(Memory for Intentions 
Screening Test, MIST)  
2) Self report of 
prospective memory 
functioning (Part A of 
Comprehensive 
Assessment of 
Prospective Memory 
(CAPM)  
3) Assessment of diary 
use  
Sydney Psychosocial 
Reintegration Scale 
(SPRS) 
None 1) All participants improved on 
MIST 
2) Mixed results for CAPM: 
some slight reductions in 
prospective memory failures, 
some slight increases.  
3) Weekly diary entries 
increased from 27-82, 0-5 and 
0-6. 
SPRS showed better 
community integration 
for 2/3 participants 
2 mth follow up of 
diary entries. 
P1 was making 
approx. 5 entries 
per day, P2 was 
making approx. 1 
entry per day, P3 
was making approx 
1-2 entries per day.  
 
Authors comment 
that generalisation 
is greatly aided by 
involvement of a 
carer.  
Not clear whether 
improvement in MIST scores 
is clinically significant.  
 
2 patients were studied soon 
after injury so improvement 
may reflect spontaneous 
recovery.  
 
Self reported prospective 
memory problems did not 
reliably improve. May reflect 
increased awareness of 
memory problems as a result 
of training.   
 
Follow up of diary use was 
self report so potentially less 
reliable. 
 
Boman et al 
(2007) 
1) Canadian 
Occupational 
Performance Measure 
(COPM) - self perception 
of change in 
occupational 
performance on 5 
activities most important 
to client.  
2) Experimenter rated 
ability to learn to use 
aids independently.  
3) Participant ratings of 
usefulness of each aid 
and ease of learning 
Sickness Impact 
Profile (SIP), Quality 
of Life Visual 
Analogue Scale 
(both self-rated) 
Wilcoxon matched 
pairs signed ranks 
test 
1) COPM showed significant 
improvement in self perceived 
performance and satisfaction 
with performance after 
intervention (improvement in 
7/8 participants).   
 
Large variation in time 
required for participants to 
learn how to use aids: 2-24 
weeks (participants with 
greater memory impairment 
took 4 weeks longer to learn to 
use aids, and relied on 
checklists to guide their use).   
 
All aids rated as useful and easy 
to learn by participants.  
 
 
Significant 
improvement in body 
care and psychosocial 
functioning scales of 
SIP.  
Significant 
improvement in self 
perceived QOL. 
 
Authors comment on 
potential for increased 
independence and 
ability to live in own 
homes for longer. 
None Participants had to be 
independent or in need of 
minimal assistance on FIM to 
be included – this may 
exclude group for whom aids 
would be most helpful. 
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Author Outcome Measure (s) Ax of Quality of 
Life / Well-being  
Statistical 
analysis 
Results QOL / Well-being 
results 
Follow-up Comments 
        
Boman et al 
(2010) 
1) Daily rating of no. 
reminders needed to 
recall how to operate the 
aids 
2) No. alarms activated 
by failure to close or turn 
off equipment.  
None Wilcoxon matched 
pairs tests, 
Spearman rank 
order correlation 
1) Significant improvements at 
a group level in learning to use 
the aids from day 1-4 (3 
participants achieved 
independent use, but 3 failed. 
2) Significant improvement at 
group level in remembering to 
turn off TV but no 
improvement in remembering 
to close terrace door or 
windows, turn off refrigerator, 
stove or water. These failures 
did not correlate with 
performance on RBMT (even 
those in normal range on RBMT 
forgot these things to a 
significant extent).  
N/A None High functioning sample – 
study excluded severe 
memory impairment and 
participants needed to be 
independent on FIM – this 
may exclude group for whom 
aids would be most helpful. 
 
Alarms did not improve 
learning, i.e. no restorative 
effect, but presumably still 
had a compensatory effect 
(response when alarm 
sounded).  
 
Data on diary and address 
book aids not reported.  
 
Unclear which factors were 
associated with failure to 
learn to use aids. Lack of 
correlation between RBMT 
and failures indicates need 
for real life evaluation of 
memory failures before 
discharge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
3.2.1. Participant characteristics:  
In all, 374 participants were studied. Of those participants where aetiology was 
reported, 283 were TBI patients and 61 were stroke patients. Participants 
varied in time post-injury, from 2 months to 34 years, minimum time post-
injury was not reported in three studies. There was a wide range in severity of 
memory impairment, with some participants having severe impairments, but 
others falling into the normal range on standardised memory testing. As with 
the studies on paper-based external aids, in most cases severity of impairment 
was categorised according to standardised measures such as the Rivermead 
Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT) or the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS). In one 
case standardised measures were not reported but a clinical description of 
memory impairment was provided (Hart, Hawkey & Whyte, 2002). Information 
on severity of memory impairment was not reported in six studies. Only 13 of 
the 27 studies specified whether their participants also suffered from other 
cognitive impairments in addition to memory impairment. Of these, two studies 
reported no additional impairments, the remaining eleven all reported 
executive impairment (amongst other cognitive impairments).  
 
3.1.2. Intervention characteristics: 
Six studies evaluated the use of a paging system, six studies evaluated personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), four studies evaluated voice organisers or voice 
recorders, three studies evaluated mobile phones, one study evaluated Google 
calendar, one study evaluated “Television Assisted Prompting”, one study 
evaluated “Interactive Task Guidance” on a personal computer, one study 
evaluated “SenseCam”, two studies evaluated compensatory aid training using a 
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device of the patients choice (diary or electronic organiser), and two studies 
evaluated “training apartments” equipped with a variety of electronic aids.  
 
Most studies compared use of the electronic aid to baseline or to a “no 
intervention” condition. No studies compared external aids to other types of 
memory rehabilitation approach, but seven studies compared different external 
aids to each other. Six studies compared electronic aids to paper-based aids 
(Dowds et al., 2011; Giles & Shore, 1989; Van Hulle & Hux, 2003; McDonald et 
al., 2011; Kirsch, Levine, Lajiness-O’Neill & Schnyder, 1992; Brindley, Bateman 
& Gracey, 2011), and one study compared two electronic aids (Wright et al., 
2001). One further study compared four different training programs using 
external aids (Shum, Fleming, Gill, Gullo & Strong, 2011).  
 
Length of training varied between studies. Most studies gave no or minimal 
training on use of the electronic device. In some cases this was because the 
device required minimal operation (for example studies evaluating pagers or 
mobile phone message services, where the participant was only required to 
respond to an alarm and read the accompanying message). In other cases 
devices were more complex (e.g. PDAs, voice organisers or functions on mobile 
phones) but were programmed by, or under the direct instruction of, the 
experimenter, and no attempt was made to train the participant in independent 
use (Dowds et al., 2011; Kim, Burke, Dowds & George, 1999; Yasuda et al., 2002; 
Stapletone, Adams & Atterton, 2005). Of the studies that did provide training, 
Thone-Otto & Walther (2003) provided up to five one-hour sessions of training 
to use their PDA and mobile phone functions. However this appeared to be 
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adequate in only six of their twelve participants. The remaining six participants 
were reported hardly to have learnt even the most basic functions of the devices 
in this time, and ability to learn to use the devices correlated with scores on 
standardised memory testing. Gentry, Wallace, Kvarfordt & Lynch (2008) 
provided three to six 90-minute sessions of training in the use of their PDA and 
this appeared to be successful. However their participants all had prior 
knowledge of computers, and also all used some form of external aid prior to 
taking part in the study.  Giles & Shore (1989) described an extensive training 
period in their single case study evaluating use of a PDA, involving four hours of 
individual training, six hours of practice with relatives, and a further month of 
use until the patient was proficient. However Wright et al. (2001) provided just 
one session of training in the use of their PDA before leaving their participants 
with a manual, and reported that all participants could use the functionality 
available when asked to do so. Hart et al. (2002) offered up to three training 
sessions in use of a voice organiser, which was sufficient in enabling their 
participants to use it for a circumscribed task. Two studies specifically 
evaluated training programmes for the use of external aids (Shum et al., 2011; 
Fleming, Shum, Strong, & Lightbody, 2005). In both cases the programmes 
lasted 8 weeks. In their training apartment, Boman, Tham, Granqvist, Bartfai & 
Hemmingsson (2007) employed errorless learning methods to train 
participants to use the external aids, and found that participants varied greatly 
in the length of time necessary to learn to use the aids, from 2 to 24 weeks. Like 
Thone-Otto & Walther (2003), they reported that those participants with 
greater memory impairment had greater difficulty learning to use the aids.   
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The majority of studies evaluating electronic aids were aimed at improving 
prospective memory functioning (19/27 studies). One study aimed to improve 
everyday memory performance and participation in everyday life tasks (Gentry 
et al., 2008), two studies evaluated new learning (Hart et al., 2002; Culley & 
Evans, 2010), one study evaluated performance on a vocational task (Kirsch et 
al., 1992), one study evaluated recall of anxiety related memories in therapy 
(Brindley et al., 2011), one study aimed to improve independent function and 
quality of life (Boman et al., 2007) and two studies evaluated ability to use the 
aids (Wright et al., 2001, Boman, Stenvall, Hemmingsson & Bartfai, 2010).  
 
3.2.3. Measurement Characteristics:  
The most frequent outcome measures were performance on prospective 
memory tasks (17 studies) and ratings of everyday memory failures (6 studies). 
Of the studies that employed these types of ratings, four used self-ratings 
(Thone-Otto & Walther, 2003, Wright et al., 2001, Fleming et al., 2005, Boman et 
al., 2007), one used carer ratings (Shum et al., 2011) and one used joint ratings 
by the patient and carer (Gentry et al., 2008).  Other outcome measures were 
measures relating to use of the external aid (four studies), ability to learn the 
external aid (three studies), standardised measures of prospective memory 
(two studies), recall of therapy goals (two studies), performance on a vocational 
task (one study), memory failures triggering household alarms (one study) and 
recall of anxiety related autobiographical memories (one study). Only two 
studies included ratings of satisfaction or usefulness of the aids (Thone-Otto & 
Walther, 2003; Boman et al., 2007). 
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Only six studies included measures assessing quality of life or well being. One 
study evaluated impact on carer strain (Wilson, Emslie, Quirk & Evans, 1999), 
one study evaluated participation in everyday life tasks (Gentry et al., 2008), 
one study evaluated impact on affect (van den Broek, Downes, Johnson, Dayus & 
Hilton, 2000), two studies evaluated psychosocial reintegration (Shum et al., 
2011; Fleming et al., 2005), and one study evaluated quality of life and self-
perceived dysfunction due to ill-health (Boman et al., 2007). 
 
Sixteen of the twenty-seven studies conducted statistical analysis of their 
results. 
 
3.2.4. Results:  
 
3.2.4.1 Pagers: Six studies evaluated paging systems. Typically in these studies 
messages are selected by the client and/or carer in collaboration with the 
therapist, and are programmed into a central system either operated by a 
paging company (e.g. Neuropage: Fish, Manly, Emslie, Evans & Wilson, 2008; 
Hersh & Treadgold, 1994; Wilson et al., 1999; Wilson, Emslie, Quirk, Evans & 
Watson, 2005; Wilson, Evans, Emslie & Malinek, 1997) or operated in-house 
(Kirsch, Shenton & Rowan, 2004). At the appropriate date and time messages 
are transmitted to the individual pager, and an audio or vibration alarm alerts 
the patient to the message, which contains a reminder of the task to be carried 
out. Typical messages might relate to taking medication or meal preparation. Of 
the six studies that evaluated pagers, all reported positive outcomes associated 
with their use.   
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Class 1 studies: 
Two class 1a studies re-analysed data from an earlier RCT (Wilson, Emslie, 
Quirk & Evans, 2001) restricted to participants with stroke (Fish et al., 2008) or 
TBI (Wilson et al., 2005). In the group with TBI, Fish et al. (2008) reported a 
significant improvement in completion of everyday tasks with the pager for 
92% of their participants, but performance significantly decreased again after 
removal of the pager in 70%. In the group with TBI (Wilson et al., 2005) there 
was also a significant improvement in performance with the pager in 81% of 
participants, but only 46.67% showed a significant decrease in performance 
when the pager was removed. This represented an interesting difference in 
performance between the TBI and stroke groups. Fish et al. (2008) reported 
that the difference in response was related to degree of executive impairment: 
those patients with more severe executive impairment were more likely to 
return to baseline after removal of the pager, whilst those with less executive 
impairment were more likely to maintain their performance.  
 
Although the results in both subgroups were overwhelmingly successful, there 
were still a small number of participants whose performance did not improve 
with the pager. Wilson et al. (2005) reported that this was more common in 
situations where a) the patient lacked insight into their memory deficit, b) the 
patent was so dependent on others that they were unable to carry out any 
activities independently, or c) where carers or relatives felt that they should do 
the reminding rather than an external device.  
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Class 2 and 3 studies: 
Four other studies evaluating the effect of pager use on prospective memory 
reported similarly positive results (Hersh & Treadgold, 1994; Kirsch et al., 2004; 
Wilson et al., 1997, 1999), with significant improvements in completion of 
everyday tasks with a pager.  These studies reported mixed results when pagers 
were removed, with some participants’ performance returning to baseline and 
some maintaining their level of performance. Although individual differences 
were not analysed in these earlier studies, the Fish et al. (2008) analysis 
suggests that these differences may have reflected degree of executive 
impairment. 
 
Quality of Life / Well-being: 
None of the pager studies evaluated impact on participant quality of life or well-
being, but there were anecdotal reports of increased independence with pager 
use (Wilson et al., 1997, 1999, 2005). In addition Wilson et al. (1999) reported 
significantly reduced carer strain in the wife of a single case who responded 
well to Neuropage. 
 
Follow up: 
Follow-up was uncommon in studies evaluating pager use, but the results 
suggested that in participants with less severe executive impairment, a seven 
week intervention with the pager was sufficient to establish a routine that could 
then be maintained without reminders. However maintenance of effect in these 
studies was only evaluated for a further seven weeks, so longer term follow-up 
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would be desirable. In those with more severe executive impairment, pagers 
may need to be used in the long-term to maintain performance.  
 
Summary: Pagers 
Six studies, including two class 1 studies, reported improved prospective memory 
functioning with use of a pager. Patients with less severe executive impairment 
were able with a pager to establish a routine that could then be maintained 
without reminders. Assessment of quality of life and long-term follow-up was not 
reported in pager studies.  
 
 
3.2.4.2: Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs): Six studies evaluated PDAs. PDAs are 
hand-held personal computers that are equipped with a variety of functions, 
such as diary, notebook, address book and reminder functions. Most PDAs have 
alarms which can be set to alert the user to a particular event. Of the six studies 
that evaluated PDAs, most showed generally positive results.  
 
Class 1 studies: 
One class 1a study evaluated the effect of two different types of PDA, a paper 
planner and a “no aid” baseline condition on prospective memory performance 
in 36 TBI patients, using a randomised crossover trial with an ABCDABCD 
design (Dowds et al., 2011). Performance was at 27% in the baseline condition, 
26% with the paper planner, 38% with a Microsoft PDA, and 56% with a Palm 
PDA. Performance with both PDAs was significantly better than baseline, and 
performance with the Palm PDA was significantly better than with the Microsoft 
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PDA. However performance even with the Palm PDA was surprisingly low, at 
only 56%. In addition, messages were input for the participants, so performance 
did not reflect any ability to use the device independently, limiting the 
generalisability of the results. Interestingly the authors reported that 
performance was not predicted by gender, age or performance on cognitive 
measures (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence: Vocabulary or Matrix 
Reasoning subtests, Wide Range Achievement Test:  Maths or Reading scores, or 
Wechsler Memory Scale: Logical Memory or Family Pictures subtests, see also 
Wright et al. 2001 for similar results).  
 
Class 2 and 3 studies: 
A class 2 study by Thone-Otto & Walther (2003) evaluated the use of a PDA or 
mobile phone agenda function on prospective memory functioning, assessing 
performance on 20 experimental tasks as well as patient-recorded everyday 
forgotten intentions. They did not compare results of the PDA to the mobile 
phone, but collapsed the results together. Although they reported that the 
number of experimental tasks and everyday intentions that were forgotten 
reduced with the electronic aids, this difference did not in fact reach 
significance. Moreover, examination of the data showed that performance 
appeared to be very close to ceiling, with only around 0.12% of experimental 
tasks being forgotten even at baseline. Unfortunately this aspect of the data 
makes interpretation of the true impact of the external aid very difficult.  
 
In the class 3 studies evaluating PDA use, Gentry et al. (2008) reported 
significant improvement on ratings of everyday performance related to memory 
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functioning in a group of 23 TBI patients. Giles & Shore (1989) reported 
improvement in prospective remembering in their single case from 0/10 tasks 
at baseline to 9/10 tasks using a PDA (which was also slightly better than 
performance using a standard diary), Kim et al. (1999) reported anecdotal 
evidence of an improvement in attendance at therapy sessions and independent 
requesting of medication in their single case. Wright et al. (2001) reported that 
even after minimal training their 12 patients were making around 3 entries per 
day on their PDAs (assessed over 18 weeks with the aids), and rated the 
usefulness of their PDAs at 6.5 / 10. However 5 of their original participants 
dropped out (potentially because they found the PDA less helpful or easy to 
adopt), and only 3 of the 12 participants recorded forgetting things in the “no 
aid” phase that they would have used their PDA for had it been available to 
them. As this study did not include any objective assessment of the impact of the 
intervention on memory performance, this finding could be taken to indicate 
that only 25% of participants benefited from the PDA. However it may also 
reflect a problem with the use of self-report measures in participants who suffer 
from memory impairments, who may be less likely to remember their memory 
failures, or to complete memory logging tasks at all.  
 
Quality of Life / Well-being: 
Only one study reported data relating to quality of life or well-being. Gentry et 
al. (2008) reported a significant improvement in satisfaction with performance, 
and also on ratings of cognitive independence, mobility and occupation, but not 
physical independence, social integration or economic self-sufficiency. 
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Follow-up: 
In the only study to report follow-up data, Giles & Shore (1989) found that their 
single case was still using the PDA at 3 month follow-up. 
 
Summary: PDAs 
Six studies, including one class 1 study, reported generally positive results, but 
with some small effects, and with some methodological problems which limited the 
conclusions that could be drawn. One class 3 study reported improvements in 
quality of life, and another class 3 study reported continued use of a PDA at three-
month follow-up.  
 
 
3.2.4.3 Voice Organisers: Four class 3 studies evaluated voice organisers.  
 
Class 3 studies: 
Hart et al. (2002) were one of the few studies to evaluate the impact of an 
external aid on new learning. They used an organiser with a chime which 
sounded three times a day to prompt their participants to play a recorded 
message reminding them of their therapy goals, and reported significantly 
greater recall of recorded than non-recorded therapy goals after 7 days. The 
other three studies evaluated the impact of voice organisers on prospective 
memory, and used devices which replayed stored voiced messages at set times. 
van den Broek et al. (2000) reported positive results in all 5 of their 
participants. However van Hulle & Hux (2003) found no improvement in the 
single case with whom they trialled a voice organiser. This patient also failed to 
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benefit from written reminders or a watch alarm, and they attributed his failure 
to respond to aids to a lack of motivation to be independent. Yasuda et al. 
(2002) reported mixed results, with the voice recorder proving an effective aid 
in five of their participants, but having no effect in the remaining three. The 
authors speculated that this might be due to executive problems in two of the 
patients, but the reason for failure in the third was unclear.  
 
Quality of Life / Well-being: 
Only one study reported data relating to quality of life or well-being, however this 
was negative. Van den Broek et al. (2000) reported no effect of voice organiser use 
on positive or negative affect using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS). 
 
Follow-up:  
None of the studies evaluating voice organisers reported follow-up data.  
 
Summary: Voice Organisers 
Four class 3 studies evaluated voice organisers. One study reported positive effects 
on new learning. Three studies assessed prospective memory, twelve of sixteen 
participants benefited from the voice organiser. Assessment of quality of life in one 
study showed no impact. No study reported follow-up data.  
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3.2.4.4 Mobile Phones: Three class 3 studies evaluated mobile phones as external 
aids. 
 
Class 3 studies: 
 Culley & Evans (2010) replicated the study of Hart et al. (2002), reporting 
significantly greater recall of therapy goals that were sent by text message to 
participants three times a day, compared to unsent goals. Wade & Troy (2001) 
also reported positive results, with improved performance in five patients on a 
prospective memory task when prompted by voice messages sent to their 
mobile phone.  However Stapletone et al. (2005) found that use of a mobile 
phone reminder function improved prospective memory performance in only 
two of their five participants. They reported that those who showed no 
improvement had more severe memory and executive impairments.  
 
No studies evaluating mobile phones reported follow-up data, or data relating to 
quality of life / well-being. 
 
Summary: Mobile Phones 
Three class 3 studies evaluated mobile phones. One study reported positive effects 
on new learning. Two studies assessed prospective memory: seven of ten 
participants benefited from the voice organiser.  
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3.2.4.5. Other electronic aids:  
 
Class 1 studies: 
Two class 1a studies evaluated other electronic aids. McDonald et al. (2011) 
compared the use of Google Calendar (an online diary which allows linked 
reminder messages to be sent to a mobile phone by text) to a standard diary in a 
randomised crossover trial. They found no improvement on prospective 
memory performance with the standard diary compared to baseline (55% and 
58% respectively), but a significant improvement with Google calendar, with 
performance reaching 82%. As with some other studies, their sample were 
already using external aids on recruitment to the study, so positive results may 
in part reflect a pre-existing orientation to using memory aids.  Again echoing 
other studies, they reported that those participants with more severe memory 
and executive impairment showed least improvement.  
 
Lemoncello Sohlberg, Fickas & Prideaux (2011) conducted a randomised 
crossover trial comparing usual practice to “Television Assisted Prompting” 
(TAP, messages which are delivered to the participant’s TV screen with an 
alerting tone). They reported a significant advantage of TAP, with performance 
on prospective memory tasks improving from 43% to 72%. 
 
Class 3 studies: 
Two other types of aid were evaluated by a single class 3 study each. Kirsch et 
al. (1992) evaluated the effect of “Interactive Task Guidance” (ITG, messages 
displayed on a computer screen) on performance of a vocational task (cleaning 
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a bathroom and waiting room). They reported that two participants performed 
better with ITG, one participant showed no improvement over written 
instructions, and one had equivocal results. Brindley et al. (2011) evaluated 
SenseCam, a wearable camera that takes photographs automatically in response 
to environmental changes. These photographs can then be compiled and viewed 
consecutively as an aid to autobiographical recollection. In this study, they 
evaluated the impact on recall of anxiety-related trigger events in the context of 
cognitive behavioural therapy for anxiety, and found that a significantly higher 
proportion of autobiographical events were recalled with SenseCam than with 
automatic thought records (traditionally used in CBT) or a no strategy 
condition.  
 
No studies evaluating other electronic aids reported follow-up data, or data 
relating to quality of life / well-being. 
 
Summary: Other Electronic Aids 
Amongst studies evaluating other electronic aids, two single class 1 studies 
reported positive results associated with Google Calendar and Television Assisted 
Prompting. Two class 3 studies showed mixed results for interactive task guidance, 
and promising preliminary results with SenseCam.  
 
 
3.2.4.6. Training programmes with mixed aids:  
Two studies examined training programmes in the use of compensatory aids 
where the type of aid was not prescribed and participants selected the aid of 
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their choice (either a diary or organisational device).  
 
Class 1 studies: 
Shum et al. (2011) conducted a class 1 randomised controlled trial comparing 
four 8-week training conditions: 1) Self Awareness Training (SAT) + 
Compensatory Prospective Memory Training (CPMT), 2) SAT plus active 
control, 3) active control plus CPMT, and 4) active control only.  They found 
significant improvements on a standardised test of prospective memory 
(CAMPROMPT) and a significant increase in diary entries, in the active control 
plus CPMT condition. Contrary to their hypothesis the addition of self 
awareness training did not appear to confer additional benefit. Although their 
results appeared positive with both statistically and clinically significant 
improvement on the CAMPROMPT, carer ratings of the frequency of everyday 
memory lapses did not improve in any group, raising some doubt about 
whether the program had an impact on real world memory functioning.  
 
Class 3 studies: 
A class 3 study by Fleming et al. (2005) also evaluated an 8-week training 
program in the use of a diary or electronic organiser. They reported 
improvement on a standardised test of prospective memory, but mixed results 
on self report of real-world prospective memory functioning.  
 
Quality of Life / Well-being: 
Both Shum et al. (2011) and Fleming et al. (2005) reported outcomes on the 
Sydney Psychosocial Reintegration Scale (SPRS). Shum et al. (2011) found no 
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change on this measure following intervention in any training condition, whilst 
Fleming et al. (2005) reported better community reintegration in two of their 
three participants.   
 
Follow-up: 
Fleming et al. (2005) reported that all three of their participants continued to 
make between one and five diary entries per day at two month follow-up. 
However this data was self-report, potentially affecting its reliability. 
 
Summary: Training Programmes with Mixed Aids 
One class 1 study and one class 3 study reported that 8 week training programmes 
applicable to various external aids had a significant effect on standardised tests of 
prospective memory but not on real world functioning. Self awareness training did 
not confer additional benefit. Impact on quality of life was mixed with no 
improvement in the class 1 study.  
 
3.2.4.7. Training apartments: Two class 3 studies evaluated the use of “training 
apartments”, apartments equipped with a variety of electronic aids to assist 
with memory functioning as well as other aspects of independent occupational 
performance.  
 
Class 3 studies: 
Boman et al. (2007) reported significant improvement in self-perceived 
occupational performance, and satisfaction with this performance, in 8 patients 
after stays of 4-6 months in an apartment equipped with a variety of living aids 
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including memory aids (an electronic calendar with reminder lists and linked 
SMS messages, reminders of facility bookings, and a telephone equipped with 
photos of contacts). In a more recent study the same group reported a reduction 
in alarms triggered by forgetting to turn off the television in participants who 
stayed in a training apartment for a 5-day period (Boman et al., 2010). They 
reported no improvement in the number of alarms triggered by other memory 
failures. However this perhaps serves to remind us of the primary function of 
external memory aids as a compensatory rather than a restorative approach.  
Although participants did not stop being liable to these memory lapses (thus 
continuing to trigger the alarms), the alarms themselves presumably functioned 
to support memory performance in enabling the participants to correct their 
errors.  
 
Quality of Life / Well-being: 
Boman et al. (2007) reported a significant improvement in self-perceived 
quality of life and psychosocial functioning following stays in their training 
apartment. 
 
Follow-up: 
Neither study evaluating training apartments reported follow-up data. 
 
Summary: Training Apartments 
Two class 3 studies report preliminary findings that training apartments may 
improve aspects of memory performance or self perceived occupational 
performance, as well as quality of life.  
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
The evidence for the efficacy of external memory aids is generally very positive. 
A large number of studies are now available, including 9 class 1 studies, all of 
which report improved memory functioning with use of an external memory 
aid. All 12 studies evaluating paper-based external aids (including 3 class 1 
studies) reported positive outcomes, all 6 studies evaluating pagers (including 2 
class 1 studies) reported positive results, 6 studies evaluating PDAs (including 1 
class 1 study) reported generally positive results, 2 of 4 studies evaluating Voice 
Organisers reported positive results (1 negative and 1 mixed), 2 of 3 studies 
evaluating mobile phones reported positive results (1 mixed), and there were 
also positive reports of interventions using Google calendar (class 1 study), 
Television Assisted Prompting (class 1 study), SenseCam and training 
apartments.  
 
Not only do external aids appear to be effective in the short-term, but, given 
sufficient training, diary use may be maintained in the long-term, and positive 
effects with some electronic aids may be maintained even after the aid is 
removed. External aids may also be associated with significant improvements in 
symptom distress, mood, carer strain, cognitive independence, community 
reintegration, psychosocial functioning and quality of life (Bergquist et al., 2009; 
Boman et al., 2007; Fleming et al., 2005; Gentry et al., 2008; Ownsworth & 
McFarland, 1999; Wilson et al., 1999). This positive evidence supports the 
increasing interest in external memory aids in rehabilitation settings, and their 
increasing availability through “memory aids clinics” (Wilson & Kapur, 2009). 
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However some gaps remain in the evidence base, and the evidence that is 
available also raises questions about which type of aid might be best, with 
which type of training, for which type of memory problem, and for which type of 
patient. These questions are discussed in turn below.  
 
Are external aids more effective than other types of memory intervention? 
Perhaps the largest gap in the literature relates to the question of whether, or in 
which situations, external aids are more effective than other memory 
rehabilitation approaches. Only one study compares the use of an external aid to 
alternative strategies (Zencius et al., 1990), and whilst this study reported 
superior performance with a memory notebook compared to three internal 
aids, there were methodological concerns which seriously limited the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Whilst we can be confident that external aids can 
have a positive effect, more studies are needed to provide evidence on the 
particular memory problems, participant groups or other circumstances for 
which external aids should be the intervention of choice over and above other 
rehabilitation methods.  
 
Which external aid is best?  
Six studies compared different external aids to each other. Studies comparing 
electronic aids to paper-based aids all found the electronic aids to be superior 
(Dowds et al., 2011; Giles & Shore, 1989; McDonald et al., 2011; Kirsch et al., 
1992; Brindley et al., 2011). In fact in these studies, performance with paper 
based aids was often equal to or sometimes even slightly lower than baseline 
performance. However diary training in these studies tended to be significantly 
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less intensive than those in those evaluating paper-based aids alone (e.g. Dowds 
et al. 2011, McDonald, et al., 2011). If a diary is to be used, it appears that 
intensive training may be necessary, and a simplified version may be preferable 
to one that requires extensive cross-referencing between sections (McKerracher 
et al., 2005). 
 
Overall there is strong evidence for the use of pagers, and strong evidence for 
paper-based aids such as diaries and memory notebooks when sufficient 
training is provided. The evidence for PDAs, voice organisers and mobile phones 
is currently less conclusive. Finally there is preliminary but promising evidence 
in support of some other systems such as Google calendar and SenseCam.  
 
The choice of aid is likely to be guided by the unique advantages and 
disadvantages of each one, and the match between these features and the needs 
of the individual patient. Paper aids such as memory notebooks can be quite 
complex and require extensive training (e.g. Donaghy & Williamns, 1998; 
Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989). They require a lot of editing and updating, and are 
not suitable for patients with reading, writing or visual impairments. They may 
be bulky to carry around, and patients may forget to use them. Certain cognitive 
impairments may also make use of a memory notebook more challenging, for 
example decreased attention / concentration, slow processing speed, reduced 
language comprehension, problem solving impairments, mental inflexibility, 
learning problems, or executive difficulties (for example initiating use of the 
memory book or acting on the information in it, Burke et al., 1994). Social and 
emotional factors are also likely to play a role, for example social stigma or 
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unwillingness to use the aid, as well as the degree of family support (Burke et 
al., 1994, Donaghy & Williams, 1998).  
 
However paper-based diaries and memory notebooks do come with two distinct 
advantages. One is that people tend to already be familiar with diaries, meaning 
that some prior knowledge can be built on. The second is that paper systems are 
multi-purpose, and can therefore be used not only to support prospective 
memory but a range of other functions too, for example new learning (in notes 
sections) and recall of day-to-day events (as a record of events is accumulated in 
the diary).  
 
An immediate advantage of electronic systems is that they are active rather than 
passive, incorporating alerts to prompt the patient to consult the device, and 
reducing the risk of forgetting to use an aid. Alerts may also have a general 
orienting function, prompting orientation to time, taking stock and goal oriented 
behaviour (Culley & Evans, 2010, see also Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt & 
Robinson, 2002). Some electronic aids may also be used with minimal or no 
training, especially where independent operation of the device is not required 
(e.g. pagers), although other types of electronic aid (e.g. PDAs) may still require 
extensive training if the participant is not already familiar with their operation. 
The evidence also suggests that in some circumstances a short term 
intervention with an electronic aid may be effective in establishing a routine 
that can then be continued without use of the device, reducing the costs of long-
term use. Some of the advantages and disadvantages specific to particular types 
of electronic aid are discussed below.  
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Pager systems such as Neuropage (Hersh & Treadgold, 1994) were specifically 
designed to overcome some of the problems of other external aids. It is 
unobtrusive, there is no need for constant checking or updating, and it is quick 
and easy to learn (for everyday operation, no training is needed as the 
participant simply needs to look at the screen of the pager when the alarm 
sounds). Feedback is available, as the client can be asked to telephone to 
confirm completion of a task, and reminders can be sent until this feedback is 
received, or a carer alerted. Neuropage is also now available as an SMS service, 
enabling clients to use their existing mobile phones rather than a pager. 
However there are disadvantages. The messages must be lined up in advance by 
a third party, limiting how flexible the reminders can be. The system is also 
primarily designed to support prospective memory, and cannot be used as a 
record of new learning or past events. The length of the message that can be 
displayed is also restricted, and it is not suitable for those with visual 
impairments (although Hersh & Treadgold, 1994, reported plans to develop a 
version using a voice-based receiver, this is not currently available). Finally it 
carries a cost implication; it currently costs £60 a month to receive the 
Neuropage service.  
 
PDAs have the advantage of carrying many more features than a pager, 
including reminders, to-do-lists, note-pages, diaries and calendars, and thus 
have the potential to support new learning and keep a record of past events, as 
well as helping with prospective memory. They also offer more opportunity for 
independent use than a pager. However their increased complexity requires 
increased training, meaning that they may be more suitable for higher 
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functioning patients, or those who were already using a PDA prior to their brain 
injury. PDAs are now becoming less widely used, as this range of functions is 
increasingly available in smartphones (see below),  
 
Voice organisers are relatively simple and inexpensive, and may be 
programmed by the user rather than centrally (van den Broek et al., 2000). They 
also allow longer messages than can be displayed on pager screen (Yasuda et al. 
2003), and may be used by those with reading, writing or visual impairments. 
However for many users auditory messages may be more stigmatising than 
visual or text messages, especially if used in public.  
 
Mobile phones may be the least stigmatising as they are so widespread in the 
healthy population. They may be used to receive messages sent from an external 
service (like Neuropage), or used independently by programming reminders 
and alarms (Stapletone et al., 2007). They may be used to receive text or 
auditory messages so may also be used by those with visual deficits (Wade & 
Troy, 2001), and they may function as a safety device, as they can be used to 
contact a patient if they are missing, or for the patient to seek help if in trouble 
(Wade & Troy, 2001). Many smartphones now incorporate a variety of functions 
including diaries, to-do lists and notepages which make them more similar to 
PDAs in the functions that they are able to support. Moreover as use of 
smartphones in the general population increases, the brain-injured population 
will have more familiarity with these devices and rehabilitation professionals 
may be able to capitalise on this pre-existing procedural knowledge, thereby 
avoiding the need for extensive new training. However these potential 
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advantages have not so far been reflected in the literature, and further studies 
evaluating the new smartphones would be desirable. 
 
The other electronic aids evaluated may also offer benefits to some patients. 
Google calendar is a free of charge service that may be a valuable means of 
organising alerts to be sent to a mobile phone, either by the individual or by a 
carer. SenseCam appears to have unique potential (over the other electronic 
aids discussed) to support autobiographical memory (see below). Other aids 
such as Television Assisted Prompting or Interactive Task Guidance may have 
more limited applicability as they are not designed to be portable systems. 
Finally, training apartments seem a valuable resource in preparing patients for 
discharge, but as they do not have a restorative effect, they may be worthwhile 
only if these aids are later available in the patients own home.  
 
What type of training is best? 
Length of training in the studies reviewed ranged from 1 day to 6 months, and 
also varied according to whether the aim was to teach independent use of the 
aid or not. For an aid to be useful participants should clearly be able to use it 
outside of the experimental or rehabilitation setting, but if independent use is 
challenging, electronic aids which are externally managed to minimise learning 
and training requirements may be more viable options. 
  
When the aim is to establish independent use, the available evidence does 
provide some guidance on the type and length of training that might be optimal. 
Longer training may be necessary to establish independent use of complex aids 
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like memory notebooks and PDAs, and detailed training protocols have been 
proposed for memory notebooks (Burke et al., 1994, Donaghy & Williams, 1998, 
Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989). Length of training may also depend on degree of 
impairment, with longer training especially important for those with more 
severe memory problems (Thone-Otto & Walther, 2003, Boman et al., 2007). 
 
Several studies identified methods that may be useful components of training 
programs. For example Donaghy & Williams (1998) used vanishing cues in their 
memory journal system training program, and Boman et al. (2007) employed 
errorless learning methods in their training apartments. Cicerone et al. (2011) 
also noted that errorless learning techniques are likely to be useful in teaching 
the use of compensatory strategies.  
 
Shum et al. (2011) in their study made an effort to examine what the active 
ingredients of training programs might be, and contrary to their hypothesis 
found that a simple compensatory training program which did not include self 
awareness training achieved the best results. Self awareness training did not 
appear to confer any additional benefit, and indeed the group who received 
compensatory plus self awareness training performed worse than those who 
received compensatory training alone. The inclusion of other executive 
strategies in training may be beneficial however. For example Ownsworth & 
McFarland (1999) reported better maintenance of diary use and greater 
reduction of memory problems in a group who received “self instructional 
training” (a strategy encouraging identification of a goal, selection of a strategy, 
implementation of the strategy and checking of the outcome) in addition to 
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standard diary training. This seems especially important in the light of repeated 
reports that executive impairments may interfere with the successful adoption 
and use of external aids.  
 
In terms of delivery of training, most studies used individual training. However 
one study highlighted the potential utility of group-based training approaches 
(Schmitter-Edgecombe et al. 1995). Two other studies used distance learning. 
Bergquist et al. (2009) reported successful results using online training via 
Instant Messenger, which could be a useful method where patients live far away 
from rehabilitation facilities or where travelling is difficult. However six 
participants in their study dropped out or were excluded, and in four cases this 
was due to missing appointments on the online system, a failure which is much 
more likely with more significant memory impairments. Dropouts were also 
less likely to already be using an external aid (17%, versus 64% who completed 
the program), indicating that this type of training may be more suited to a 
higher functioning group, to those already oriented to using external aids, or for 
delivery of top-up training after strategy use is established. The distance 
learning approach employed by Ownsworth & McFarland (1999), using a letter 
and follow up telephone calls, appeared inadequate to establish ongoing use of 
the aid.  
 
What type of memory problem are external aids best suited to?  
Most studies evaluating external aids examined their impact on prospective 
memory functioning.  However there was also evidence that external aids may 
be useful in managing memory-related behavioural problems such as repetitive 
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questioning (Squires et al., 1996). Three studies also demonstrated that external 
aids may be effective in learning new information (Hart et al. 2002, Culley & 
Evans 2010, Zencius et al., 1990). Certainly external aids may be a useful tool for 
errorless learning (Kirsch et al., 1992), and this may be the mechanism by which 
routines can be established with pagers and some other electronic aids that are 
then maintained after removal of the aid (Fish et al., 2008; Stapletone et al., 
2005; van den Broek et al., 2000; Wade & Troy, 2001; Wilson et al., 1997, 1999, 
2005; Yasuda et al., 2002). However the studies addressing new learning did not 
compare external aids to an alternative training measure, and it is possible that 
the new learning resulted simply from rehearsal that could have been achieved 
without an external aid. As yet it is unknown whether an external aid is superior 
to other techniques such as vanishing cues in establishing new learning. Finally 
there is the question of whether external aids have a role to play in supporting 
retrospective memory, for example recall of what one has done that day. 
Although having a record of past events is often cited as an advantage of 
memory notebooks over electronic aids such as pagers, voice organisers and 
mobile phones, no study has actually evaluated the use of memory notebooks 
for this purpose, neither do any of them include anecdotal reports about 
whether participants use memory aids of this sort to refer back to past events. 
The only study to directly examine recall of autobiographical events used 
SenseCam (Brindley et al., 2011), and reported greater recall in the SenseCam 
condition. However SenseCam was used in this study to recall a single event, 
and it is more difficult to see how it might function as a general memory aid on a 
day-to-day basis, as the quantity of data accumulated would be very large, and 
procedures for reviewing and archiving would be complex.   
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Different memory aids may be best suited to different memory problems, and in 
some cases, a combination of aids might be better able than a single aid to 
address the full range of rehabilitation needs (Boman et al., 2010). Careful goal 
setting is likely to be critical in identifying the most suitable external aid. 
Interestingly in a survey conducted by Hart, Buchhofer & Vaccaro (2004), 
people with moderate to severe brain injury reported that the functions they 
most wanted from an aid were keeping track of money spent, remembering 
what people tell you, and keeping track of things you need to do. Although most 
of the aids reviewed here could address the last of these functions, it is not clear 
that existing aids match up at all well to the other requirements.   
 
Who do external aids work for?  
The studies reviewed here suggest that external aids are effective for most 
patients with stroke and TBI, but not all. The lowest rates of improvement were 
consistently associated with greater executive impairment, across studies and 
across aids (Fish et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2011; Stapletone et al., 2005; 
Wilson et al., 2005; Yasuda et al., 2002; Zencius et al., 1991,). This lends further 
support to the suggestion that executive strategies might be a useful addition to 
compensatory aid training (Ownsworth & McFarland, 1999).   
 
Other features associated with poor response to external aids were reduced 
awareness of deficit (Donaghy & Williams, 1998; Ownsworth & McFarland, 
1999; Wilson, 2005), lack of motivation (van Hulle & Hux, 2003), initiation 
problems (Yasuda et al., 2002), increased dependence on others (Wilson, 2005), 
and lack of support for the external aid from relatives (Wilson, 2005). Those 
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patients with the most severe memory deficits may also face additional 
challenges in using external aids (McDonald et al., 2011; Stapletone et al., 2007) 
 
Giles & Shore (1989) suggest the following criteria for useful intervention with 
an electronic memory aid: 1) average or near average intelligence, 2) retained 
or mildly impaired reasoning skills, 3) insight into deficits, 4) adequate ability to 
initiate behaviour, and 5) a functional disorder arising from significant memory 
impairment. These criteria appear quite restrictive, however there has been 
much progress in electronic aids since that time, and one would hope that 
external aids might also be of benefit to clients with more severe deficits. Indeed 
there is evidence that a dedicated training approach can be successful even in 
the most extreme cases of lack of awareness of memory deficits and resistance 
to using aids, (Burke et al. 2004; Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989), and Sohlberg & 
Mateer (1989) caution against using motivational issues as an excuse to 
abandon compensatory aid training when it is challenging.  
 
The studies reviewed here included many more TBI than stroke participants. 
However some interesting aetiological differences emerged from the analyses of 
Wilson et al. (2005) and Fish et al. (2008). The stroke group were less likely 
than the TBI group to show maintenance of performance after the pager was 
removed, and this was related to greater executive impairment in the stroke 
group. This finding suggests that interventions with stroke patients may need to 
be longer term than with TBI patients. However executive impairments are also 
common in TBI, so it may be that clinicians should be guided by degree of 
executive deficit rather than aetiology per se in making decisions about length 
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or type of intervention. Other differences exist between stroke and TBI groups, 
for example in typical cognitive complaints, region of damage, and age of the 
patients, which may also impact upon the choice of intervention, but as yet the 
literature does not provide any clear evidence about the impact of these factors 
on response to external aids.  
 
As yet there are no studies directly addressing the question of who would be 
most suited to which type of external aid. However it might be expected that 
those with milder impairments will be more likely to benefit from more 
complex aids intended for independent use (e.g. memory notebooks or PDAs), 
whilst those with more severe impairments might be more likely to benefit from 
externally controlled aids requiring minimal training (e.g. pagers or text 
message reminders). Portability, expense, training, degree of independent 
control, prior experience and personal preference will all be important factors 
in selecting an appropriate external aid. Memory aids clinics where clients can 
“try out” different memory aids before committing to buy them are likely to be a 
useful resource in this process (Wilson & Kapur, 2009).  
 
Methodological issues: 
 
Some methodological issues in the studies reviewed limited the conclusions that 
could be drawn, and these might be addressed in future studies. In terms of 
participant characteristics, many studies included participants in the early 
months after their brain injury, some as early as 2 months post-injury. This 
raises the risk that any improvement in performance may be due to 
spontaneous recovery rather than the effects of the intervention. Whilst 
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experimental design (e.g. ABA designs) can go some way to addressing this 
issue, it would be optimal for future studies to limit participants to those at least 
12 months after injury, when most spontaneous recovery is likely to have been 
achieved. In a clinical setting of course, external aids may also be of benefit 
during the acute period.  
 
A second problem was that many studies included participants with relatively 
mild memory impairment, often scoring in the normal range on standardised 
tests. In some cases this may reflect failure of standardised memory testing to 
capture everyday memory impairment. However it also raises the possibility 
that some participants did not have impairments that required memory 
rehabilitation, making them inappropriate for the evaluation of external 
memory aids. Even where memory impairments were present, many 
participants were already using aids prior to recruitment to the study, were able 
to learn to use new aids with very little training, or appeared to remember to 
use their aids during the intervention period with few problems, indicating a 
high level of functioning. Overall, few studies included severely impaired 
patients, and those that did often grouped them together with patients with less 
severe deficits, so our knowledge about whether and how external aids might be 
most helpful for the most severely impaired patients, who cannot recall one 
rehabilitation session to the next, is limited.  Future studies might consider 
stratifying their samples on the basis of severity of memory or other cognitive 
impairment, to ascertain which aids and which training strategies are best 
suited to those with more severe deficits. Moreover, some studies failed to 
provide any information at all on the severity of memory impairment. Future 
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studies should at least offer a clinical description of the type of memory 
impairment they are addressing (and ideally also results on relevant 
standardised testing). The presence and extent of any additional cognitive 
impairment, especially executive dysfunction, which might impact on response 
to intervention, should also be described.  
 
In terms of measurement characteristics, the type of outcome measures 
employed varied widely across studies. Measures evaluating use of the aid (such 
as number of diary entries) are interesting, but in order to evaluate efficacy it is 
necessary to include a measure of the impact of the aid on memory functioning. 
In this regard functional measures, for example performance on a prospective 
memory task, or assessment of everyday memory failures, are a more sensitive 
and more ecologically valid measure of outcome than standardised 
neuropsychological measures (Quemada et al., 2003, Wilson, 1987). This is 
particularly true because external aids are intended to perform a compensatory 
rather than a restorative function. 
 
Consistent with this, standardised measures showed no improvement in the 
studies reviewed here, with the exception of standardised measures of 
prospective memory. Improvements on the CAMPROMPT were reported by 
Kime et al. (1996) and Shum et al. (2011). In both cases this improved score 
reflected an increase in note-taking during the test. This suggests that the 
CAMPROMPT may be a standardised measure that is sensitive enough to detect 
changes resulting from use of an external aid. However Shum et al. (2011) did 
not report any improvement on ratings of everyday memory failure in their 
  
86 
study, raising some doubt about the ecological validity of the CAMPROMPT, at 
least in this study. This finding underlines the importance of including a “real 
world” measure in evaluations of external memory aids.  Fleming et al. (2005) 
reported improvement on the MIST in their study, which was particularly 
interesting as the use of aids is restricted in administration of this test. This 
suggests either that their training program had a restorative effect on some 
aspect of prospective memory, or that spontaneous recovery had occurred in 
their participants. However the greatest improvement in MIST scores was seen 
in a client 12 months post-injury, making spontaneous recovery less likely. 
Replication of this result would be desirable. 
 
One of the most ecologically valid measures is assessment of everyday memory 
failures. However six studies used self-report versions of these measures 
(Ownsworth & McFarland, 1999; Bergquist et al., 2009 Thone-Otto & Walther, 
2003, Wright et al., 2001, Fleming et al., 2005, Boman et al., 2007). The problem 
with self-report measures of memory performance is that awareness and 
memory impairments may interfere with the reliability of the data. Patients may 
under-report memory problems due to lack of insight, fail to remember their 
memory failures, or forget to fill in their memory logs at all. Alternatively an 
increase in awareness of memory problems as a result of the intervention may 
lead to increase in self reported memory failures, even if the intervention has 
been successful (this may have been a factor in the null results of Fleming et al., 
2005). In the opposite direction, an improvement in self-ratings may be 
observed due to demand characteristics or a placebo effect (an effect to which 
studies with no control group are particularly vulnerable). For all of these 
  
87 
reasons corroborative measure are important, either in the form of supporting 
ratings from a carer, or (more reliably) objective measures of performance 
where completion can be monitored directly (e.g. experimental tasks such as 
calling a voicemail system). Where ratings are used, the findings of Schmitter-
Edgecombe et al. (1995) indicate that daily records may be more sensitive to 
change than retrospective measures. 
 
The aim of rehabilitation is not just to remediate impairment but also to 
improve quality of life and help restore social role functioning. However only 
eleven out of twenty-seven studies included measures of subjective wellbeing 
and quality of life. Some of these studies reported significant improvements in 
symptom distress, mood, carer strain, cognitive independence, community 
reintegration, psychosocial functioning and quality of life (Bergquist et al., 2009; 
Boman et al., 2007; Fleming et al., 2005; Gentry et al., 2008; Ownsworth & 
McFarland, 1999; Wilson et al., 1999), and anecdotal reports suggested that one 
of the major impacts of external aids could be the increased independence they 
bring. However not all studies reported positive results. Schmitter-Edgecombe 
et al. (1995) found no reduction in symptom distress in their study, 
McKerracher et al. (2005) reported no improvement in mood, Bergquist et al. 
(2009) found no improvement in community reintegration, van den Broek et al. 
(2000) found no change in affect, and Shum et al. (2011) found no change in 
psychosocial reintegration with use of an external aid. Further study of the 
factors determining whether improvements in independence, quality of life and 
subjective well-being are associated with external memory aids are required. 
The evidence suggests that the best rehabilitation outcomes result from 
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comprehensive-holistic programs of rehabilitation which include individualised 
cognitive and interpersonal therapies (Cicerone et al., 2011). This suggests that 
for best results, intervention with external aids should be offered as part of a 
wider program of rehabilitation.  
 
In terms of design, some studies suffered from confounds due to order effects 
and counterbalancing which could be avoided in future studies. Others lacked 
important details of procedure or training which limited the conclusions that 
could be drawn. Finally, only half of the studies conducted statistical analyses of 
their results, and many of the studies which did not include statistical analysis 
were single case studies. Class 3 single case studies were included in this review 
(following Cicerone and colleagues) because single cases can provide useful 
preliminary information about the effectiveness of rehabilitation approaches, 
which may guide subsequent controlled studies. However well designed group 
studies involving statistical analysis are now necessary to address critical 
outstanding questions about external aids.  
 
Future research 
We now have good evidence that external aids can be effective in patients with 
mild-moderate memory impairment. However further research is needed to 
address whether and how external aids might be most helpful for the most 
severely impaired patients. Further comparisons between aids would also be 
desirable, to offer guidance on which aid is best suited to a particular client 
group, or to a particular type of memory problem. In particular, further research 
on whether external aids might be able to support retrospective memory for 
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autobiographical events would be valuable. Information on the critical length 
and type of training for different aids would also be welcome. And as 
technological advances are occurring at such a rapid pace, evaluation of newer 
technologies such as smartphones will be important. Indeed the pace of change 
means that the electronic aids of tomorrow are likely to be very different from 
those that have been evaluated to date, hopefully offering new benefits to those 
exploiting their potential as a memory aid.  
 
In terms of response to aids, further study of the factors determining whether 
improvements in independence, quality of life and subjective well-being will 
occur is required. In addition more research on the factors predictive of 
sustained use after discharge, and generalisation to the patients own life would 
be welcome.  
 
Limitations of this review  
This review included articles evaluating the use of external aids for memory 
impairment in patients with acquired brain injury due to TBI and stroke. The 
exclusion of articles where the primary diagnosis was not TBI or stroke meant that 
some studies evaluating external aids in cases who had suffered other brain injuries, 
(e.g. due to infection) were not reviewed. Studies where external aids were used to 
address functions other than memory were also excluded. This is perhaps an artificial 
distinction as external aids may also be very helpful in managing the executive and 
attention impairments which frequently co-occur with memory impairment in 
acquired brain injury. The reader is directed to de Joode et al. (2010) for a recent 
review including studies addressing these issues.   
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PART TWO: EMPIRICAL PAPER 
 
Investigation of a “déjà vécu” delusion in a single case with 
matched controls 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Aim: To present a single case (EN) with a unique déjà vécu delusion, and 
experimentally explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying the condition.   
 
Methods: The study employed a neuropsychological single case design. Full 
neuropsychological assessment was completed and seven experimental tests were 
administered to explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying EN’s déjà vécu. 
Performance was compared to 10 matched controls. 
 
Results: EN showed a marked false recognition effect for particular types of 
stimuli, and also had a severe source monitoring impairment in which he was 
completely unable to recall contextual information about the source of his 
memories. The results also indicated a dissociation between autobiographical 
and non-autobiographical episodic memory processing.  
 
Conclusions: A “two-factor” theory of déjà vécu is proposed in which déjà vécu 
is suggested to arise from an abnormal sense of familiarity overlain with 
impairments in belief evaluation and monitoring processes. The dissociation 
between autobiographical and non autobiographical episodic memory 
processing is discussed in terms of differences in the degree to which personal 
and emotional associations are formed for these two different types of event. 
Finally, implications for the rehabilitation of déjà vécu and other paramnestic 
disorders are explored. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Memory disorders are a common consequence of brain injury, and pose 
significant problems for the sufferer in day to day life. They also pose a 
significant rehabilitation challenge, as rehabilitation professionals try to 
uncover the best ways of ameliorating or compensating for changes in memory 
functioning.  The most common form of memory disorder is amnesia, the loss of 
pre-existing memory, or the loss of the ability to form new memories. These are 
disorders involving the absence of memory. However there are also memory 
disorders in which the critical feature is not the absence of memories, but the 
presence of incorrect memories, conditions sometimes known as paramnesias.  
 
In normal life, the closest we come to this type of experience is probably déjà vu. 
Déjà vu describes the strange sensation that one has already encountered the 
current situation at some point in the past. As well as being a feature of some 
neurological conditions, most notably temporal lobe epilepsy (Wild, 2005), it is 
also a relatively common phenomenon in neurologically normal populations, 
with estimates that approximately 60% of people have experienced it (Brown, 
2003).  The defining feature of déjà vu is that it is a disorder of familiarity – one 
feels that the current situation is familiar, despite the certain knowledge that 
this cannot be so. However a pathological form of déjà vu, known as “déjà vécu” 
has recently been described (Moulin, Conway, Thompson, James & Jones, 2005; 
Moulin, Turunen, Salter, O'Connor, Conway, & Jones, 2006; Tabet & 
Sivaloganathan, 2001; Thompson, Moulin, Conway, & Jones, 2004). In déjà vécu, 
the sense of déjà vu is persistent and convincing rather than being fleeting, and 
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patients genuinely believe that they have lived through the current moment at 
some previous time. These beliefs can take on a delusional intensity, and result 
in considerable disruption in day to day life.  
 
Moulin et al. (2005) described a detailed experimental investigation of two 
patients with déjà vécu. Patients AKP and MA both had diffuse temporal lobe 
pathology, and both presented with the belief that they had already experienced 
events before. They had withdrawn from previously enjoyed activities, for 
example reading and watching TV, because they felt they had seen it all before. 
This sense of déjà vécu also permeated their daily activities, for example AKP 
complained that every time he went for a walk “it was the same bird in the same 
tree singing the same song” (Moulin et al., 2005, p 1364), and MA felt that she 
could predict the future, as she had lived through it all before.   
 
In an elegant series of experiments Moulin et al. (2005) demonstrated that both 
patients shared a characteristic pattern of memory impairment. First, they 
showed high levels of false positives on recognition tasks. Second, they had an 
overextended recollective experience for items which they falsely recognised. 
Recognition memory can be subdivided into two component processes: 
recollection and familiarity. Recollective experience is characteristic of genuine 
memories, as it involves recall of details (images, thoughts and feelings) 
associated with the event. In this way it differs from familiarity, which lacks the 
detail of recollection but is characterised by a more general feeling of having 
encountered the information before (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, 
Yonelinas, 2002). AKP and MA, rather than simply indicating that the items felt 
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familiar, actually reported that they remembered the prior (non-existent) 
presentation of the items. Third, they showed a tendency to produce 
“recollective confabulations” to justify their déjà vécu, in which they provided 
false details and false accounts of having experienced items and events before. 
On the basis of this evidence Moulin et al. (2005) concluded that in contrast to 
déjà vu (a disorder of familiarity), déjà vécu is a disorder of recollection, 
resulting from damage to fronto-temporal circuits which monitor and control 
experiences of remembering.  
 
This study presents a new case of déjà vecu, with a unique presentation in 
which déjà vecu is entirely restricted to non-personal events. The study aims to 
further examine the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the disorder, with a 
view to informing both our understanding of normal memory function, and our 
understanding of how to rehabilitate memory disorders of this type.  
 
 
CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
We saw EN when he was 38 years old, after he was referred for assessment of 
an “apparent delusional condition”. Twelve years prior to this, EN had suffered a 
severe closed head injury when he fell from a cliff. Hospital reports from the 
time indicate a head injury involving combined hypoxic and diffuse axonal 
damage, and a depressed fracture of the left frontal bones. Initial Glasgow Coma 
Scale score was 6, and he remained in post-traumatic amnesia for four months. 
In the initial stages of recovery he was mute but could communicate by writing 
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(although this was bizarre with jargon). He was discharged home five months 
after his accident to live with his father. His neuropsychological report on 
discharge indicates a severe memory impairment, word finding difficulties and 
executive functioning impairments with lack of insight into his difficulties. At 
that time he had a Verbal IQ of 86, a Performance IQ of 66 (Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Revised), and an Immediate Memory Index of 75 (Wechsler 
Memory Scale – Revised). 
 
When assessed 12 years later EN was cheerful, alert, fully oriented and 
appeared to have made a remarkable recovery. He provided a full history and 
reported that he could remember events up to and including part of the fall. EN 
was unable to work due to residual back and neck pain and remained living 
with his father, supported by disability benefit. He was taking medication for 
headaches and reflux, but no other medications. He reported two other head 
injuries, both prior to his fall; on both occasions he was struck on the head by a 
cricket ball and was concussed but made a full recovery. He had no other 
neurological or psychiatric history.  
 
When questioned about any lasting effects of his accident, EN reported that he 
had some problems with his memory, and felt he was more impatient than he 
used to be. He did not report any other problems. However his father reported 
significant problems consistent with déjà vécu. He said that EN had delusions 
about events re-occurring, especially with large sporting events that he was 
watching on television. When EN saw these events on television he insisted that 
he had already seen them before. He always reported that he had seen them in 
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1994 when he was in the Brain Injury Unit of the hospital where he had been 
treated following his accident. His father reported that EN was absolutely 
convinced that he had seen these events before, and could not be reasoned with 
about the inconsistencies these beliefs entailed. Indeed he would occasionally 
become aggressive if his beliefs were challenged.  
 
EN was interviewed in detail about his déjà vécu experiences. When asked 
whether he ever felt that the same things happened to him more than once, EN 
responded that he did feel this way about things that he read in the papers and 
watched on TV, specifically for sport, soap operas, and news. For example when 
EN was interviewed, the Australian cricket team had just played the first 
international Twenty20 game against South Africa in Australia, and were soon 
to travel to South Africa for the away game. EN told us that he had already seen 
these matches in 1994 when he was in hospital after his head injury.  
 
EN described experiencing this feeling for numerous sporting and news events, 
including several cricket matches, the July 2005 bombings in London, and the 
2004 tsunami. He did not believe that the events themselves were happening 
twice, but believed that they had happened just once in 1994, and were later 
repeated on the television as if they were current events. He reasoned that this 
was because Sydney (where he had been hospitalised in 1994) had television 
programming that was significantly ahead of his small rural home town, which 
he believed was screening events several years after they had occurred.    
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EN: I saw the tsunami and I said “That happened when I was in hospital in 
Sydney!” And I said – “We’re finally catching up!”.  I thought “get over the déjà 
vu, I’ll be able to start living a normal life now!””  
Experimenter: So when did the tsunami actually happen? What year? 
EN: Well I reckon I saw it when I was in hospital in 1994.  
Experimenter: And they were showing reports of the 1994 tsunami more 
recently? 
EN: Yeah. They were finally showing in the country what I saw in hospital in 
1994. 
 
EN was asked whether what he experienced was similar to the regular feeling of 
déjà vu that everyone has once in a while:  
 
Experimenter: Have you heard the term déjà vu? Is there any difference 
between that and the kind of thing you experience? 
EN: Well everyone says “you only think you’ve seen it before”. But I’ll swear 
black and blue that I have seen it before.  
Experimenter: So with these kinds of events … with the sports and everything 
else, you’re sure that you’ve seen it before? 
EN: Yeah I’m 100% sure that I saw it when I was in hospital. 
 
EN commented that when he told people about these experiences they regularly 
challenged him to tell them what was going to happen, or, in the case of sporting 
events, what the outcome of the match was. However he said that he could not 
always remember the exact details of events due to his memory problem.  
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EN: People say “Well if you’ve seen it can you remember what’s going to 
happen?” And I say “Well sometimes your memory gets it right and sometimes 
it gets it wrong”.  
EN’s father: Actually with that Twenty20 match the other night you said “I 
know who wins this but I won’t tell you, I won’t spoil it for you”. 
EN: Yeah. 
 
EN does admit to some occasional confusion regarding his beliefs. For example 
on one occasion his brother went to see a live cricket match, but EN 
remembered seeing this same match on television in 1994. EN struggles to 
explain this incident. However he is very resistant to any challenge to his beliefs.  
 
Experimenter: When you see things now and you remember already having 
seen them in 1994, does anyone try to tell you that you’re mistaken? 
EN: Well people say “It’s live!”  And I say “Yeah, well, whenever they take the 
picture it’s always live – but it’s just the programming of the stations, that’s 
why you’ve got it now”. 
Experimenter:  So when people say that it is live and that it’s happening now 
you don’t think that they’re right? 
EN: No, I reckon I saw it when I was in hospital and that’s when it was on then. 
Experimenter: And why do you think that they always repeating programs just 
from that period in 1994? Why don’t they repeat things from 1996 or 1998? 
EN: Oh well I just put that down to the programming of the stations. 
Experimenter: Right. But they don’t repeat programs other than from those 6 
weeks (that you were in hospital). Is that right? 
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EN: Well, I don’t know because I wouldn’t have seen any more after that. I was 
gone then! 
Experimenter: What would you think if I told you that sometimes after head 
injuries people get the feeling that things that they are seeing now have 
happened before, but actually they didn’t. That actually it’s a consequence of 
having had a head injury. 
EN: Well your mind can make you believe what it wants. 
Experimenter: Yes that’s the difficulty. Do you think that could have happened 
to you? 
EN: Um….(long pause). Well that’s what everyone says, but I still remember 
lying in bed and watching it on TV. I can remember the TV, sitting in bed and 
watching it on TV. 
 
EN’s déjà vécu is so pervasive that he does not appear to experience any news 
or sporting events as current, or as having occurred later than 1994.  
 
Experimenter: When you’re watching the news, do some items seem completely 
new to you, that you haven’t seen before? 
EN: Um, no, I think I’ve heard all of it.  
Experimenter: All of it? 
EN: Yes, the news and the sport. 
Experimenter: Can you tell me about a few big sporting or news events which 
have happened between ’94 and now? What have been the major things in the 
news since your accident? 
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EN: Um… what they say now I reckon I’ve seen it in ’94, so to me its not news 
it’s just old news. 
Experimenter: Have there been any new things that have happened between 
’94 and now? 
EN: Not that I can think of off-hand. 
Experimenter: Nothing in the news? No world events? 
EN: I can’t think of any. Like I reckon I saw those Bali bombings, the tsunami, 
Australia losing the Ashes, the Olympics, the tri-nations. I came back and I said 
“England beats them in the football!”, I said “Australia loses the tri-nations” 
and they said “No!”, and I said “You watch”. So I don’t think I would say 
anything, no. 
Experimenter: There have been no big events between ’94 and now? 
EN: Not that I can think of. Not that, as I say, I hadn’t already seen. 
 
For EN, world events stood still in 1994. 
 
Aims of the study: 
The aim of this study was to explore the mechanisms underlying EN’s déjà vécu 
delusion using a neuropsychological single case design. In order to do this a full 
standardised neuropsychological assessment was conducted, and seven new 
experimental tests were designed and administered. These were conducted with EN 
and 10 matched controls. The experimental investigations had two main objectives. 
First, to explore the extent and nature of EN’s delusional, confabulatory and déjà 
vécu experiences (Objective 1), and second, to explore the cognitive mechanisms 
responsible for his déjà vécu (Objective 2). The neuropsychological assessment and 
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the two experimental objectives are presented separately below. For clarity, methods 
and results are presented for each test in turn.  
 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
Standardised Neuropsychological Assessment 
EN’s performance on standardised tests assessing intelligence, executive 
functioning and memory can be seen in Table 1. On the WAIS-III, performance 
was in the Average range apart from Processing Speed, which was in the Low 
Average range. Memory functioning as measured by the WMS-III was lower 
than would be expected on the basis of his general level of intelligence, with five 
of the eight index scores significantly lower than his full scale IQ. Similarly his 
performance on the California Verbal Learning Test and Doors and People test 
indicated significant problems with memory, although Story Recall was 
preserved. In terms of executive functioning, EN had impairments in response 
suppression (as measured by the Hayling test), and set-shifting (as measured by 
the WCST). However his resistance to interference (Stroop), planning (Tower of 
London), cognitive estimation, verbal fluency and sustained attention were 
within normal limits.  
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Table 1:   
Standardised Neuropsychological Assessment (* indicates performance in the impaired range). 
 
Test Patient EN Test Patient EN 
Intelligence:   Memory:  
WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997)  WMS-III Index Scores (Wechsler, 1997)  
     Verbal IQ 101      Auditory Memory 86 
     Performance IQ 92      Visual Immediate 65 
     Full Scale IQ 98      Immediate Memory 71 
          Verbal Comprehension 96      Auditory Delayed 80 
          Perceptual Organisation 95      Visual Delayed 68 
          Working Memory 108      Auditory Recognition Delayed 90 
          Processing Speed 88      General Memory 74 
       Working Memory 96 
Executive Function:  Story Recall (Coughlan & Hollows, 1985)  
Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997)       Immediate Story Recall  33/56 (50 %ile) 
     Part A Sensible Completion 6 (Average)      Intrusions in Immediate Story Recall  3   
     Part B Unconnected Completion 5 (Mod. Average)      Delayed Story Recall  30/56 (25-50 %ile) 
     Error Score 3 (Poor) *      Intrusions in Delayed Story Recall  3 
Stroop (Golden & Freshwater, 2002)  California Verbal Learning Test (Delis et al., 2000)  
     Word Score T = 44      Trials 1-5 Free Recall Total T = 30 * 
     Colour Score T = 54      List B Free Recall Correct Z = -1.5 
     Colour-Word Score T = 60      Short Delay Free Recall Correct Z = -2.0 * 
     Interference Score T = 57       Short Delay Cued Recall Correct Z = -2.0 * 
Tower Of London (Shallice, 1982)       Long Delay Free Recall Correct Z = -2.5 * 
    Trials Correct 12/12      Long Delay Cued Recall Correct Z = -2.5 * 
    Trials Solved in Minimum Moves 8/12      Total Intrusions Z = 3.5 * 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Milner, 1963)       Long Delay Yes/No Recognition Hits Z = -3.0 * 
     Categories 1 (2-5%ile) *      Long Delay Yes/No Recognition False Positives Z = 3.5 * 
     Total Errors 64/128 (1 %ile) *      Long Delay Forced Choice Recognition 16/16 
     Perseverative Errors 26 (4 %ile) * Doors & People (Baddeley et al., 1994)  
     Failures to Maintain Set  2 (11-16 %ile)      Visual Memory <1 %ile * 
Cognitive Estimates (Shallice & Evans, l978) 6 (10 %ile)      Verbal Memory <1 %ile * 
Controlled Oral Word Association (Heaton et al., 2004) T = 33      Recall Memory <1 %ile * 
Elevator Test of Sustained Attention (Robertson et al., 1994) 7/7 (normal)      Recognition Memory <1 %ile * 
114 
 
Objective 1: Exploration of EN’s Delusional, Confabulatory and Déjà Vécu 
Experiences: 
 
i) Delusion Interview 
It was unclear whether, in addition to déjà vécu, EN might also be experiencing 
a wide range of unusual beliefs.  In order to investigate this, a semi-structured 
interview was designed consisting of a series of questions assessing for the presence 
of a range of false beliefs, delusions, hallucination and reduplications (see appendix 
i). EN reported a false belief that his brother was repeatedly stealing his clothing 
and possessions, which had led to the breakdown of their relationship. However 
he reported no other false beliefs, delusions, hallucinations or reduplications 
apart from his déjà vécu experiences.  
 
ii)Confabulation Battery 
In order to explore whether EN’s déjà vécu extended to a general tendency to 
confabulate, he was given a modified confabulation battery based on that 
developed by Dalla Barba, Cipolotti & Denes (1990; see appendix ii).  
 
Method: 
The 45-item battery consisted of 10 questions probing personal semantic 
memory (5 remote and 5 current), 10 questions probing general semantic 
memory (5 remote and 5 current), 15 questions probing personal episodic 
memory (5 remote, 5 current and 5 future), and 10 questions to which most 
participants would be expected to answer “I Don’t Know” (5 semantic and 5 
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personal episodic). Questions were put to EN in a random order, and responses 
were scored as ‘‘correct’’, ‘‘confabulation” or a “don’t know’’ response.  
 
Results: 
EN produced only 3 confabulations out of a possible 45. All of these concerned 
general semantic information. When asked what happened to President 
Kennedy, he mentioned as part of his (otherwise accurate) response that the 
fellow who shot him had recently been released from prison. When asked what 
event had taken place in New Orleans the previous year (Hurricane Katrina) he 
responded that terrorists had hijacked an aeroplane, although he readily 
accepted that this was an error when corrected. The third confabulation related 
directly to his déjà vécu (when asked what happened in Bali the previous year, 
he accurately described the Bali bombings, but insisted that this had originally 
happened in 1994). All other questions were answered appropriately, and his 
father did not report any problems with spontaneous confabulation.  Hence 
there is no evidence of a generalised confabulatory disorder. Rather, EN’s 
presentation appears to be one of circumscribed déjà vécu.   
 
iii)Dating Battery 
There were three striking aspects to EN’s déjà vécu. First, it seemed to be 
entirely restricted to non-personal events. This is in contrast to previous 
reports of déjà vecu, which have described déjà vecu affecting personal and non-
personal events. For example, similar to EN, Moulin et al.’s (2005) patient AKP 
refused to watch TV or read the newspapers because he said he had seen it 
before. However AKP also experienced déjà vécu for personally experienced 
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events, for example when he went for a walk he would complain that drivers 
must have very regular habits as the same cars always passed by at the same 
time each day. Similarly patient MA experienced déjà vécu for television 
programs and news events, believing that she knew the number of people killed 
in the terrorist bombing in Bali. However she also experienced déjà vécu for 
personally experienced situations, for example during a visit to an electrical 
store she became convinced that she had already been to the same store and sat 
on the same chairs with the same people in the room. In sharp contrast, whilst 
EN regularly experiences déjà vécu for sporting and news events encountered 
on television and radio, neither he nor his father could recall any incidences 
where this had happened for personally experienced, autobiographical events. 
Secondly, EN’s déjà vécu was extraordinarily time-specific. In contrast to other 
reported cases of déjà vécu, EN reported that all events for which he 
experienced déjà vécu had originally been encountered at the same time: in 
1994, whilst he was in hospital. Thirdly, EN was completely convinced by his 
déjà vécu experience. No attempts to reason with him could persuade him that 
he might be mistaken. In order to explore these impressions experimentally, a 
battery was designed to assess EN’s ability to accurately date events from 
different time periods. 
 
Method: 
EN was presented with brief descriptions of 40 events. 20 were well-known 
news and sporting events, and 20 were events which had happened to him 
personally. Details of these personal events were obtained from his father. 
Within each category, 10 events had occurred prior to his accident in 1994, and 
117 
 
10 had occurred after his accident (see appendix iii). An account of each event 
was read individually to EN in a random order, and he was asked to estimate 
which year the event had occurred in. After he gave a date for each event, EN 
was also asked to give a rating of how confident he was that his response was 
correct. He was asked to give a figure between 0% and 100%, where 0% meant 
“I am not at all sure that this date is correct” and 100% meant “I am totally sure 
that this date is correct”. 
 
Results: 
EN’s performance on the dating battery is shown in figure 1. He was able to 
provide relatively accurate date estimates for both personally experienced 
events and for news and sporting events which occurred prior to 1994. 
However there was a dramatic dissociation in his ability to date events which 
occurred after his accident. Whilst his ability to estimate the date of personal 
events was unaffected, he was no longer able to provide accurate date estimates 
for news and sporting events. Instead he estimated that nine out of the ten post-
1994 events occurred in 1994, whilst he was in hospital following his accident. 
The only event which he did not attribute to 1994 was the 9/11 terrorist attack 
on the US. For this item he originally provided a date estimate of 1994. However 
he then commented that the event had happened in September, and he hadn’t 
been in hospital in September 1994. He reasoned therefore that the event must 
have happened in September 1993, but that he had not seen it on television
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Figure 1: EN’s performance on the Dating Battery and accompanying confidence ratings (insert). 
until he was in hospital in 19941.  
 
A 2x2 ANOVA conducted on EN’s confidence ratings for his date estimates 
showed no difference in confidence judgements between pre-accident and post-
accident events (Figure 1: main effect F(1, 36) = 1.20, p =0.28) , and no difference 
in confidence judgements between personal and news / sporting events (main 
effect F(1, 36) = 2.62, p =0.11). However there was a significant interaction (F(1, 36) 
= 10.69, p = 0.002), with EN’s confidence at ceiling for post-accident news and 
sporting events. He reported that he was 100% confident that all ten post-1994 
news and sporting events had occurred in (or before) 1994.  
 
Objective 1: Summary: 
The results of the experiments described so far indicate a remarkably specific 
déjà vécu disorder. There is no evidence of other delusional beliefs, or of a 
general confabulatory disorder. Nor is there any evidence that EN experiences 
déjà vécu for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Instead EN 
experiences déjà vécu which is domain-specific (for news and sporting events, 
nearly always encountered in the media), time-specific (all events are reported 
as having first been encountered in 1994) and associated with pathologically 
high confidence.  
 
                                                 
1
  EN did date one pre-accident news event as having occurred post-1994. When asked “When did the 
Berlin wall come down?” he responded “Um…say the 90s… I’m only guessing there.” When pushed 
for a specific year he responded “Make it half way, say ’95”. This response did not therefore seem to 
be based on a recollection of a news event that took place after his accident, but was a guess. 
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Objective 2: Experimental Tests Exploring the Cognitive Mechanisms 
Underlying EN’s Déjà Vécu: 
 
In order to explore the cognitive mechanisms underling EN’s déjà vécu a series 
of experimental tests derived from those used by Moulin et al. (2005) were 
administered. These assessed: i) EN’s metacognitive ability; ii) his tendency 
towards false positives; iii) whether there was evidence for overextended 
recollective experience; and iv) memory for temporal and contextual source. 
The aim was to see if EN’s déjà vécu was associated with the same pattern of 
impairments as Moulin et al.’s (2005) patients, AKP and MA. On each test EN’s 
performance was compared to that of 10 male volunteers matched for age 
(mean 37.1 yrs, SD = 4.56) and years of education (mean 14.4 yrs, SD = 2.24). 
EN’s performance was compared to controls using Crawford & Garthwaite’s 
(2002) modified t-test, which allows comparison of an individual patient's score 
with a small control sample. One-tailed tests were used to test the hypothesis 
that EN was impaired on these tasks compared to controls. 
 
i) Feeling of Knowing Task 
 
One hypothesis is that EN’s déjà vécu might be the result of generally disordered 
metacognitive abilities, which would disrupt his ability to accurately evaluate 
the content and process of his memory. In other words EN may feel that he 
knows most things, even if he doesn’t get them right. In order to explore this 
possibility a “feeling of knowing” (FOK) task based on that described by Moulin 
et al. (2005) was administered (see appendix iv).   
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Methods:  
EN and controls were required to recall answers to 50 general knowledge 
questions (e.g. In which country did Chess originate?) with instructions not to 
guess. For those questions they were unable to answer, they were asked to 
predict how likely it was that they would recognise the answer if presented with 
four alternatives. These FOK predictions were made on a three-point scale: “I 
am certain I will be able to recognise this answer later / I am quite sure I will be 
able to recognise this answer / I will have to guess”. Immediately after the recall 
phase participants were given the recognition phase. In this phase they were 
provided with the same general knowledge questions but this time were 
required to select the correct answer from four alternatives (e.g. In which 
country did Chess originate? a) England; b) Germany; c) India; d) Italy). 
Participants with good metacognitive abilities are expected to make higher FOK 
judgements for items which are ultimately recognised correctly, and lower FOK 
judgements for items for which they ultimately select the wrong answer.  
 
Results: 
Table 2:  
Feeling of Knowing Task (* = significantly different from control p < 0.05). 
 
 Control 
Mean 
Control 
Std. Dev. 
EN 
Recall Phase    
     Correct Recall  (Max 50) 22.00 7.90 7 
     Incorrect Recall (Max 50) 1.9 1.6 8 * 
Recognition Phase (includes only those items not  
answered in recall phase)  
   
     Proportion “Certain” responses  0.17 0.19 0 
     … later recognised correctly 0.85 0.13 N/A 
     Proportion “Quite sure” responses 0.30 0.14 0.69 * 
     … later recognised correctly 0.78 0.12 0.67 
     Proportion “Guess” responses 0.53 0.25 0.31 
     … later recognised correctly 0.54 0.16 0.36 
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EN’s performance on the feeling of knowing task can be seen in table 2 
alongside the performance of the control group. EN’s correct recall of answers 
to the general knowledge questions was low but did not differ significantly from 
control performance. However his incorrect recall was significantly higher than 
controls (t = 3.66, p = 0.003). This offers some indication of reduced 
metacognitive accuracy, as participants were specifically instructed not to guess 
unless they were sure of the answer.  
 
However EN’s performance on the recognition phase did not suggest that he had 
generally reduced metacognitive accuracy. The only measure on which he 
differed significantly from controls was the proportion of “quite sure” responses 
he made. He was significantly more likely to use this response category than 
controls (t = 2.66, p = 0.01). EN did not use any “certain” FOK responses, which 
may partly explain this result. However there was no significant difference 
between EN and controls in terms of the proportions of “quite sure” and “guess” 
responses which were later answered correctly. Both controls and EN showed 
an appropriate slope whereby those questions assigned “quite sure” FOK 
judgements were more likely to be answered correctly than those assigned 
“guess” FOK judgements, and EN’s response accuracy did not differ significantly 
from controls. EN did seem able to make accurate feeling of knowing 
judgements which reflected his later memory performance. Like Moulin et al.’s 
(2005) patients, déjà vécu in EN does not seem to result from a dysfunctional 
feeling of knowing in which he feels he knows everything.  
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ii)Famous Faces Test  
 
Moulin et al. (2005) reported that both of their cases showed high levels of false 
positives on recognition tasks. In order to explore whether EN shared this 
tendency towards false positive responding EN was given a face recognition 
task based on that used by Moulin et al. (2005). 
 
Methods: 
Participants were shown a series of photographs of faces, and were required to 
make two judgements for each photograph. First they were asked to indicate if 
the person in the photograph was famous or not (a semantic memory 
judgement). Second they were asked to indicate if they had seen the photograph 
already in the test session (an episodic memory judgement). 54 photographs 
were presented individually: 18 stimuli were presented once and 18 were 
presented twice. In each of these sets of 18, half of the faces were famous and 
half were non-famous. 
 
Results: 
Compared to controls, EN showed a significant reduction in the number of faces 
he was able to identify as famous (Figure 2: t = -6.818, p < 0.001). His semantic 
memory false alarm rate (the number of non-famous faces he misidentified as 
famous) was normal. However in terms of identifying pictures which were 
repeated (episodic memory), EN showed a normal hit rate but an enormous 
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Figure 2: Performance on the Famous Faces task. * indicates significant difference 
between EN and control performance p < 0.05. 
 
 
false alarm rate (t = 33.173, p < 0.001). EN identified 35 out of the 36 images as 
having been seen already in the experiment. The only face he said he had not 
seen already was the first face presented in the run.  
 
Déjà vécu patients AKP and MA (Moulin et al., 2005) had marked false 
recognition effects in both their judgements of fame and their judgements of 
repetitions. By contrast EN showed a false recognition effect only for episodic 
familiarity (repetition) but not for semantic familiarity (fame). It is interesting 
to note that EN (unlike AKP and MA) does not experience déjà vécu in relation 
to people and faces in everyday life. Therefore it initially seems surprising that 
he shows such a pronounced false repetition effect for faces. However this 
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experiment involves viewing images of faces, rather than real life encounters 
with people. As such it is more similar to watching television than experiencing 
an autobiographical event, and may therefore reflect his déjà vécu more closely 
than it might first appear. This distinction between personally experienced, 
autobiographical episodes and non-personal episodes is explored further in the 
discussion.   
 
iii) Recollective Experience Task 
 
Moulin et al. (2005) attributed déjà vécu in their two cases to overextended 
recollective experience, in which falsely recognised items and situations were 
“recollected” with the same detail as a genuinely remembered experience. This 
recollective experience differs from familiarity, which lacks the detail of 
recollection but is characterised by a more general feeling of having 
encountered the information before (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, 
Yonelinas, 2002). Therefore a recollective task based on that described by 
Moulin et al. (2005) was administered in order to explore whether 
overextended recollective experience was also a feature of EN’s déjà vécu.  
 
Methods: 
Participants were presented with a series of 30 words. 10 of these words were 
low frequency (Kucera-Francis frequency = 1, e.g. “presage”), 10 were of mid 
frequency (Kucera-Francis frequency = 150-350, e.g. “heart”) and 10 were of 
high-frequency (Kucera-Francis frequency 500-1600, e.g. “good”, see appendix v 
for a full list of words used). Frequency information was obtained from the MRC 
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Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). This manipulation examined the 
possibility that déjà vécu may be more marked for distinct than mundane events 
(Moulin et al., 2005). Words were read out loud in a pseudo-random order and 
participants were asked to make a pleasantness judgement for each word 
(pleasant, unpleasant or neutral). Immediately afterwards the participants had 
a test phase in which the 30 original words were presented alongside 30 
frequency-matched new words. Words were read out loud in a pseudo-random 
order and participants were asked to indicate whether the word was one of 
those from the original list. If they indicated that it was, they were asked to 
describe how “well” they remembered the word from the list by indicating 
whether their response was “remember”, “familiar” or “guess”.  
 
The same instructions given by Moulin et al. (2005) were used to explain the 
different memory awareness states to participants. The three response 
categories were also presented on a card to which they could refer throughout 
testing. The categories were: “Remember: this is one of the words I heard 
before. I can remember hearing it. It has a feeling of pastness. I can remember 
something about it when it was presented before. Familiar: This is one the 
words I heard before, it seems familiar to me. Guess: This is one of the words I 
heard before, but I’m guessing.” Following a Remember response, participants 
were asked to justify their choice by describing what it was they remembered 
about the word. Justification for Familiar and Guess responses was not 
requested. 
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Figure 3: Correct recognition and false alarm rates on the Recollective Experience task, 
divided into Remember, Familiar and Guess responses. 
 
EN’s rates of correct recognition and false alarms did not differ significantly 
from controls. Similarly there were no significant differences in the proportion 
of R, F and G responses assigned by EN to his responses compared to controls, 
for either correct recognition or false alarms. No effects of word frequency were 
found on rates of correct recognition or false alarms. EN made two false alarms 
in response to high frequency lures and three in response to mid-frequency 
lures. However, like controls, he made no false alarms to low frequency lures.  
 
Patients AKP and MA made high numbers of false alarms on this task (including 
to low frequency words), and tended to provide “Remember” responses for 
them, leading Moulin et al. (2005) to conclude that an overextended recollective 
experience was a key feature of their déjà vécu. In contrast EN seemed well able 
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to distinguish previously encountered words from lures, and also had normal 
recollective experience. EN did tend to use a large number of R responses, 
however his justifications for these seemed appropriate. For example when 
justifying his R response for the presented word “presage” he responded “I 
remember I had to ask you to repeat this one”. EN did assign R responses to 2 of 
his false alarms (which are more normally associated with F responses, 
Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000), and provided recollective 
confabulations to justify these responses (for example for the lure “field” he 
responded “I remember thinking of a cricket field”). However given that his 
rates of false alarms were low and within normal limits on this task, there is no 
evidence of generally over-extended recollective experience.  
 
iv) Source Monitoring Task 
 
One final possibility is that EN’s déjà vécu results from a source monitoring 
impairment. Source monitoring describes the attribution process by which 
current mental events are attributed to particular sources on the basis of their 
qualitative characteristics, such as perceptual, contextual, and semantic 
information (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). It is possible that EN suffers 
from a particular type of source monitoring impairment in which he is unable to 
accurately evaluate the source of his memories. Many types of source 
monitoring impairment could be implicated in déjà vécu; one obvious candidate 
is an impairment in temporal source monitoring (i.e. memory for when events 
happened). In order to investigate this possibility a source monitoring test was 
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administered assessing memory for two types of source (temporal and person 
source) based on that developed by Waters, Maybery, Badcock & Michie (2004). 
 
Methods: 
Participants watched or performed pairings of two sets of 24 household objects 
over two sessions 30 minutes apart. In each session 24 objects (e.g. toy car, coin, 
etc) were randomly intermixed on a table top. Participants were told that they 
would pair some of the objects together and that the experimenter would pair 
other objects together, and that they would do this in two separate sessions. 
They were warned that they should try to remember which objects went 
together, who paired them, and in which session, for a subsequent memory test. 
The experimenter and the participant took turns to pair the objects, and 
instructions were read out loud by the experimenter (e.g. “I would like you to 
put together the cup and the key”, “Now watch me put together the spoon and 
the button”). Five minutes after the second session the participants had a 
recognition test in which 24 object pairs were read out loud in a random order. 
16 pairs were kept in their original combination and 8 pairs were objects that 
were re-paired in new combinations. No new objects were presented and 
objects in new combinations were kept within the same action sequence 
(watch/perform) and presentation session (1 or 2). Participants were asked to 
say if the pairs were pairs that had been made earlier, or if they were new 
combinations of objects. For those pairs which they indicated had been made 
earlier they had to specify who performed the pairing, (self/experimenter), and 
in which session the pair had been made (session 1/2). See appendix vi for a list 
of all stimuli. 
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Results: 
Table 3:  
Source Monitoring Task. (* = significantly different from control p < 0.05). 
 
 Control 
Mean 
Control 
Std. Dev. 
EN 
Item Memory    
     Correctly recognised pairs  
     (Max 16) 
12.30 3.83 12 
     False Alarms (Max 8) 1.7 1.77 5 
Source Monitoring     
     Proportion Correct Person Source 0.96 0.05 0.58 * 
     Proportion Correct Temporal Source 0.85 0.17 0.50 * 
 
 
 
EN’s performance on the Source Monitoring task can be seen in table 3 
alongside the performance of the control group. In terms of item recognition, 
EN’s ability to correctly identify pairs which had been presented earlier was 
unimpaired. His false alarm rate (misidentifying re-arranged pairs as original 
pairs) was slightly raised but within normal limits.  
 
However EN’s source monitoring ability was dramatically impaired. Controls 
correctly identified whether they or the experimenter had made the pair 96% of 
the time, and correctly identified the session in which the pairing had been 
made in 85% of cases. However EN performed at chance levels when asked to 
make either type of source judgement, and his performance was significantly 
worse than controls in both categories (person source judgements: t = -7.25, p 
<0.001; temporal source judgements: t = -1.963, p = 0.04). Despite intact item 
memory, EN is completely unable to accurately recall contextual information 
about the source of his memories.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
This study presents a unique case of déjà vécu. For 12 years, EN has had the 
experience that he has lived through events before. This differs from the typical 
déjà vu experience in which there is a general feeling that the event has 
happened at some unspecified point in “the undefined past” (Neppe, 1983). EN 
is completely convinced by his experience, cannot be reasoned out of the belief 
that he has seen these events before, and provides recollective confabulations to 
justify his beliefs. EN’s déjà vécu also has features not described previously in 
the literature: unlike previous cases, his déjà vécu is limited to non-personal 
events. By contrast he never experiences déjà vécu for personally experienced, 
autobiographical events. EN’s déjà vécu is also very specific in time: all events 
are thought to have been first experienced in 1994 in the period he spent in 
hospital immediately after his accident.  
 
The key features of EN’s case will be discussed as follows: First, the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying EN’s déjà vécu are discussed and a theory of déjà vécu 
offered. Second, the unusual domain-specificity of EN’s déjà vécu is discussed, 
along with the implications for our understanding of normal memory. Third, the 
implications of these findings for cognitive rehabilitation of déjà vécu and 
related disorders are explored. Finally, the limitations of the study are 
addressed, and some speculations made about the neuroanatomical substrates 
of the déjà vécu experience.  
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The Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Déjà Vécu 
In Moulin et al.’s (2005) study, their two patients with déjà vécu showed a 
characteristic pattern of performance on experimental tasks. Their 
metacognitive abilities were intact. However a) they had high levels of false 
positives on a range of recognition tasks, b) they provided “Remember” 
responses for falsely recognised items, indicating overextended recollective 
experience, and c) they produced “recollective confabulations” to back these 
responses up, i.e. they provided (false) accounts of their prior experience of 
items and events.  On this basis Moulin et al. (2005) distinguished between the 
normal experience of déjà vu and pathological déjà vécu by arguing that whilst 
déjà vu results from false familiarity, déjà vécu results from false recollective 
experience.  
 
Similar to AKP and MA, EN was found to have intact metacognitive abilities in 
experimental testing – his déjà vécu could not be explained by a tendency to 
think that he knew everything. However the results from the other experimental 
tests showed a slightly different pattern of performance to Moulin et al.’s 
patients AKP and MA. In terms of false recognition EN had a normal false alarm 
rate for word recognition (in the recollective experience task) and for object 
pairs (in the source memory task). In the famous faces task his false alarm rate 
was also normal for semantic memory (fame judgements), but he had a very 
high false alarm rate in episodic memory (indicating repetitions of faces). In 
terms of recollective experience, EN did not show elevated “Remember” 
responses, indicating no evidence for overextended recollective experience. 
However the source memory task revealed a dramatic source monitoring 
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impairment, in which his ability to recollect source information was at chance, 
despite intact memory for the items themselves.  
 
EN showed no evidence of extended recollective experience on the recollective 
experience task. This suggests that, in contrast to Moulin et al.’s (2005) account, 
déjà vécu in EN’s case does not arise from generally overextended recollective 
experience. However EN did show an increased false alarm rate on specific 
tasks, raising the possibility that déjà vécu may arise from false familiarity.  
 
The task on which EN showed the most marked impairment was the source 
monitoring task. On this task although he was as good as controls at recognising 
object pairs which had been made in the study session, he was at chance in his 
ability to identify a) whether it was him or the experimenter who had made the 
pairing, and b) which of two sessions the pair had been made in. In fact Moulin 
et al.’s (2005) patients also showed significant source monitoring impairments, 
even with a very easy source monitoring task (discriminating whether items 
had been presented in word or picture form), but this impairment was not 
raised in their discussion of the possible mechanisms underlying déjà vécu. A 
source monitoring impairment of this severity would mean that these patients, 
when they encounter something that feels familiar, have no supporting detail 
available to them about the source of this memory.  A combination of false 
familiarity with a source monitoring impairment might therefore be the critical 
cognitive mechanisms underlying déjà vécu, and may be able offer an account of 
déjà vécu that applies to AKP, MA and EN.  
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A two-factor theory of déjà vécu: 
Coltheart and colleagues (Coltheart, 2007; Coltheart, Langdon & McKay, 2007; 
Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Metcalf, 
Langdon & Coltheart, 2007, Turner & Coltheart, 2010) have suggested that 
delusions may result from a two factor impairment in which a first factor 
neuropsychological anomaly (which determines the broad type of delusion) is 
overlain with a second factor impairment in belief evaluation or monitoring 
processes. This second factor accounts for why the unusual belief is adopted 
and maintained rather than being rejected. Whilst the first factor will vary 
according to delusion type, the second factor may be common to all delusion 
types. This theory allows for the observation that many neuropsychological 
impairments associated with delusions may also be experienced without leading 
to a delusion (Davies et al., 2001).  
 
This type of theory offers a means of understanding both déjà vu and déjà vécu. 
Both déjà vu and déjà vécu may result from the same “first factor” impairment: a 
false sense of familiarity (perhaps resulting from false activation of recognition 
memory systems located in the mesial temporal lobe, discussed further below). 
However if both déjà vu and déjà vécu arise from the same core deficit, how do 
they lead to such different disorders: one a normal and fleeting sensation 
experienced by approximately 60% of the population, and the other a delusional 
disorder? The two-factor account proposes that in order to create déjà vécu, the 
false feeling of familiarity must be combined with a second factor impairment in 
which belief evaluation or monitoring processes are faulty. Thus in déjà vu one 
has a strong sense that the familiarity is inappropriate and that one cannot 
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really have experienced this situation before. However in déjà vécu, false 
familiarity is overlaid with a failure in belief evaluation or monitoring processes, 
which renders the patient unable to reject their false beliefs. 
 
The second factor belief evaluation or monitoring deficit has been proposed to 
be shared with other conditions involving false beliefs (Davies et al, 2001), and 
is likely to involve several components (Turner & Coltheart, 2010). However in 
déjà vécu, source monitoring impairments, and particularly temporal source 
monitoring impairments, may be a critical feature. A false sense of familiarity, 
for which you cannot identify the source, would give rise to the sensation of déjà 
vu (Brown, 2003). However a source monitoring impairment in which the sense 
of familiarity is inappropriate, and strongly linked to source information that is 
incorrect, would lead to a delusional proposition about the source of the 
familiarity, i.e. that you have experienced it before. In EN, his poor source 
monitoring seems to be combined with a bias to temporally place events in 
1994. This may be because when he experiences a false sense of familiarity, the 
period of the accident (a very significant event in his past, when he also suffered 
a long period of PTA), offers the most obvious explanation, and because his 
memory impairment means that details of events encountered since 1994 are 
vague. In combination with other types of belief evaluation impairment, such as 
impairment of the ability to assess the plausibility of the belief in relation to 
other knowledge, this could lead to the adoption and maintenance of a 
delusional belief.  
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Most normal déjà vu experiences are unpredictable and fleeting, making 
empirical study difficult. However Kalra, Chancellor & Zeman (2007) reported 
an intriguing case of sudden onset déjà vu in a woman taking 5-
hydroxytryptophan for a medical complaint. Forty-five minutes after taking the 
tablet the patient was overwhelmed with feelings of déjà vécu which lasted 
several hours. The same thing happened again on second administration for the 
drug. The paper contains a fascinating passage in which the patient describes 
her experience in detail. She comments at one point “I was a little freaked out 
when I watched TV as I felt I was watching repeats, although I knew I wasn’t, as 
it was the news”. Later she comments “I knew I couldn’t know these things, but I 
felt like I did.” (Kalra et al., 2007, p312). This paper seems to describe the first 
factor impairment of déjà vécu, without the second factor impairment. In this 
case, although disturbed by the intensity of her feelings of déjà vu, the patient 
was able to reason that the sensation of having lived through the present 
moment before could not be real.  
 
To summarise, a two factor theory of déjà vécu would propose that the 
experience arises initially from a false sensation of familiarity (the first factor 
impairment). In normal cases this is fleeting, and addressed by intact source 
monitoring and reasoning processes, leading to a feeling of déjà vu. However in 
déjà vécu this experience is prolonged. Due to the additional presence of source 
monitoring and other belief evaluation impairments (the second factor), a 
recollective confabulation is generated about the source of the familiarity, 
leading to the delusional form of déjà vécu.  
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Domain specific déjà vécu: A dissociation between autobiographical and 
non-autobiographical episodic memory processing? 
The most striking feature of EN’s déjà vécu is that it does not affect all domains 
of memory. The patients described by Moulin et al. (2005) experienced déjà 
vécu across the board, for news events but also for personally experienced 
events. In sharp contrast, EN only experiences déjà vécu for news and sporting 
events, most often encountered on television. He has never experienced déjà 
vécu for personally experienced events. It appears that in EN, personal events 
may somehow be protected from the delusional process. If so, the current 
findings could have implications not only for our understanding of déjà vécu, 
but also for our understanding of normal memory.  
 
Tulving and colleagues (Tulving 1972, 1983, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 
1997) have famously distinguished between episodic and semantic memory 
systems. Semantic memory describes the store of generic knowledge we have 
about the world, about facts, people and events, which lack accompanying 
knowledge of an individual episode in which the info was learnt. We simply 
“know” these things without recollecting an episode in which we learnt them. In 
contrast episodic memory uniquely enables us to remember past experiences - 
for example when we recollect what we had for breakfast this morning, or the 
events of our first day at school many years ago, we are using the episodic 
memory system. There is substantial evidence from the neuropsychological 
literature that these memory systems are dissociable. Thus most patients with 
amnesia have great difficulty recollecting events from their personal past, but 
have intact semantic knowledge of facts, meanings and events (see Kapur, 1999 
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and Wheeler & McMillan, 2001, for reviews). More rarely, the opposite pattern 
can also be seen, in which there is preserved memory for episodes but impaired 
memory for semantic knowledge (Markowitsch, Calabrese, Neufeldt, Gehlen & 
Durwen, 1999).  
 
However the dissociation shown by EN is not as simple as an episodic / 
semantic distinction. EN’s déjà vécu is restricted to news events, which may on 
the surface appear to relate to semantic knowledge, but they are in fact 
episodes. This is so for several reasons. First, the memories he has are time-
specific: EN (falsely) recalls individual episodes in which he first encountered 
these news events on television in 1994 in Sydney, he does not recall 
generalised semantic knowledge of a fact. Second, his déjà vécu occurs when he 
experiences these events for the first time (he just doesn’t believe that this is 
so), so by definition they relate to episodes. Third, it has been demonstrated 
that EN does not experience déjà vécu for general semantic knowledge. The 
Feeling of Knowing task demonstrated that he has no general feeling that he 
knows facts that he doesn’t, and the Famous Faces task demonstrated that his 
false alarm rate for semantic (fame) information was normal. EN’s déjà vécu 
only affects episodic memory. But more specifically, EN’s déjà vécu affects only 
non-autobiographical episodic memory, that is events that he is not personally 
involved in.  
 
The fact that EN never experiences déjà vécu for personally experienced events 
suggests the possibility that autobiographical and non-autobiographical 
episodic memories are processed differently, allowing for one domain to be 
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disrupted and the other to remain intact. No dissociation between these two 
forms of memory has been reported previously in the literature.  But how might 
this three-way distinction, between semantic, autobiographical episodic, and 
non-autobiographical episodic memory, be explained? One argument would be 
that there are in fact three separate memory systems rather than two. However 
a single dissociation is not sufficient evidence to propose a third system, and the 
ability to remember both individual autobiographical and individual non-
autobiographical episodes is well captured by the concept of episodic memory. 
Nonetheless EN provides evidence that these types of memory may dissociate. 
EN’s episodic memory is damaged, but something is protecting autobiographical 
episodes from being disrupted, whilst leaving non-autobiographical episodes 
vulnerable to déjà vécu. 
 
What is it that protects EN’s autobiographical episodic memory from déjà vécu? 
Some clues may come from his performance on the experimental tasks. In these 
tasks his memory was largely preserved, and he very rarely showed false 
alarms, which would be expected if he was experiencing déjà vécu for the items. 
Therefore it is of value to examine the characteristics of these tasks which may 
have protected his memory from errors.  In the Recollective Experience task EN 
showed a normal hit rate and a normal false alarm rate. One of the features of 
this task was a deep encoding manipulation during initial exposure to the 
words, in which he was required to make a pleasantness judgement about each 
item. It is likely that making a pleasantness judgement encouraged EN to encode 
these words in terms of associations that were of personal relevance. Indeed 
this is what he reported when justifying his R responses. The personal and 
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emotional associations he made with each word appeared to protect him from 
making high numbers of false alarms. Similarly in the Source Monitoring task, 
EN either paired objects together himself or watched a real other person make 
the pairings. Again his false alarm rate was within normal limits, which may be 
secondary to his personal involvement in the procedure. The only task in which 
he showed an elevated false alarm rate (and in this case his false alarm rate was 
dramatically high) was the Famous Faces task. In this task he was exposed to a 
series of photographs with which he did not interact personally, and for which 
he did not complete an encoding task encouraging him to make personal or 
emotional associations.  
 
These tasks seem to mirror very well the real life situations for which EN does 
and does not experience déjà vécu. Situations with which he is personally 
involved, for example pairing objects, meeting someone, or going somewhere 
for the first time, are associated with personal actions, thoughts and emotional 
content. As such they are salient experiences, and are not associated with false 
alarms or déjà vécu. However in non-personal, passive situations such as 
watching TV, or viewing a series of photographs, the personal and emotional 
associations are reduced. In these cases EN seems unable to overcome his 
feelings of familiarity. This familiarity may be enhanced because these types of 
events (watching TV or images) are very similar to each other (they share 
“single element familiarity”; Brown, 1993; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998) and 
therefore arouse more familiarity than autobiographical events which have 
personal and emotional context identifying them as unique. In EN, 
autobiographical or personally experienced events appear to be protected by 
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the salience afforded by their emotional and personal associations, leaving only 
non-autobiographical episodes vulnerable to déjà vécu. 
 
This account fits well with Conway’s “Self Memory System” (Conway, 2001, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In this theory autobiographical 
memories are created when episodic memories (defined as detailed but short-
lived sensory-perceptual records of an experience) become integrated with the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base. Only once this consolidation has 
occurred do they become long-lasting autobiographical memories which are 
then retrieved with recollective experience. In EN, personally experienced 
events seem to undergo this consolidation appropriately, but news and sporting 
events, for which he experiences high levels of familiarity without the personal 
and emotional associations which would identify them as unique, become 
inappropriately linked with one single aspect of his autobiographical knowledge 
base: his 1994 stay in hospital. Having been incorrectly associated with this 
autobiographical event, novel news and sporting events are then experienced as 
if they were autobiographical memories, with false recollective experience. 
 
Implications for the rehabilitation of déjà vécu and related disorders: 
EN suffers from memory impairment. Part of this impairment is of the type that 
cognitive rehabilitation professionals are familiar with, namely impairment in 
forming new memories (anterograde memory impairment), as demonstrated by 
his performance on standardised memory testing. However his presentation 
involves not only the absence of memories, but also the presence of false 
memories, in the form of déjà vécu. Traditional forms of memory rehabilitation 
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(such as mnemonics, spaced retrieval, vanishing cues, errorless learning and 
external memory aids), are designed to compensate for disorders involving the 
absence of memory, but not to correct for the presence of false memories, 
leaving a gap in our knowledge about how to rehabilitate this type of memory 
disorder.  
 
In order to develop rehabilitation programs for memory disorders, we need a 
thorough understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie them. If we 
can precisely identify the nature of the impairment, this gives us clues about 
possible approaches to improve performance (Ptak, der Linden & Schnider, 
2010).  If the account of déjà vécu offered here is correct, it carries implications 
for the rehabilitation of déjà vécu and related disorders. Whilst it may not be 
possible to directly affect the false feeling of familiarity that EN experiences for 
novel stimuli (the first factor), it may be possible to address the monitoring 
impairments which overlie this (the second factor). One possibility would be to 
directly target EN’s source monitoring impairment. This might include 
increasing his awareness of the source monitoring process, so that he might 
learn to differentiate those features associated with genuine memories from 
those associated with the déjà vécu experience. This would be an internal 
intervention, and rely quite heavily on insight and intact reasoning skills. An 
alternative approach would be to try and implement external aids to source 
monitoring. For example EN might be encouraged to find supporting evidence 
for a memory in the form of external accounts or records, that backed up his 
sense that the information had been encountered before. Other interventions 
targeted at second factor monitoring impairments might include capitalising on 
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EN’s remaining intact reasoning abilities to reason about his experience, 
question the evidence, and evaluate the plausibility of his “memories” (perhaps 
using  a Theory A vs. Theory B intervention). As well as targeting the déjà vécu 
experience after it has occurred, it may be possible to reduce the frequency of 
EN’s déjà vécu by avoiding the types of experience that are most likely to trigger 
it. If it is true that the formation of personal and emotional associations with an 
event protect EN’s episodic memories from déjà vécu, then encouraging him to 
encode new events in this way might reduce the occurrence of the déjà vécu 
experience.  
 
In addition to interventions directly informed by the experimental results 
presented here, other general rehabilitation strategies might be useful in 
managing déjà vécu and related disorders. Very few published papers describe 
rehabilitation of paramnestic conditions. However those that do describe a 
critical role for increasing awareness of the deficit as a first step in the 
rehabilitation program (DeLuca, 1992; DeLuca & Locker, 1996). This might 
include psychoeducation about the potential role of brain injury in false feelings 
of familiarity. Dayus & van den Broek (2000) have reported successful use of 
self monitoring training (also based on increased awareness) to reduce 
delusional confabulations. However it is possible that this type of intervention 
may reduce the outward expression of false beliefs whilst not affecting their 
actual occurrence. Some authors also suggest correction of the false belief (Del 
Grosso Destreri et al., 2002). In previous studies of rehabilitation of 
paramnesias this has been successfully achieved by having the patient keep a 
memory notebook or diary in which they record daily events, and which they 
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can refer back to in order to disconfirm their erroneous memories (Burgess & 
McNeil, 1999; del Grosso Destreri et al., 2002; Yamamoto, Izumi, Shimakura, 
Sawatari & Ishida, 2000). Unfortunately in EN’s case, a diary intervention would 
be unlikely to work, because all of his déjà vécu experiences are attributed to 
1994 (a period for which no diary of events is available), but it may be a useful 
intervention in other cases where the incorrect attributions are not time-
specific. However caution should be exercised in directly confronting or 
challenging incorrect beliefs, as in déjà vécu and other paramnesias the false 
beliefs are generally held with considerable conviction and form the basis of the 
patient’s subjective reality. Confrontation that is not managed sensitively may 
cause anxiety and lead to resistance and breakdown of the therapeutic alliance 
(Fotopoulou, 2010; Glowinski, Payman & Frencham, 2008).  
 
In general, errorless learning principles suggest that best practice would be to 
limit the number of occasions on which EN has a déjà vécu experience (Ptak et 
al. 2010), as the repeated process of falsely recalling an earlier encounter with 
the information will reinforce the false memory and make it more likely to be 
recalled in future. For the same reasons, Hinkebein, Callahan & Gelber (2001) 
recommend minimising discussion of the inaccurate memories to avoid 
inadvertent reinforcement. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
One weakness of the current study is that no contemporary brain imaging was 
available for EN. Whilst CT reports from the time of his injury indicated a severe 
head injury involving combined hypoxic and diffuse axonal damage, and a 
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depressed fracture of the left frontal bones, there is unfortunately no 
information about the specific brain regions that showed most damage, nor 
about the pattern of injury that was evident 12 years post-injury at the time this 
study was undertaken.  
 
The available evidence gives reason to expect that EN’s impairments would 
have been associated with damage to the mesial temporal and frontal lobes. The 
mesial temporal lobe is known to be critically involved in memory (Aggleton & 
Brown, 1999). It is also known that temporal lobe epilepsy can give rise to 
sensations of déjà vu, indeed déjà vécu is part of the “dreamy state” associated 
with epilepsy (Jackson, 1931), and studies of the dreamy state using both 
cortical stimulations and spontaneous epileptic seizures have consistently 
associated déjà vécu experiences with electrical discharges localised within the 
mesiotemporal and limbic structures (Bancaud, Brunet-Bourgin, Chauvel & 
Helgren, 1994; Bartolomei, Barbeau, Gavaret, Guye, McGonigal, Regis, & 
Chauvel, 2004; Vignal, Maillard, McGonigal & Chauvel, 2007; Weinand, 
Hermann, Wyler, Carter, Oommen, Labiner, Ahern & Herring, 1994). The sense 
of false familiarity associated with déjà vécu has therefore been hypothesised to 
arise from false activation of recognition memory systems located in the mesial 
temporal lobe (Moulin et al., 2005; Spatt 2002) 
 
The idea that frontal regions should be involved in déjà vécu also fits well with 
current knowledge. The prefrontal cortex is known to be critically involved in 
control of memory processes (Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Moscovitch & Winocur, 
2001; Petrides, 2000), including strategic memory retrieval and the monitoring 
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of memory output for accuracy (Burgess & Shallice, 1996, Henson, Shallice & 
Dolan, 1999; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Schacter, Norman & Koustaal, 1998; 
Shallice, 2006; Stuss & Alexander, 2007). The prefrontal cortex is also thought 
to be critically involved in source monitoring, including retrieval of temporal 
source information about when an event took place (Cabeza, Locantore & 
Anderson, 2003; Daum & Mayes, 2000; Milner, Petrides & Smith, 1985; Johnson, 
1997; Turner, Simons, Gilbert, Frith & Burgess, 2008). These are all processes 
assumed to be involved in the “second factor” ability to evaluate ones beliefs.  
 
Consistent with this explanation, previous patients with déjà vécu have had 
frontal and temporal involvement. Patients AKP and MA had diffuse temporal 
damage and MA had additional frontal atrophy (Moulin et al., 2005), Tabet & 
Sivaloganathan (2001) reported a case of déjà vécu with a high density mass 
lesion in right frontal lobe, and Ide, Mizukami, Suzuki & Shiraishi (2000) 
reported persistent déjà vécu in a patient with abnormalities in the right fronto-
temporal region.  
 
A further potential weakness of this study was the range of measures employed. 
Measures were selected in advance to test hypotheses derived from the work of 
Moulin et al. (2005). However if further testing with EN had been possible, the 
existing results indicate that at least two further measures would have been of 
interest. First, it would have been desirable to assess recollective experience for 
additional stimulus types. The existing recollective experience task assessed 
whether EN produced abnormal number of false positive responses associated 
with “Remember” responses in word recognition. He did not. However it is 
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possible that EN would have shown evidence of overextended recollective 
experience for stimuli more closely related to the domain of his déjà vécu. In 
other words, we cannot be certain that EN did not have overextended 
recollective experience without assessing the rate of Remember responses for 
stimuli that did trigger false recognition (e.g. repetition of faces in the famous 
faces task, or news and sporting events).  
 
To further test the hypothesis that EN had disruption to “second factor” belief 
evaluation processes it would also have been interesting to assess a wider range 
of reasoning and monitoring processes than just source monitoring. These 
might have included reality monitoring, plausibility judgements, and logical 
reasoning. Finally, greater attention to the wider clinical picture surrounding 
EN’s case would have been desirable. The measures selected focused on 
memory processes that were predicted on a theoretical basis to be involved in 
déjà vécu. However assessment of EN’s mood and pre-morbid personality style, 
as well as exploration of additional factors that may have motivated or 
maintained EN’s déjà vecu, would have enabled a full formulation of his 
individual case. All of these issues are explored further in the critical appraisal. 
 
Finally some comment should be made about the utility of single case 
approaches in neuropsychology. On one hand, single case studies allow us to 
look in detail at unusual conditions such as déjà vécu and experimentally 
explore potential cognitive mechanisms in cases where it is not feasible to use 
group studies. The single case approach is particularly valuable in cases like EN 
who present with features not described previously in the literature. His case 
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also adds important information about the aetiologies associated with déjà vécu. 
EN is the first case to be reported where déjà vécu resulted from traumatic 
brain injury, whereas previous cases were associated with dementia (Moulin et 
al., 2005), tumour (Tabet & Sivaloganathan, 2001) or meningitis (Ide et al., 
2000). On the other hand, a limitation of the single case approach is that the 
findings derived from EN may not generalise to other patients with déjà vécu. 
Indeed he showed a different pattern of performance from the patients 
presented by Moulin et al. (2005).   
 
Conclusions 
This study has presented a case of déjà vécu. Unlike previous cases described in 
the literature, EN’s déjà vécu is limited to non-personal events (mainly news 
and sporting events) and is also very specific in time (all events are thought to 
have been first experienced in a single period in 1994). EN’s déjà vécu was 
associated with an elevated false alarm rate in specific circumstances. It was 
also associated with a severe source monitoring impairment. On the basis of 
these cognitive impairments a two factor theory of déjà vécu has been proposed 
in which false familiarity for particular episodes (resulting from mesial 
temporal lobe dysfunction) is overlain with impairments in frontally located 
belief evaluation and monitoring processes, which allow recollective 
confabulations to be produced and not rejected. On the basis of the current data, 
at least one component of the belief evaluation impairment in déjà vécu is a 
deficit in source monitoring. It is proposed that the dissociation between 
autobiographical and non-autobiographical episodic memory processing in EN 
may be secondary to differences in the degree to which personal and emotional 
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associations are formed for these two different types of event. An understanding 
of the cognitive mechanisms underlying neuropsychological impairments is 
critical for the formulation of appropriate rehabilitation strategies. On the basis 
of the current results some preliminary options for rehabilitation of déjà vécu 
have been proposed. However further research on rehabilitation approaches for 
paramnestic conditions is required.  
 
 150 
REFERENCES 
 
Aggleton, J. P. & Brown, M. W. (1999). Episodic memory, amnesia, and the 
hippocampal-anterior thalamic axis. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 22, 425-
444. 
 
Baddeley, A., Emslie, H. & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1994). Doors and People. Bury St 
Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company. 
 
Bancaud, J., Brunet-Bourgin, F., Chauvel, P., & Halgren, E. (1994). Anatomical 
origin of déjà vu and vivid 'memories' in human temporal lobe epilepsy. Brain, 
117, 71-90. 
 
Bartolomei, F., Barbeau, E., Gavaret, M., Guye, M., McGonigal, A., Regis, J. et al.. 
(2004). Cortical stimulation study of the role of rhinal cortex in déjà vu and 
reminiscence of memories. Neurology, 63, 858-864. 
 
Brown, A. S. (2003). A review of the déjà vu experience. Psychological Bulletin, 
129, 394-413. 
 
Burgess, P. W. & McNeil, J. E. (1999). Content-specific confabulation. Cortex, 35, 
163-182.  
 
Burgess, P. W. & Shallice, T. (1996). Confabulation and the control of 
recollection. Memory, 4, 359-411. 
 151 
Burgess, P. W. & Shallice, T. (1997). The Hayling and Brixton Tests. Thurston, 
Suffolk: Thames Valley Test Company.  
 
Cabeza, R., Locantore, J. K., & Anderson, N. D. (2003). Lateralization of prefrontal 
activity during episodic memory retrieval: evidence for the production-
monitoring hypothesis. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience., 15, 249-259. 
 
Coltheart, M. (1981). The MRC Psycholinguistic Database. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 33A, 497-505. 
 
Coltheart, M. (2007). The 33rd Bartlett Lecture: Cognitive neuropsychiatry and 
delusional belief. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60, 1041-1062. 
 
Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. (2007). Schizophrenia and monothematic 
delusions. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33, 642-647. 
 
Conway, M. A. (2001). Sensory-perceptual episodic memory and its context: 
autobiographical memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-
Biological Sciences, 356, 1375-1384. 
 
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and Language, 
53, 594-628. 
 
 152 
Conway, M. A. & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of 
autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 
107, 261-288. 
 
Coughlan, A. K. & Hollows, S. E. (1985) The Adult Memory and Information 
Processing Battery. St James University Hospital, Leeds: AK Coughlan. 
 
Crawford, J. R. & Garthwaite, P. H. (2002). Investigation of the single case in 
neuropsychology: confidence limits on the abnormality of test scores and test 
score differences. Neuropsychologia, 40, 1196-1208. 
 
Dalla Barba, G., Cipolotti, L., & Denes, G. (1990). Autobiographical memory loss 
and confabulation in Korsakoff's syndrome: a case report. Cortex, 26, 525-534. 
 
Daum, I. & Mayes, A. R. (2000). Memory and executive function impairments 
after frontal or posterior cortex lesions. Behavioural Neurology, 12, 161-173. 
 
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic 
Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 
8, 133-158. 
 
Dayus, B. & van den Broek, M. D. (2000). Treatment of stable delusional 
confabulations using self-monitoring training. Neuropsychological 
Rehabilitation, 10, 415-427. 
 
 153 
De Luca, J. (1992). Rehabilitation of confabulation: the issue of awareness of 
deficit. Neurorehabilitation, 2, 23-30.  
 
De Luca, J. & Locker, R. (1996). Cognitive rehabilitation following anterior 
communicating artery aneurysm bleeding: A case report. Disability and 
Rehabilitation, 18, 265-272. 
 
Del Grosso Destreri, N., Farina, E., Calabrese, E., Pinardi, G., Imbornone, E. & 
Mariani, C. (2002). Frontal impairment and confabulation after herpes simplex 
encephalitis: A case report. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 83, 
423-426. 
 
Delis, D., Kramer, J., Kaplan, E. & Ober, B. (2000). California Verbal Learning Test-
Second Edition. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation.  
 
Fletcher, P. C. & Henson, R. N. (2001). Frontal lobes and human memory: 
insights from functional neuroimaging. Brain, 124, 849-881. 
 
Fotopoulou, A. (2010). The affective neuropsychology of confabulation and 
delusion. In Langdon, R. & Turner, M. (Eds). Delusion and Confabulation. Hove: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Gardiner, J. M. & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and knowing. In 
E.Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory (pp. 229-244). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 154 
Golden, C. J. & Freshwater, S. M. (2002). Stroop Color and Word Test: Revised 
Examiners Manual. Wood Dale IL: Stoelting Co. 
 
Glowinski, R., Payman, V. & Frencham, K. (2008). Confabulation: a spontaneous 
and fantastic review. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 42, 932-
940. 
  
Heaton R, Miller W, Taylor M & Grant I. (2004). Revised Comprehensive Norms 
for an Expanded Halstead-Reitan Battery: Demographically Adjusted 
Neuropsychological Norms for African American and Caucasian Adults. Lutz, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc. 
 
Henson, R. N., Shallice, T., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). Right prefrontal cortex and 
episodic memory retrieval: a functional MRI test of the monitoring hypothesis. 
Brain, 122 (7), 1367-1381. 
 
Hinkebein, J. H., Callahan, C. D. & Gelber, D. (2001). Reduplicative paramnesia: 
Rehabilitation of content-specific delusion after brain injury. Rehabilitation 
Psychology, 46, 75-81. 
 
Ide, M., Mizukami, K., Suzuki, T., & Shiraishi, H. (2000). A case of temporal lobe 
epilepsy with improvement of clinical symptoms and single photon emission 
computed tomography findings after treatment with clonazepam. Psychiatry 
and Clinical Neurosciences, 54, 595-597. 
 
 155 
Jackson, J. H. (1931). Selected writings of John Hughlings Jackson. Vol. 1. On 
epilepsy and epileptiform convulsions. London : Hodder and Stoughton. 
 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. 
Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3-28. 
 
Johnson, M. K. (1997). Source monitoring and memory distortion. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 352, 1733-1745. 
 
Kalra, S., Chancellor, A., & Zeman, A. (2007). Recurring déjà vu associated with 
5-hydroxytryptophan. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19, 311-313. 
 
Kapur, N. (1999). Syndromes of retrograde amnesia: A conceptual and empirical 
synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 800-825. 
 
Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (2000). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of 
Delusions. Mind and Language, 15, 184-218. 
 
Markowitsch, H. J., Calabrese, P., Neufeld, H., Gehlen, W., & Durwen, H. F. (1999). 
Retrograde amnesia for world knowledge and preserved memory for 
autobiographic events. A case report. Cortex, 35, 243-252. 
 
Metcalf, K., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2007). Models of confabulation: a 
critical review and a new framework. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 24, 23-47. 
 
 156 
Milner, B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions on card sorting: The role of 
the frontal lobes. Archives of Neurology, 9, 100–110. 
 
Milner, B., Petrides, M., & Smith, M. L. (1985). Frontal lobes and the temporal 
organization of memory. Human Neurobiology, 4, 137-142. 
 
Moscovitch, M. & Melo, B. (1997). Strategic retrieval and the frontal lobes: 
evidence from confabulation and amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 35, 1017-1034. 
 
Moscovitch, M. & Winocur, G. (2001). Working-with-memory and the frontal 
lobes: Human and animal models. Brain and Cognition, 47, 22-23. 
 
Moulin, C. J., Conway, M. A., Thompson, R. G., James, N., & Jones, R. W. (2005). 
Disordered memory awareness: recollective confabulation in two cases of 
persistent déjà vécu. Neuropsychologia, 43, 1362-1378. 
 
Moulin, C. J. A., Turunen, M. H., Salter, A. J. A., O'Connor, A. R., Conway, M. A., & 
Jones, R. W. (2006). Recollective confabulation: Persistent déjà vécu in 
dementia. Dementia Helix Review Series, 8, 10-15. 
 
Neppe, V. M. (1983). The psychology of déjà vu: have I been here before? 
Johannesburg : Witwatersrand University Press. 
 
Petrides, M. (2000). Frontal Lobes and Memory. In L. S. Cermak (Ed.), Handbook 
of Neuropsychology: Memory and its disorders Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 157 
Ptak, R., der Linden, M. V., & Schnider, A. (2010). Cognitive rehabilitation of 
episodic memory disorders: from theory to practice. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 4(57), doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00057. 
 
Robertson, I. H., Ward, T., Ridgeway, V. & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1994) The Test of 
Everyday Attention. Bury St Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company. 
 
Schacter, D. L., Norman, K. A., & Koutstaal, W. (1998). The cognitive 
neuroscience of constructive memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 289-
318. 
 
Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society of London B, 298, 199-209. 
 
Shallice, T. (2006). Contrasting domains in the control of action: the routine and 
the non-routine. In Y.Munakata & M. Johnson (Eds.), Attention and Performance 
XXI: Processes of Change in Brain and Cognitive Development. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Shallice, T. & Evans, M. E. (1978). The Involvement of the Frontal Lobes in 
Cognitive Estimation. Cortex, 14: 294-303. 
 
Spatt, J. (2002). Déjà vu: possible parahippocampal mechanisms. Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry & Clinical Neurosciences, 14, 6-10. 
 
 158 
Stuss, D. T. & Alexander, M. P. (2007). Is there a dysexecutive syndrome? 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362, 901-915. 
 
Tabet, N. & Sivaloganathan, S. (2001). A case of persistent déjà vu in an elderly 
patient. Progress in Neurology and Psychiatry, 5, 18-19. 
 
Thompson, R. G., Moulin, C. J., Conway, M. A., & Jones, R. W. (2004). Persistent 
Déjà vu: a disorder of memory. International .Journal of Geriatric .Psychiatry, 19, 
906-907. 
 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53, 1-25. 
 
Tulving, E., Donaldson, W., Bower, G. H., United States, & Office of Naval 
Research (1972). Organization of memory. New York: Academic Press. 
 
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Turner, M. & Coltheart, M. (2010). Confabulation and delusion: A common 
monitoring framework, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15, 346-376, 
 
Turner, M. S., Simons, J. S., Gilbert, S. J., Frith, C. D., & Burgess, P. W. (2008). 
Distinct roles for lateral and medial rostral prefrontal cortex in source 
monitoring of perceived and imagined events. Neuropsychologia, 46, 1442-1453. 
 
 159 
Vignal, J. P., Maillard, L., McGonigal, A., & Chauvel, P. (2007). The dreamy state: 
hallucinations of autobiographic memory evoked by temporal lobe stimulations 
and seizures. Brain, 130, 88-99. 
 
Waters, F. A., Maybery, M. T., Badcock, J. C., & Michie, P. T. (2004). Context 
memory and binding in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research., 68, 119-125. 
 
Wechsler, D. (1997). WAIS-III, WMS-III, Technical Manual. San Antonio: The 
Psychological Coorporation.  
 
Weinand, M. E., Hermann, B., Wyler, A. R., Carter, L. P., Oommen, K. J., Labiner, D. 
et al.. (1994). Long-term subdural strip electrocorticographic monitoring of ictal 
déjà vu. Epilepsia, 35, 1054-1059. 
 
Wheeler, M. A., Stuss, D. T., & Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of episodic 
memory: The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness.  Psychological Bulletin, 
121, 331-354. 
 
Wheeler, M. A. & McMillan, C. T. (2001). Focal retrograde amnesia and the 
episodic-semantic distinction. Cognitive, Affective and Behaviural Neuroscience, 
1, 22-36. 
 
Whittlesea, B. W. & Williams, L. D. (1998). Why do strangers feel familiar, but 
friends don't? A discrepancy-attribution account of feelings of familiarity. Acta 
Psychologica (Amsterdam), 98, 141-165. 
 160 
Wild, E. (2005). Déjà vu in neurology. Journal of Neurology, 252, 1-7. 
 
Yamamoto, E., Izumi, S., Shimakura, K., Sawatari, M. & Ishida, A. (2000). Memory 
rehabilitation of an amnesic patient following limbic encephalitis and a role of 
family members: A case report. Tokai Journal of Experimental and Clinical 
Medicine, 25, 173-181. 
 
Yonelinas, AP (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 
years of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46 (3), 441-517. 
 
 161 
 
 
 
PART THREE: CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
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The study reported here is in the form of a traditional neuropsychological case study. 
The aim of these studies is to inform either our understanding of the normal 
operation of the cognitive function studied (in this case, memory), and/or to inform 
our understanding of how to rehabilitate the condition described. To what extent has 
the current study achieved either of these objectives? 
 
Implications for the Understanding of Normal Memory Function: 
In terms of our understanding of normal memory function, the greatest contribution 
of the current study is the demonstration of a dissociation between autobiographical 
and non-autobiographical episodic memory processing. This is the first time such a 
dissociation has been reported, and indicates that the two types of memory may be 
processed differently in the normal brain. Dissociations are important in cognitive 
neuropsychology. A dissociation alone is insufficient to conclude that the two 
processes are functionally separate in terms of cognitive architecture (i.e. that there 
are two systems, one for autobiographical episodic memory and one for non-
autobiographical memory). For that we would need a double dissociation (i.e. reports 
of patients with preserved non-autobiographical episodic memory processing, but 
impaired autobiographical memory processing, see Shallice, 1988). However a 
dissociation does indicate at the very least that these two forms of memory are 
processed differently in some way, such that one can be disrupted whilst leaving the 
other intact. On the basis of the current data, a preliminary explanation has been 
offered in terms of differences in the degree to which personal and emotional 
associations are formed for these two types of event. Greater personal and 
emotional associations, it is argued, protect autobiographical episodic memories 
from false feelings of familiarity, but leave non-autobiographical episodic 
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memories vulnerable to disruption. However further research is clearly 
necessary to evaluate whether this explanation is able to account for the data. 
One direct way of doing this would be experimentally manipulate the personal 
and emotional associations that EN made for different types of memory, and 
observe the impact on his experience of déjà vécu. Other avenues of research 
might include using the “dreamy state” associated with temporal lobe epilepsy 
as a model. Vignal, Maillard, McGonigal, & Chauvel (1994) reported the 
intriguing finding that in their study of the dreamy state, all patients who 
experienced involuntary memory recall during stimulation or spontaneous seizure 
recalled an event from episodic memory; none recalled a public or historical event 
from semantic memory. It would be interesting to further explore this pattern in 
terms of recall of autobiographical versus non-autobiographical events. Also of 
interest to the current case is Vignal et al’s finding that although the memories 
evoked differed on each occasion, they were drawn from the same period of the 
subject’s life (this observation applied to all subjects except one). This temporal 
consistency is reminiscent of EN’s tendency to attribute all of his déjà vécu 
experiences to the same time period in 1994. It may be that study of the dreamy state 
could shed further light on the characteristics of the delusional déjà vécu experience 
and its underlying cognitive mechanisms.  
 
The study also has the potential to tell us something about the way the normal brain 
processes familiarity and recollection, regardless of whether this is in 
autobiographical episodic memory, non-autobiographical episodic memory, or both. 
The study followed the example of Moulin, Conway, Thompson, James & Jones 
(2005) in attempting to break down a cognitive disorder into its component cognitive 
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mechanisms, by experimentally assessing a range of cognitive functions thought to 
be theoretically involved in déjà vécu. This type of study has the potential to move us 
beyond simple descriptive accounts of syndromes and towards a fuller understanding 
of how cognitive disorders might arise (and also therefore, how they might be 
rehabilitated). The current study partially replicated Moulin et al.’s (2005) results. It 
confirmed that for EN, as for AKP and MA, déjà vécu does not arise from generally 
disordered metacognitive abilities, but that it is associated with false recognition (in 
the form of false alarms to certain types of stimuli) and source monitoring 
impairments. However the current study did not replicate Moulin et al.’s (2005) 
finding that déjà vécu was associated with overextended recollective experience. On 
the basis of these results an account was proposed suggesting that false activation of 
the networks responsible for the normal feeling of familiarity may give rise to both 
déjà vu and déjà vécu. The difference between the two, on this account, is the normal 
or otherwise operation of processes responsible for belief evaluation and monitoring. 
This account is of course preliminary. However it does incorporate both of the 
cognitive impairments revealed in experimental testing (disordered recognition and 
source monitoring impairments) and is also in line with wider theories about the 
mechanisms responsible for delusional beliefs (Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen, 
2001).  
 
This account is in contrast, however, to that of Moulin et al. (2005), who argue that 
whilst déjà vu is a disorder of familiarity, déjà vécu is a disorder of recollection. One 
weakness of the current study is the extent to which we can be confident in ruling out 
their account. EN did not show overextended recollective experience in the 
“recollective experience” task. However he also did not show elevated false alarms 
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in this task. This raises the possibility that if we had assessed recollective experience 
for items for which EN did produce false alarms (repetition of faces in the “famous 
faces” task, for example), we may in fact have seen evidence of overextended 
recollective experience. This is certainly a limitation of the study. However even if 
we had observed overextended recollective experience it would have been difficult to 
conclude that it represented a separate process to that responsible for false 
familiarity. In other words, false recollection may arise quite separately from 
familiarity, or it may result from a feeling of false familiarity which is then justified 
by the production of a confabulated account of when the item was encountered. 
These two possibilities are very difficult to pick apart. Indeed this problem lies at the 
heart of the ongoing debate about whether recollection is simply a stronger, more 
vivid version of familiarity (the single process account of recognition) or whether 
recollection and familiarity represent separate processes (the dual process account, 
see Squire, Wixted & Clark, 2007, and Mandler, 2008 for reviews). On the basis of 
the evidence available for EN, an account in terms of familiarity seems at present to 
be the more parsimonious option. However it would certainly have been desirable to 
further explore EN’s recollective experience with a greater range of stimuli.  
 
Unfortunately the current study was not able to inform our understanding of brain-
behaviour relationships, as neuroimaging was not available for EN. However, some 
speculations have been made on the likely neuroanatomical basis for déjà vécu 
(medial temporal and frontal), and whilst knowledge about the neural basis of 
behaviour is certainly interesting, theoretical inferences about cognitive architecture 
may be made in the absence of knowledge about localisation (Coltheart, 2006). 
Future research using both structural and functional imaging techniques may be able 
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to confirm or refute the proposed neuroanatomical basis of déjà vécu, and perhaps 
also shed light on differences in activation associated with autobiographical and non-
autobiographical episodic memory.  
 
Implications for Rehabilitation of Déjà Vécu and Related Disorders: 
Paramnesias have been largely ignored in the rehabilitation literature, in favour of 
interventions for the amnesias. In part, this is because conditions such as déjà vécu, 
reduplication and confabulation are rare, and tend to resolve spontaneously after a 
few months. Indeed only a handful of cases of déjà vécu have been reported in the 
literature. However this case highlights the fact that there are cases where 
paramnestic experience can persist and become delusion-like in intensity, posing a 
significant rehabilitation problem. Déjà vécu also bears several similarities to other 
forms of confabulation and delusion, meaning that rehabilitation approaches 
developed for one disorder may also be applicable to the others.  
 
A critical task in developing rehabilitation approaches for paramnestic conditions is 
to establish the cognitive mechanisms responsible, and target these mechanisms in 
rehabilitation (Ptak, der Linden & Schnider, 2010). In the empirical paper some 
suggestions were made about potential rehabilitation approaches that might target the 
cognitive mechanisms identified in this study. As it seems unlikely that one would be 
able to directly target the false feeling of familiarity, these mainly focused on 
“second factor” belief evaluation and monitoring processes, for example 
implementing procedures that would compensate for EN’s source monitoring 
impairment, or capitalise on his intact reasoning and evaluation processes to evaluate 
his experiences. The earlier discussion also highlighted the importance of raising 
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awareness of impairment as a first step to rehabilitation, and (in line with errorless 
learning principles), of avoiding the déjà vécu experience arising at all where 
possible, perhaps by encouraging the formation of personal / emotional associations 
with new memories. Unfortunately there would be limited application for the use of 
external aids in this case, as EN’s déjà vécu was unusually specific in time, with all 
events being attributed to 1994, a period for which no external record of events was 
available to consult. However in other cases of paramnesia, external aids which 
allow a record of past events to be accumulated (such as diaries or SenseCam) might 
be useful in providing a means of checking memories.  
 
Finally, the similarities between paramnestic conditions such as déjà vécu and 
delusions raises the possibility that interventions designed for delusions in the 
context of psychiatric disorders might be effective for cases like EN. Elements of 
CBT for psychosis, for example, might have some application, perhaps including 
reality testing or thought challenging work (Nelson, 2005), exploring conviction in 
beliefs, or Theory A vs Theory B interventions (comparing the possibility that you 
have lived through the current moment before, to the possibility that feelings of 
familiarity have been disrupted in some way by head injury). As with other types of 
delusions, EN’s déjà vécu is experienced as incontrovertibly “true”, meaning that any 
direct challenging of beliefs would need to be conducted sensitively.  
 
The current study therefore raises several possibilities for rehabilitation, and this is a 
strength of studies that attempt to analyse in detail the cognitive mechanisms 
involved, rather than simply describe a phenomenon. However it is a limitation of the 
study that we were not able to attempt any of these rehabilitation techniques with 
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EN. Preliminary data on how he responded to various interventions would not only 
have enabled a test of the account of déjà vécu offered, but would also have offered 
valuable information on which, if any, of these approaches might be effective for the 
rehabilitation of this and other paramnestic conditions.  
 
Limitations of the current study: 
Two additional limitations of the current study were touched upon in the 
empirical paper which deserve further comment here.  Firstly, the inclusion of 
additional measures would have been desirable if further testing opportunities 
with EN had been available. The measures included were able to reveal some 
interesting results and dissociations. However as mentioned above, further 
measures assessing recollective experience in different domains would have 
been desirable. In addition, to further test the hypothesis that EN had disruption 
to “second factor” belief evaluation processes, it would have been interesting to 
assess a wider range of reasoning and monitoring processes than just source 
monitoring. These might have included reality monitoring, plausibility 
judgements, and logical reasoning. In general, further attention might also have 
been paid to the ecological validity of the measures employed. Some of the 
experimental tests were rather dry, and measures which better captured the 
essence of EN’s experience (for example the experiential quality of TV or news 
events, or of real-life autobiographical events) might have been able to model 
the circumstances which gave rise to (or did not give rise to) his déjà vécu 
experiences more closely.  
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Secondly, greater attention to the wider clinical picture surrounding EN’s case 
would have been desirable. The focus on cognitive neuropsychological 
measures and models meant that formulation of personal historical and 
psychological factors received less attention. EN’s early experiences, pre-morbid 
personality characteristics, current situation, and mood, whilst not causing his 
déjà vécu per se, will have interacted with his neurological insult to produce the 
particular flavour of his false beliefs, and further attention to these may have 
uncovered factors involved in motivating or maintaining EN’s déjà vécu.  
 
There has been increasing interest in the role of motivational factors in 
confabulation and delusion (e.g. Fotopoulou 2010; McKay & Kinsbourne, 2010), 
and the potential role that confabulation might play in making the world a more 
pleasant or controllable place, in extremely difficult circumstances. It may be 
that some people are more liable to confabulatory compensatory mechanisms 
than others, for example to maintain a sense of self or a sense of mastery in a 
situation that is otherwise characterised by confusion, impairment and 
uncertainty. EN’s tendency to attribute all events to 1994, for example, may be 
related to the fact that this was a particularly traumatic period. Along these 
lines, the delusion interview revealed the intriguing presence of an isolated 
paranoid belief about his brother. The source of this would have been 
interesting to explore. Paranoid beliefs following brain injury have been 
interpreted as a means of reasserting ones own importance when other people’s 
behaviour towards you is changing, and as the product of disordered conceptual 
ability in interpersonal situations, and changing social roles (Leftoff, 1983). It is 
very likely that EN’s change in role from a successful young man with a 
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promising future, to an impaired 38 year old living with his father, would have 
had a significant impact on his adjustment and coping mechanisms, and 
therefore upon the particular characteristics of his déjà vécu presentation.  
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Appendix i: Delusion Interview 
 
 
Orientation to situation: 
 
Why are you here today? 
 
Have you recently been unwell / had to go to hospital for any reason? (When? What? 
Ask for full details) 
 
Did you have any surgery or treatment for this?  
 
Are you having any treatment or seeing anyone for help with anything at the moment? 
 
Why are we interested in seeing you? 
 
 
Effect of illness: 
 
If illness / accident acknowledged: 
Tell me about how your illness / accident has affected you. 
 
Have you had any difficulties since your illness / accident, or found that you cannot do 
things you used to be able to do? 
 
Have you experienced things since your illness / accident that you did not experience 
before? 
 
Has your illness / accident changed you or the way you think in any way at all? 
 
Have you felt confused since your accident?  
 
Do things ever feel unreal or like a dream? 
 
If illness / accident not acknowledged: 
Have you had any difficulties recently or found that you cannot do things you used to be 
able to do? 
 
Have you experienced things recently that you did not experience before? 
 
Have you felt confused?  
 
Do things ever feel unreal or like a dream? 
 
 
Orientation in time: 
 
What year is it? 
 
What season are we in? 
 
What month is it? 
 
What day is it? 
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What is the date? 
 
 
Orientation to place: 
 
Where are we now? (Which centre / hospital) 
 
Which floor are we on? 
 
Which city / town are we in? 
 
Which suburb / area are we in? 
 
Which state / country are we in? 
 
 
Reduplicative paramnesia: 
 
Have you been here before? 
 
How many centres / hospitals with this name are there? 
 
Who am I? 
 
Have you seen or met me before? 
 
Have you known any of the other people here previously? 
 
Do you know anyone else with your illness? 
 
Have you had any similar illnesses or treatment in the past?  / How many accidents / 
operations have you had? 
 
 
Delusion Battery: 
 
Some people have experiences which are unusual or troubling after head injury / 
illness. I’m interested in finding out whether you have experienced any of these.  
 
Hallucinations (all from SAPS): 
Have you ever heard voices or other sounds when no one is around?  
If so: What did they say? 
 
Have you ever had burning sensations or other strange feelings in your body?  
If so: What were they? 
 
Have you ever experienced any unusual smells or smells that other people do not 
notice? 
If so: What were they? 
 
Have you ever had visions or seen things that other people cannot see? 
If so: What did you see?  
Did this occur when you were falling asleep or waking up? 
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Schizophrenia-type Delusions (all from SAPS or PDI): 
Have you felt that people are against you, trying to monitor you, or trying to harm you 
in any way? (Persecutory delusions) 
 
Do you have a partner? Are you often worried that your partner might be unfaithful to 
you? (Delusions of jealousy) 
 
Do you ever feel that you have done more wrong than the average person, or deserve to 
be punished? (Delusions of sin or guilt) 
 
Do you have any special or unusual abilities? Or do you feel that you are destined to 
achieve great things? (Grandiose delusions) 
 
Have you had any unusual religious experiences or felt particularly close to God? 
(Religious delusions. If present, check religious background). 
 
Is there anything wrong with your body or have there been any unusual changes to do 
with your body? (Somatic delusions) 
 
Do you ever feel that things in magazines or TV were written specifically for you, or 
contain messages specifically for you? (Ideas and delusions of reference) 
 
Have you felt that you were being controlled by some outside force? (Delusions of being 
controlled) 
 
Have you ever had the feeling that people could read your mind? (Delusions of mind 
reading) 
 
Have you ever heard your own thoughts out loud as if they were a voice outside your 
head? Have you ever felt that your thoughts were broadcast in some way so other 
people could hear them? (Thought broadcast) 
 
Have you ever experienced thoughts that didn’t seem to be your own, or felt that 
thoughts were being put into your head by some outside force? (Thought insertion) 
 
Have you ever felt your thoughts were taken away by some outside force? (Thought 
withdrawal) 
 
Cotard 
Do things ever seem very unreal to you? 
 
Do you ever feel that you do not really exist?  
 
Do you ever feel that you have died? 
 
De Clerambault 
Have you felt that anyone has become very interested in you, or fallen in love with you? 
  
General misidentification question 
Do you ever feel as if some people are not who they appear to be? 
 
Capgras 
Do you ever feel that people around you have been replaced by someone else?  
 
 176 
Fregoli 
Do you ever feel that people around you are in disguise? 
 
Intermetamorphosis 
Have you ever felt that someone you know has been transformed into someone else? 
 
Reduplicative paramnesia 
Do you ever feel that several people exist who are very similar or identical?  
 
Do you ever feel that several places exist that are very similar or identical, for example 
a hospital, house or other building?  
 
Have you felt that any of your possessions have been replaced? 
 
Have you ever felt that the same things have happened to you more than once?  
 
Mirrored self misidentification 
Practical test – hold up mirror and ask “who is this?” 
 
Denial of ownership in neglect  
This section administered only for patients with paralysis / neglect 
 
Can you raise your left arm? 
 
Is this your arm? 
 
How many arms/legs do you have? (also reduplication) 
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Appendix ii: Confabulation Battery 
 
 
I am going to ask you a few questions about yourself and about world events and 
general knowledge. Some of these are difficult or hard to remember, so if you 
don’t know the answer to any question that is fine, just say you don’t know. I 
would rather you didn’t guess, so just tell me if you are sure. 
 
The following section consists of 10 personal semantic memory questions (5 current 
“CPS” and 5 remote “RPS”), 10 general semantic memory questions (5 current “CGS” 
and 5 remote “RGS”), 15 personal episodic questions (5 remote “RPE”, 5 current “CPE”, 
5 future “FPE”), and 10 “Don’t Know” questions (5 semantic “SDK” and 5 personal 
episodic “EDK”) 
 
 
How old are you? (CPS) 
 
Tell me about a memorable birthday party or celebration you had when you were 
young (RPE) 
 
Where is the river Boas? (SDK) 
 
What happened to President Kennedy? (RGS) 
 
Where were you born? (RPS) 
 
What style were the shoes you wore in summer 1995? (EDK) 
 
How did you spend last Christmas? (CPE) 
 
Do you work at the moment? What is your job? (CPS) 
 
What did you do this morning? (CPE) 
 
Who won the AFL premiership last year? (CGS) 
 
Do you have any children? How many? What are their names and ages? (CPS) 
 
What are your plans for tomorrow? (FPE) 
 
Who was Harold Holt? (RGS) 
 
How old were you when you first used a telephone? (EDK) 
 
What did your parents do for a living? (RPS) 
 
What happened in Bali last year? (CGS) 
 
Tell me about a childhood holiday you remember going on (RPE) 
 
Do you have any trips planned for the next few months? When will your next holiday 
be? (FPE) 
 
Who was Lindy Chamberlain? (RGS) 
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Where do you live? (CPS) 
 
Who is Schapelle Corby? (CGS) 
 
Are you married? Who to? (CPS) 
 
How will you spend next Christmas? (FPE) 
 
Who is the author of Black Snow? (SDK) 
 
Tell me about your first day at high school (RPE) 
 
What happened in Chernobyl? (RGS) 
 
What were you doing on May 2nd, last year? (EDK) 
 
How did you get here today? (CPE) 
 
What are you doing when you leave here today? (FPE) 
 
What is your date of birth? (RPS) 
 
What happened with Princess Mary recently? (CGS) 
 
Who is the current world-fencing champion? (SDK) 
 
Where were you going on your first car journey of 2001? (EDK) 
 
Who were the Beatles? (RGS) 
 
Tell me about your first date (RPE) 
 
How far did you get at school? What kind of education or training have you completed? 
(RPS) 
 
What happened in New Orleans last year? (CGS) 
 
Who is Stockhausen? (SDK) 
 
Tell me about the closest friend you had in your teens. What did you do together? (RPE) 
 
When was the Concorde’s first flight? (SDK) 
 
Do you have any brothers or sisters? What are their names? Are they older or younger? 
(RPS) 
 
What did you do yesterday? (CPE) 
 
What was your primary school teacher’s favourite pet? (EDK) 
 
When was the last time you were away from your home town? (CPE) 
 
What will you be doing next year? (FPE) 
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Appendix iii: Dating Battery 
 
NEWS / SPORTS EVENTS 
Pre-accident 
When did man first walk on the moon?     1969 
When was the first world series cricket game held?     1977 
When did John Lennon die?        1980 
When did Ronald Reagan come to power?     1981 
When did the Wallabies win their first Grand Slam title?    1984 
When did Allan Border become captain of the Australian cricket team? 1984 
When did the Berlin wall come down?      1989 
When did David Boon drink 52 cans on a flight to London?   1989 
When was Nelson Mandela released from prison?    1990 
When did Shane Warne bowl the “Ball of the century” to Mike Gatting? 1993 
  
Post-accident 
When was the Port Arthur massacre?      1996 
When did Princess Diana die?       1997 
When was the Olympics held in Sydney?     2000 
When did Donald Bradman die?      2001 
When did the September 11th attacks take place?    2001 
When did Lleyton Hewitt win Wimbledon?      2002 
When did Ponting take over from Waugh?     2002 
When was Shane Warne suspended for failing a drugs test    2003 
When did the Asian tsunami happen?      2005 
When did the London bombings happen?     2005 
 
 
PERSONAL EVENTS 
Pre-accident 
When did you fall off the horse that bolted?     1974 
When did you and your Dad fall off the motorbike?    1975 
When did you attend cricket school at the University of Sydney?  1980 
When did your family buy the surfer’s paradise timeshare?   1983 
When did you build the cubby house?      1984 
When did you win “Junior cricketer of year”?     1985 
When did you play in a cricket match against the Indian team?  1988 
When did you write off your Holden Nova?     1990 
When did you buy the PND store?      1990 
When did your mother pass away?      1992 
 
Post-accident 
When did Tom get married?       1996 
When did you drive to Mooree to see a friend?    1996 
When did you travel to Sydney by train but got off early by mistake?  1996 
When did you leave your car in Canberra?     1998 
When did you first come to Macquarie University?    1999 
When did you sell your red commodore?     2002 
When did you move to your current address?     2003 
When was your last visit to the Gold Coast?     2004 
When was Rory Born?        2004 
When did your Dad travel to New Zealand?     2004 
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Appendix iv: Feeling of Knowing Task 
 
 
PART A: RECALL SECTION: 
 
Here are a series of general knowledge questions. Some of them are rather 
difficult.  
 
If you know the answer I would like you to write it in the space provided. Please 
do not guess at this stage, but only write the answer if you are sure. 
 
If you do not know the answer I would like you to circle one of the three options 
according to whether you think you would recognise the answer if I gave you four 
options.  
 
REMEMBER PLEASE DO NOT GUESS UNLESS YOU ARE SURE OF THE ANSWER. YOU 
WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHOOSE FROM A LIST LATER ON. 
 
 
1) In which country did Chess originate? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
2) Which system in the human body controls hormones? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
3) Which US president was shot 5 days after the end of the American civil war? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
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 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
4) Which team sport has periods of play called 'chukkas'? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
5) Which language has the most native speakers? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
6) What device mixes air and petrol (gas) for the internal combustion engine? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
 
 
7) Which is the largest planet in our solar system? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
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 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
8) What is the capital city of Norway? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
9) In which country will the 2008 Olympic Games be held?  
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
10) How many strings does a violin have?  
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
11) What do we call a shape with 8 sides? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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12) Who developed the theory of relativity? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
13) Which chemical element is represented by the symbol N?  
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
14) In which country is Mount Everest? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
 
  
15) On which continent is the Sahara desert? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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16) Which pop singer married British movie director Guy Ritchie? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
17) Who wrote Tess of the D’Urbervilles? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
18) Which rock group did George Harrison belong to? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
19) Who developed the theory of evolution by natural selection? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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20) What gas do plants absorb from the atmosphere? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
21) What is the study of plants called? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
22) What is the capital city of Sri Lanka? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
23) Who won the 2003 Wimbledon women's tennis championship? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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24) What does an orchestra's conductor wave to keep time? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
25) What nationality was Mozart? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
26) Which rock group is Michael Stipe the lead singer of? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
27) Triton is a moon of which planet? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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28) For what process do plants need sunlight, CO2 and water? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
29) Which physicist wrote a book called “A Brief History of Time”? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
30) In which organ of the body is the cerebrum found? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
31) In which country is the world’s highest waterfall? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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32) What is South America’s highest mountain range? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
33) What is the capital city of Kenya? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
34) Which instrument did the jazz musician Miles Davis play? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
35) Which is the largest stringed instrument in a classical orchestra? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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36) Which artist painted the Mona Lisa? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
37) What is a killdeer? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
38) What was the name of Charles Darwin’s ship?  
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
39) In the fairy tale “Hansel & Gretel” what is the witch’s house made of? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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40) Who invented the aeroplane? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
41) Who invented the microphone? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
42) Which ocean is the deepest? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
43) Who was the Roman messenger God? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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44) Cochineal is used to dye food red, what is it made from?  
  
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
45) How many standard bottles of wine does a rehoboam bottle contain?  
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
46) How many states are there in the US? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
47) Who wrote Animal Farm? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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48) What is the currency of Russia? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
49) Who wrote a famous diary while hiding from the Nazis in Amsterdam? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
  
 
50) In which city is the cathedral of Notre Dame? 
 
Answer:__________________________________________________________ 
 
 If you do not know the answer please circle one of the following options: 
 
 A) I am CERTAIN I will be able to recognise this answer later 
 
 B) I am quite sure I will be able to recognise this answer 
 
 C) I will have to guess 
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PART B: RECOGNITION SECTION 
 
 
1) In which country did Chess originate? 
England 
Germany 
India  
Italy 
 
2) Which system in the human body controls hormones? 
Circulatory system 
Endocrine system 
Immune system 
Reproductive system 
 
3) Which US president was shot 5 days after the end of the American civil war? 
George Washington 
Thomas Jefferson 
Abraham Lincoln 
John Adams 
 
4) Which team sport has periods of play called 'chukkas'? 
Baseball 
Hockey 
Polo 
Rugby 
 
5) Which language has the most native speakers? 
Bengali 
English 
Mandarin Chinese 
Spanish 
 
6) What device mixes air and petrol (gas) for the internal combustion engine? 
Carburettor 
Choke 
Crankshaft 
Cylinder 
 
7) Which is the largest planet in our solar system? 
Saturn 
Pluto 
Neptune 
Jupiter 
 
8) What is the capital city of Norway? 
Helsinki 
Oslo 
Paris 
Dubrovnik 
 
9) In which country will the 2008 Olympic Games be held?  
England 
China 
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India 
France 
 
10) How many strings does a violin have?  
4 
5 
6 
8 
 
11) What do we call a shape with 8 sides? 
Hectagon 
Polygon 
Octagon 
Dodecahedron 
 
12) Who developed the theory of relativity? 
Francis Galton 
Louis Pasteur 
Isaac Newton 
Albert Einstein 
 
13) Which chemical element is represented by the symbol N?  
Nitrogen 
Oxygen 
Nickel 
Hydrogen 
 
14) In which country is Mount Everest? 
Thailand 
Italy 
Nepal 
Brazil 
 
15) On which continent is the Sahara desert? 
Europe 
Asia 
Africa 
North America 
 
16) Which pop singer married British movie director Guy Ritchie? 
Britney Spears 
Madonna 
Kylie Minogue 
Christina Aguilera 
 
17) Who wrote Tess of the D’Urbervilles? 
Charles Dickens 
Robert Louis Stevenson 
Oscar Wilde 
Thomas Hardy 
 
18) Which rock group did George Harrison belong to? 
The Rolling Stones 
Pink Floyd 
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The Beatles 
ACDC 
 
19) Who developed the theory of evolution by natural selection? 
Charles Darwin 
Albert Einstein 
Isaac Newton 
Francis Galton 
 
20) What gas do plants absorb from the atmosphere? 
Oxygen 
Carbon Dioxide 
Hydrogen 
Helium 
 
21) What is the study of plants called? 
Astronomy 
Cardiology 
Botany 
Zoology 
 
22) What is the capital city of Sri Lanka? 
Bangkok 
Delhi 
Colombo 
Beijing 
 
23) Who won the 2003 Wimbledon women's tennis championship? 
Serena Williams 
Maria Sharapova 
Jennifer Capriati 
Lindsay Davenport 
 
24) What does an orchestra's conductor wave to keep time? 
Wand 
Baton 
Stick 
Pen 
 
25) What nationality was Mozart? 
Austrian 
Swiss 
Norwegian 
German 
 
26) Which rock group is Michael Stipe the lead singer of? 
INXS 
Guns n Roses 
Coldplay 
REM 
 
27) Triton is a moon of which planet? 
Jupiter 
Saturn 
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Pluto 
Neptune 
 
28) For what process do plants need sunlight, CO2 and water? 
Photosynthesis 
Cell adhesion 
Pigmentation 
Lysogeny 
 
29) Which physicist wrote a book called “A Brief History of Time”? 
Albert Einstein 
Stephen Hawking 
Richard Dawkins 
Steven Pinker 
 
30) In which organ of the body is the cerebrum found? 
Heart 
Liver 
Brain 
Lung 
 
31) In which country is the world’s highest waterfall? 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Canada 
Zimbabwe 
 
32) What is South America’s highest mountain range? 
Andes 
Himalayas 
Pennines 
Alps 
 
33) What is the capital city of Kenya? 
Livingstone 
Kampala 
Nairobi 
Johannesburg 
 
34) Which instrument did the jazz musician Miles Davis play? 
Saxophone 
Piano 
Trombone 
Trumpet 
 
35) Which is the largest stringed instrument in a classical orchestra? 
Violin 
Double Bass 
Cello 
Viola 
 
36) Which artist painted the Mona Lisa? 
Leonardo da Vinci 
Pablo Picasso 
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Vincent van Gogh 
Henri Matisse 
 
37) What is a killdeer? 
An American bird 
A hunting jacket 
A rock used as a boat anchor 
A theatrical critic 
 
38) What was the name of Charles Darwin’s ship? 
The Enterprise 
The Beagle 
The Santa Maria 
The Endeavour 
 
39) In the fairy tale “Hansel & Gretel” what is the witch’s house made of? 
Chocolate 
Cake 
Gingerbread 
Sugar 
 
40) Who invented the aeroplane? 
Orville & Wilbur Wright 
Alfred B Nobel 
Alexander Graham Bell 
Thomas Alva Edison 
 
41) Who invented the microphone? 
Alexander Graham Bell 
Michael Faraday 
Elisha G Otis 
John Boyd Dunlop 
 
42) Which ocean is the deepest? 
Atlantic 
Indian 
Pacific 
Arctic 
 
43) Who was the Roman messenger God? 
Pluto 
Mercury 
Apollo 
Mars 
 
44) Cochineal is used to dye food red, what is it made from?  
A plant 
A beetle 
A Mineral 
A Fish 
 
45) How many standard bottles of wine does a rehoboam bottle contain?  
2 
4 
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6 
8 
 
46) How many states are there in the US? 
a. 49 
b. 50 
c. 51 
d. 48 
 
47) Who wrote Animal Farm? 
Franz Kafka 
Aldous Huxley 
Charles Dickens 
George Orwell 
 
48) What is the currency of Russia? 
Ruble 
Peso 
Franc 
Dollar 
 
49) Who wrote a famous diary while hiding from the Nazis in Amsterdam? 
Helen Keller 
Edith Piaf 
Anne Frank 
Stella McCartney 
 
50) In which city is the cathedral of Notre Dame? 
Paris 
London 
Rome 
Madrid 
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Appendix v: Words used in the “Recollective Experience” task 
 
 
Presented words Kucera-Francis Frequency 
Back   967  
Court   230  
Heart   173  
Sago   1  
Man   1202  
Presage  1  
Surface   200  
Life   715  
Obverse  1  
Right   613  
Moment  246  
Mica   1  
Time   1599  
Kale   1  
Road   197  
Well   897  
Glanders  1  
World   787  
Office   255  
Fay   1  
Job   238  
Data   173  
Part   500  
Clod   1  
Three   610  
Bathos   1  
Earth   150  
Good   807  
Amide   1  
Church   348  
  
Distractors  Kucera-Francis Frequency 
Long   755  
Board   239  
Arbor   1  
Cost   229  
State   808  
Layette   1  
House   591  
Door   312  
Way   909  
Halma   1  
Field   274  
Island   167  
Day   686  
Finial   1  
Market   155  
North   206  
People   847  
Extern   1  
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Question  257  
Sound   204  
Capstan  1  
Morel   1  
Year   660  
Wall   160  
Small   542  
Barium   1  
Rand   1  
Thought  515  
Parry   1  
Work   760  
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Appendix vi: Source Monitoring Task 
 
 
This task is about memory. I am going to put some of these objects in pairs, and I 
am also going to ask you to put some of these objects in pairs. I will tell you which 
ones to pair, and we will take it in turns. We are going to do this once now with 
this set of objects, and again later with a different set of objects. I want you to try 
and remember which objects we pair together, who puts them in pairs (me or 
you), and whether we put them in pairs in this first session or in the next session. 
Later on today and I going to give you a memory quiz to see how much you can 
remember. 
 
Set One: 
Condition Object 1 Object 2 
Watch  Bell  String 
Perform Baby  Balloon 
Watch  Cup  Key 
Perform Battery  Teabag  
Watch  Ball  Ring 
Perform Car  Envelope 
Watch  Triangle Mirror 
Perform Chair  Barrel 
Watch  Horse  Bulldog Clip 
Perform Block  Pen 
Watch  Tiger  Stapler 
Perform Torch  Scissors 
 
Set Two: 
Condition Object 1 Object 2 
Watch  Tape   Duck 
Perform Calculator  Cotton Bud 
Watch  Pencil Sharpener Ribbon 
Perform Hole Punch  Box 
Watch  Spoon   Button 
Perform Rubber Band  Shell 
Watch  Stamp   Lid 
Perform Coin   Postcard 
Watch  Computer Mouse Puzzle Piece 
Perform Screwdriver  Stickers 
Watch  Dinosaur  Matches 
Perform Bear   Paperclip 
 
 
Recognition Test. 
I am going to read out some pairs of objects now, and I want to tell you whether 
these were the pairs we made earlier or not. I also want you to tell me how 
confident you are that you are right, as a percentage between 0 and 100, where 
100 % is completely sure and 0% is not at all sure. 
 
Original Pairs 
Pair    Who paired Session 1/2? 
Cup/Key   Exp  1 
Dinosaur/Matches  Exp  2 
Rubber Band/Shell  EN  2 
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Car/Envelope   EN  1 
Triangle/Mirror  Exp  1 
Tape/Duck   Exp  2 
Battery/Tea Bag  EN  1 
Ball/Ring   Exp  1 
Calculator /Cotton Bud EN  2 
Pencil Sharpener/Ribbon Exp  2 
Bear/Paperclip  EN  2 
Baby/Balloon   EN  1 
Spoon/Button   Exp  2 
Bell/String   Exp  1 
Torch/Scissors   EN  1 
Coin/Postcard   EN  2 
 
Distractor pairs 
Computer Mouse/Stamp    
Chair/Pen    
Tiger/Horse    
Stickers/Hole Punch    
Bulldog Clip/Stapler    
Box/Screwdriver   
Block/Barrel   
Puzzle Piece/Lid   
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Appendix vii: Ethics Approval 
 
  
     
 
